Wage inflation in the U.K: 1951-1975, a switching regimes model by Hudson, John
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138135 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TIGHTLY 
BOUND 
COPY
Wage inflation in the U.K.: 1951 - 1975, A Switching Regimes Model
by
John Hudson
thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
to the
University of Warwick
Department of Economics
September 1979
ii
Table of Contents
Page
Acknowledgements 1
Declaration 1
Summary 2
List of Figures and Tables 3
Chapter 1 Introduction to the Thesis
Section 1.1 Introduction 8
1.2 Excess Demand Theories of Inflation 8
1.3 The Breakdown of the Phillips Curve 11
1.4 The Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve 14
1.5 Search Theories 23
1.6 Wage Bargaining Theories 28
1.7 The Effects of Incomes Policies 36
1.8 Recent Developments 40
1.9 Conclusion 42
Chapter 2 A Search Theoretic Model of Inflation and
Section 2.1
the Labour Market 
Introduction 48
2.2 Quits 52
2.3 Fires 59
2.4 Hires 63
2.5 The Hiring Wage 68
2.6 The Quit and Firing Wages 71
2.7 Conclusions 76
Chapter 3 An Initial Test of the Search Theory
Section 3.1 Introduction 80
3.2 The Relationship Between Unemployment and
Vacancies 81
iii -
Chapter 3 (cont.) Page
3.3 Negativity and Convexity Conditions for the
U-V Curve 86
3.4 The Data 91
3.5 The Results 95
3.6 Conclusion 103
Data Appendix to Chapter 3 106
Chapter 4 A Review of the Literature on Expectations
of Inflation
4.1 Introduction 108
4.2 Theories of Expectation Formation 109
4.3 A Theoretical Evaluation of the Differing Theor-
ies 111
4.4 An Evaluation of the Optimality Criteria 122
4.5 Empirical Evidence on Expectation Formation 127
4.6 Incorporating Expectations into the Wage
Equation 144
Chapter 5 An Empirical Analysis of the Formation of
Expectations
Section 5.1 Introduction 148
5.2 The Data 148
5.3 The Problem of Perceptions 152
5.4 The Results 156
5.5 Conclusion 167
Chapter 6 Expectations and Uncertainty
Section 6.1 Introduction 169
6.2 Individual and Cross Section Uncertainty 169
6.3 The Data 175
6.4 Empirical Representation and Results 181
-i V “
Chapter 6 (cont .) Page
6.5 Conclusion 188
Chapter 7 An Empirical Analysis of the Wage Equation
Section 7.1 Introduction 190
7.2 The Data 190
7.3 The Specification of the Disturbance Term 195
7.4 The Results: 1951(1) - 1969(2) 202
7.5 The Effects of Incomes Policies 214
7.6 The Period after 1969 219
7.7 Conclusion 220
Data Appendix to Chapter 7 223
Chapter 8 A Switching Regimes Model
Section 8.1 Introduction 226
8.2 The Individual Worker's Aspiration Wage 231
8.3 The Trade Union Leader's Target Wage 239
8.4 The Employer's Competitive Wage 241
8.5 An Analysis of the Wage Bargaining Process 244
8.6 Empirical Formulation 249
8.7 The Link Between the Worker's Aspiration Wage
and Permanent Income 259
8.8 Conclusion 263
Chapter 9 Conclusion
Section 9.1 A Restatement of the Central Theme 265
9.2 Subsidiary Themes and Conclusions 266
9.3 Comparisons With Other Theories 272
9.4 Policy Implications 276
Data Appendix 286
Bibliography 308
Acknowledgements
The C.I.E.B.R. provided funds for a years full-time research on the 
thesis. I would also like to thank Bob Lindley and the other members of 
that unit for helpfull advice throughout that year. Prior to that, as a 
research assistant at Durham, I received helpfull suggestions from the 
members of the Economics Department, particularly Dr. Van Doom. My first 
supervisor at Warwick was Professor Williamson who also made several 
usefull suggestions. Upon his departure to S. America Ben Knight became 
my supervisor and it is to him that I owe the largest academic debt. He 
has provided many suggestions and ideas, both on style and content, which 
are particularly evident in the crucial eighth chapter, but having done this 
he has always been willing to let the final decision rest with me. My final 
debt is to my wife and familly who have borne with great patience a very 
difficult time.
Declaration
The work on the U-V curve in chapter 3 was largely based on a joint 
working paper with Dr. Van Doom, "The Relationship Between Unemployment 
and Vacancies in Great Britain", Discussion Paper No 77-16, Department of 
Economics, University of British Columbia. (Parts of chapter 2, also drew 
on this work).
The work on expectations in chapter 5 was largely based on a paper 
published in 1978, "Expectations of Wage Inflation and their Formation",
Applied Economics.
-2-
Summary
This thesis has been primarily concerned with explaining why excess 
demand based theories appear to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
inflation prior to 1969, but appear to break down after that date. This 
explanation took the form of a synthesis between such theories and wage 
bargaining ones.
Each of these theories emphasise aspects of the inflationary process 
which the other ignores. Excess demand based theories emphasise the role 
of the employer, but ignore that of the trade union, whilst wage bargaining 
theories do the opposite.
Thus the employer will seek to pay a wage, which we call the competi­
tive wage, based on the ease with which labour can be attracted and 
retained. The more difficulties he is experiencing, the higher the competi­
tive wage will be. The wage the trade union leader seeks to negotiate will 
be that which satisfies some mimimum proportion of his membership. It is 
this which we call the union leader's target wage.
If, in the wage negotiations, the competitive wage exceeds the target 
wage, then this is the wage that will be"negotiated". This is, we argue, 
in fact the situation which existed prior to 1969, and this is why excess 
demand based theories appeared to be satisfactory in this period. If, 
however, this is not the case, then we are in a more genuine bargaining 
situation, which is what we argue has happenned several times since 1969.
In developing this theory several subsidiary themes emerge, e.g., the 
importance of profits within an excess demand framework, the problem of 
perception with respect to expectations, the specification of the error term 
in the wage equation and the link between the worker's aspiration wage 
and permanent income. We also examine the search process, the degree of 
certainty with which expectations are held and the relationship between 
union leaders and their membership.
' - ' . . ‘-V ■ V- '~ '
r  1 • ' J ’ • ’ " :V  * ' *' -l \* '“. '.* *-*■ ' Jvr-J, • M - ■•■v^' •
-3-
List of Figures and Tables
Figures Page
1.1 Demand and Supply in the Labour Market 19
1.2 The Effects of an Increase in Demand 21
2.1 The Distribution of Wage Offers 50
2.2 The Effects on Search Productivity of Unemployment and 
Vacancies 52
2.3 Determination of the Optimum Search Time 54
2.4 The Effects on the Worker's Search Strategy of an 
Increase in Vacancies 55
2.5 The Employed Workers Perceptions of Current Wage Offers 57
2.6 The Changing Relationship Between the Employee's Own 
Wage and Current Offers 57
2.7 The Job Searcher's Acceptance Curve 63
2.8 The Employer's and Employee's Acceptance Curves 65
3.1 The Observed Segment of the U-V Curve 85
3.2 The Relationship Between Vacancies and Fires, Quits
and Hires 89
3.3 The Combined Effects of Unemployment and Vacancies
Upon the Labour Market Flow Variables 90
3.4 Estimates of the U-V Curve 101
4.1 The Carlson-Parkin Expectations Series 136
5.1 Actual and Expected Rates of Inflation 1967 - 1976 153
5.2 Perceived and Actual Inflation 155
5.3 Structural Changes in the Inflationary Process 164
6.1 The Maze Example 170
6.2 The Proportion Who Decline to Answer the Survey Question 176
6.3 The Standard Deviation of the Distribution of Expectat­
ions 177
l i t .
-4- 1
Figures Page 1
7.1 Possible Annual Fluctuations in the Wage Level 197 |
7.2 The Wage Rate 198 1
7.3 An Example of Non-Linear Serial Correlation 209 1
7.4 Residuals from Equation (7.21) 210 1
7.5 The Quarterly Rate of Wage Inflation: 1951(1) - 1969(2) 211 1
7.6 Residuals from Equation (7.18) 222 1
8.1 The Effect of a Strike on the Worker's Minimum 1 
Acceptable Wage 229 1
8.2 Distribution of Union Members' Aspiration Wages 239 1
8.3 Disputes over Wages 252 1
8.4 The Residuals from Equation (8.8) 254 1
Tables
3.1 Summary of Regressions with Changes in Unemployment as 1 
the Independent Variable 96 1
3.2 Summary of Regressions with Unemployment as the 1 
Independent Variable 97 1
3.3 Summary of Regressions with Log Vacancies as the 1 
Independent Variable 98 1
4.1 Turnovsky and Wachter's Results 129 1
4.2 Carlson and Parkin's Results 141 1
4.3 Summary of the Various Studies of Expectation Formation 141 1
5.1 The Annual Rate of Inflation: 1960 - 1966 154 1
5.2 Incomes Policies Introduced in the Sample Period 157 1
5.3 The Almon Lag Estimates of an Extrapolative Model 159 1
7.1 Politico-Economic Events which Coincide with Peaks in 1 
the Wage Inflation Series 213 B
7.2 Comparisons of Predicted and Actual Inflation Rates 214 1
8.1 Summary of Different "Income" Terms 237 B
f
-5-
Tables
8.2 Summary of Different Wage Concepts
8.3 A Comparison of the Competitive and Aspiration Wages 
1960(2) - 1975(4)
Page
249
262
-8-
Chapter 1
Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive survey 
of the work on wage inflation. This has been done elsewhere, to varying 
degree's of thoroughness (Mulvey and Trevithick (1975), Laidler and Parkin 
(1975), Gordon (1977), Fleming (1976)). Instead we will be laying the 
foundations upon which the thesis can be built, by examining certain 
contributions and trends within the literature. Because of this there will 
be a bias to considering the theoretical side of the literature and ignoring 
somewhat empirical contributions. Within this framework we shall also 
occasionally be calling attention to what seem to us to be certain 
deficencies in the theories and reconciling the different trends.
There appear to be two main trends or approaches to the problem of 
wage inflation. First there are those studies which see it essentially as, 
for want of a better phrase, an excess demand type phenomenon. The alternative 
is to see it in terms of a bargaining situation between bilateral monopolists. 
In this latter case,although the forces of supply and demand may influence 
the outcome, they may not be the most important factor. The degree of 
trade union militancy, which may not be governed by economic factors alone, 
may also affect the rate of wage inflation. We will begin by analysing work 
in the excess demand tradition and then turn to the trade union bargaining 
. approach.
1.2 Excess Demand Theories of Inflation
One of the earliest works which explicitly and in detail postulated a 
relationship between unemployment and inflation was Fisher's 1926 paper.
Fisher took the rate of change of prices as the independent variable, i.e.
-9-
the causation runs from price changes to unemployment in his words
"When the dollar is losing value, or in other words when the 
price level is rising, a businessman may find his receipts 
rising as fast, on the average, as this general rise, but 
not his expenses, because his expenses consist, to a large 
extent, of things which are contractually fixed ... Employ­
ment is then stimulated - for a short time at least."
In more recent times interest in such a relationship stems, not from Fisher, 
but from Phillip's classic paper (1958), where to quote Friedman (1975) he 
"rediscovered" this relationship. This rediscovery consisted of fitting a 
curve through observations in the unemployment-wage inflation plane for the 
period 1861 to 1913, when he came to compare post-war observations with 
this curve he found a "stunning correspondence". Phillips also found that 
actual observations tended to loop around this curve in, generally, an 
anticlockwise direction. Thus if unemployment was falling the rate of wage 
inflation would be higher than that indicated by the curve and vice versa if 
unemployment was rising. Phillips' rationale for these loops was not made 
entirely clear. Although Lipsey (1960) thought that he might have had some 
expectational mechanism in mind, whereby employer's might vary the strength 
of their bidding not merely in response to present need, but because of what 
they expect to need in the future. However as Lipsey also noted there are 
certain difficulties with this,and other possible explanations, and finding 
a rationale for these loops bacame a favoured occupation for economists for 
several years.
Finally Phillips postulated a restricted role for price increases which 
operates with a threshold effect. It is only when the cost of living rises 
more rapidly then money wages that these become operative. He claims that 
when money wages are rising more rapidly than the cost of living then
"... employers will merely be giving under the name of cost 
of living adjustments part of the increases which they 
would in any case have given as a result of their competi­
tive bidding for labour."
This hypothesis has not received much attention, nor been further
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developed. Trevithick and Mulvey, for example, find it "not particularly 
convincing". However it seems to us a hypothesis worth pursuing and we will 
be returning to this when we come to examine inflation in the 1970's.
One important implication of Phillips’ work is that it indicated the 
existence of a trade off between unemployment and inflation, e.g. the curve 
showed that at a rate of unemployment of about 2^% wages would rise at about 
2% p.a., which is consistent with price stability if productivity is also 
rising at 2%. The existence of this trade off generated a great deal of 
literature on the optimal combination of unemployment and inflation.
Although it is clear that Phillips had in mind the hypothesis that wage 
inflation was a function of excess demand in the labour market there was 
little in the way of theoretical justification for this. This had to wait 
until Lipsey's paper which basically, for the case of a single micro-labour 
market, postulated a wage reaction function dependent upon the ratio of 
excess demand for labour to total supply
W .= f (D. - N ) l i si
N . si
(111)
He then linked the rate of unemployment with the excess demand for labour
U = i e CD. - N ) i si
Nsi
( 1 . 2 )
and upon combining these two relationships we get a further one between 
wage inflation and unemployment
W.= f(g-1(U)) (1.3)
Lipsey's explanation of the loops is simply that in the upswing some 
some labour markets might lag behind others, pushing the Phillips curve to 
the right, whilst in the downswing the lag disappears hence the macro curve 
coincides with the micro curves. Ingenious as it is this explanation suffers
-11-
irora a number of flaws. Firstly relatively little in the way of justificat­
ion is given for the operation of the lags in this manner. Secondly it 
assumes identical micro-reaction curves, an assumption which has been called 
into question by, for example, Bowers et al (1970) and Sargan (1971).
An alternative explanation for these loops,which can be made compatible 
with the rest of Lipsey's theory, was put forward by Hines (1971). He 
proposes that vacancies and unemployment are not related in a linear manner. 
But when excess demand is rising vacancies will rise more rapidly than 
unemployment falls and vice versa when excess demand is falling (the reasons 
for this will be examined in detail when we come to consider specifically 
the relationship between unemployment and vacancies). Thus unemployment will 
understate the true level of excess demand when it is rising and overstate 
it when it is falling. Hines claims that a valid proxy for excess demand is 
provided by the level of unemployment together with the rate of change of 
unemployment. This then would seem to offer an explanation for the loops 
which suffers from none of the drawbacks of either Phillips' or Lipsey's.
1.3 The Breakdown of the Phillips Curve
This concept of a relationship between the level of unemployment and 
the rate of change of wages quickly became accepted by economists. As an 
empirical concept it seemed beyond dispute, in addition Lipsey's analysis 
seemed to have provided the basis for a satisfactory explanation. Thus 
Corry and Laidler in 1967 were able to write
"It is apparent that the Phillips curve has been absorbed 
rather rapidly by the profession, a tribute to the great 
insight furnished in Professor Phillips' orignal article 
and also to the high quality of subsequent literature."
In the opinion of most of the "profession" the only remaining questions 
were mainly peripheral ones, such as those surrounding the trade off.
Unfortunately, as so often happens, this feeling of satisfaction was
rudely shattered by actual events. The U.K. Phillips curve appeared to 
shift substantially and unpredictably to the right in 1966/7 and again in 
1969/70, this latter shift being replicated in most other developed.countries. 
In the face of this many economists attempted to reconstruct the Phillips 
curve in a manner which could account for these shifts. This reconstruction 
took place on two planes, the first revolved around attempts to improve 
upon registered unemployment as a measure of excess demand. The second was 
more fundamental and involved a reconstruction of the theoretical framework 
proposed by Lipsey, which led to what has become known as the expectations 
augmented Phillips curve.
Those economists who argued that unemployment was a less than adequate 
measure of excess demand noted that there was also an apparent shift in the 
relationship between unemployment and vacancies (Bowers et al (1970)).
Possible reasons for this shift, which also implied a shift between unempl­
oyment and excess demand, included the introduction of earnings related 
benefits in October 1966, which had the effect of almost doubling 
unemployment benefit payable to a man who had previously been recieving 
average earnings, the introduction of statutory redundancy payments in 
December 1965 and various labour shake-out hypotheses.
Because of this it has been argued that vacancies give a more accurate 
measure of excess demand than unemployment and Trevithick and Mulvey report 
that the vacancy rate performs considerably more satisfactorily than the 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable in the wage equation for the 
years 1966-69, but that in 1970 and 1971 this too seems to break down.
In a similar vein Simler and Telia (1968) used a "labour reserves" 
variable based on variations in participation rates. Taylor,in a series of 
papers (1970, 1972 and Godfrey and Taylor (1973)), has used a measure of 
unemployment which includes estimates of hoarded labour. The results of such 
exercises are somewhat contradictory, Perry (1971) and Taylor (1970) found
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that including hidden unemployment in the regressions for the U.S. did not 
improve the results wheras Simler and Telia found that they did. For the 
U.K. Taylor (1972) and Godfrey and Taylor found hoarded labour to be a 
significant factor, though this only seems to apply to the rate of change 
of earnings corrected for overtime and not to the wage rate change equation.
Thus this line of approach seems less than satisfactory. Economists, 
faced with the apparent breakdown of the Phillips curve seemed to be 
replacing registered unemployment with anything which appeared to work.
They then, sometimes, attempted to find a theoretic justification for their 
superiority over unemployment as a measure of excess demand in the labour 
market. Consider, for example, Taylor's justification for the importance of 
labour hoarding. He argues that the correct measure of excess demand would 
take account of hidden unemployment and hoarded labour. The argument for 
hidden unemployment is the stronger of the two, although even here there 
are difficulties. It can be divided into several components, firstly those 
workers who are actively involved in search for employment but have not 
registered as unemployed, probably because they do not qualify for 
unemployment benefit.Secondly there are those, not actively engaged in 
search, but who would take a job "if one came along". The first of these 
components will probably have a stronger influence on wage inflation than 
the second.
The justification for hoarded labour is, however, more tenuous. Whether 
they are actively engaged in productive work or not, the fact remains that 
they are employed. They do not represent an excess supply of labour because 
they are not actively engaged in looking for employment or,in offering their 
services in the job market, for their services have already been bid for, 
and in excess demand terms it matters little as to the possible motives of 
the employer in bidding for them. To stress the point again, they do not 
represent an excess supply of labour because they are already employed.
-14-
Although, in another context.it could be argued that as these workers are 
not currently engaged in productive work the employer will not be so keen 
to bid for more workers as he might otherwise be. This might be quite valid 
but in this case it would appear that hoarded labour is acting as a proxy 
for "employer's keeness" to bid for labour, and it does not seem valid to 
place it in the equation on the same grounds as registered unemployment, 
which is there to represent the excess of supply over demand. If hoarded 
labour is to be included in the equation as a proxy for employer keeness 
then it should properly be entered as affecting the speed with which the 
market responds to excess supply, not as a component of excess supply itself.
Similar comments can also be made about the work of Bowers et al. If, 
for example, the relationship between unemployment and vacancies has shifted 
this might imply not only a shift between unemployment and excess demand, 
but also one in the opposite direction, between vacancies and excess demand.
1.4 The Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve
The second line of approach,aimed at rehabilitating the Phillips curve, 
involved a much more fundamental reappraisal of the theoretical framework 
proposed by Lipsey. Once again within this general reappraisal there appear 
to be two fairly distinct approaches. The first was developed by Friedman 
(1968), and involved a more rigorous application of the commodity market 
approach. The second approach was developed basically by Phelps (1968), 
Mortenson (1970) and Holt (1970), but has been expanded upon by other 
economists. In some respects it is more revolutionary than Friedman's 
approach as it abandoned the perfectly competitive labour market assumption 
made, implicitly or otherwise, by Lipsey and Friedman. In addition it is, 
as developed by Mortenson for example, a dynamic theory, in the sense that 
the decision makers are not restricted to considerations of the present
alone. However a more detailed consideration of this approach will have to
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be postponed until we have examined the contributions made by Friedman and 
others who have been influenced by him.
Friedman argues that the relevant wage rate in (1.1) is the real wage 
and not the money wage. In addition, as both potentialemployers and 
potential employees envisage the employment contract covering a fairly 
long period, it will be the anticipated real wage not the current real wage 
which is relevant. The "Phillips curve" can then be written as
W - P® = f(U ) (1.4)
or
W = f(Ut) + P® (1.5)
where P® is the expected rate of price inflation over some future period. 
This equation is known as the "price expectations augmented Phillips curve". 
Friedman also argued that for short periods price inflation expectations 
might lag behind actual inflation, but given a constant inflation rate 
expectations would eventually equal inflation. If we also make the 
assumption that in the long run the rate of price inflation equals the rate 
of wage inflation plus a constant, k, which may be negative and represents 
the rate of productivity and any other long term effects on the inflation 
rate, then we can rewrite (1.5) as
I> = f(U ) + P® + k (1.6)t t t
It then follows that, if the coefficent on expectations is equal to unity 
(which is implicit in the way the equations have been presented), any trade­
off between unemployment and inflation will disapear. Thus in the long run 
there is only one possible sustainable level of unemployment, which is 
known as the "natural rate of unemployment" and is given by the following
formula
-16-
U = f-1(-k) (1.7)
If the unemployment rate is below this level then it will lead to a rate of 
wage inflation higher than the growth in productivity and hence to price 
inflation, this in turn will generate price inflation expectations which 
will further increase the rate of wage inflation and so on. This hypothesis 
has come to be called the accelerationist or the natural rate hypothesis, 
as a policy of trying to hold unemployment below the natural rate must lead 
to an ever accelerating inflation. Similarly a rate of unemployment above 
the natural rate would lead to ever accelerating deflation. It is therefore 
of little surpriseto learn that the coefficent on expectations in the 
augmented Phillips curve has become a subject of considerable interest to 
economists.
A great deal of empirical work has been done which has tried to
estimate this coefficent, the chief problem in this work is finding a
suitable measure for expectations of inflation. An early attempt to surmount
S
this was made by Solow (1969). He assumed expectations \;o be formed by an 
adaptive expectations mechanism and experimented with different parameters 
for this, choosing that which was most satisfactory in terms of statistical 
significance. From this he concluded that the coefficent on price expectatr 
ions was about 0.4, and significantly less than one. Solow therefore 
concluded that there was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
Other studies followed by, for example, Turnovsky (1972), Lucas and Rapping 
(1969), Saunders and Nobay (1972), Parkin, Sumner and Ward (1974) and 
Mcguire (1976). The results varied, most found expectations to be 
significant, some e.g. Parkin, Sumner and Ward found the coefficent to be 
insignificantly different from one, but this was by no means a universal 
conclusion.
These studies tackled the problem of proxying expectations in different 
ways, some generated an expectations series in a similar manner to Solow.
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Others used an expectations series derived from sample surveys, whilst 
Mcguire estimated expectations by treating them as coefficents on a dummy 
variable in a set of equations which besides the Phillips curve equation 
also included Fisher's nominal interest rate equation, a price change 
equation and a price expectation formation equation. On the other hand 
Sumner proxies expectations by using the difference between the real and 
the monetary rate of interest, and others have used still other methods.
In short considerable ingenuity has been expended in attempting to overcome 
the problem of proxying expectations of inflation. However it is far from 
clear that any of these has been wholly successfull as we shall see when we 
come to discuss expectations in greater detail. This, coupled with the lack 
of agreement in the empirical work means that the question as to whether the 
coefficent on expectations is unity is far from settled.
One important strand of the literature, developed by Lucas (1972) and 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) , builds upon an initial concept first put 
forward by Muth (1961). Muth proposed that certain expectations were 
rational in the sense that they were essentially the same as the predictions 
of the relevant economic theory. This implies that expectations of inflation 
and actual inflation differ only by a random forecast error. In this case, 
because there is no lag between inflation and expectations,there is no 
longer any possibility for even a short run trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation. A more detailed examination of this concept, together with 
the more general problem of expectation will wait until later in the thesis. 
For the moment we will restrict ourselves to the comment that in view of 
all the evidence that there is a short run trade-off, it seems surprising 
that anybody can seriously put forward a proposition which denies it. As 
Gordon (1977) observes Hall (1975) has shown that only 1.7% of the 
quarterly variation in United States unemployment during 1954-74 remains 
unexplained in a simple two quarter autoregression. Hall therefore concludes
that 98.3% of the variance must have been due to shifts in the natural rate
-18-
of unemployment, a proposition Gordon finds difficult to accept.
One possible reason why the coefficent on price expectations might not 
be unity is that price inflation below a certain level may be too small to 
be perceived, or that though perceived it is too small to make adjustments 
for in the labour market. This argument can be found in Eckstein and Brinner 
(1972), on the grounds that in "normal times", defined as any period when 
consumer prices have risen on average by no more than 2.5% p.a. over the 
previous two years, workers percieve and experience relatively little wage 
reduction. Consequently they have small incentive, when bargaining with 
employers to insist on obtaining money wage settlements proportionate to 
their expectations of price increase. Askin and Kraft (1974) when testing 
this hypothesis do find a non-linear effect, such that in normal times the 
coefficent on expectations is much less than in inflationary times, indeed 
in normal times it is insignificantly different from zero.
Johnston and Timbrell (1974) have also argued for a non-linear price 
expectations effect within a bargaining model. They argue that since price 
expectations are a crucial determinant of the size of the real claim and 
the vigour with which it is pursued it is not clear that it must enter the 
wage equation in a simple linear fashion, and that a plot of nominal wage 
claims against price changes over recent years would give a highly non­
linear relationship. In the empirical results they also find some support 
for this relationship.
A rather different line of development,found for example in both 
Gordon (1971) and Parkin, Sumner and Ward (1974), is to try and include not 
only the general price inflation expectations, which are relevant to the 
average worker, but also product price expectations, or actual product 
prices, which are the main concern of employers. Parkin, Sumner and Ward 
include three measures of price inflation expectations, one set relating to 
consumer prices and two others with specific reference to employers, one
for domestic and a second for export prices. It is worth noting that
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employers' expectations seem to be most important in that the sum of the 
two expectational terms relating to them is around 0.7, and that relating 
to consumers around 0.3.
Apart from the matter of expectations Friedman also differs from 
Lipsey and Phillips in another way. According to them the direction of 
causation runs from unemployment to inflation. In Fisher's ealier paper it 
is the other way round. Friedman has commented upon this difference and 
concluded that the fallacy lies with Phillips. The essence of his argument 
is as follows. In figure 1.1 EQ is the equilibrium employment level and 
(W/P)Q the equilibrium real wage. Initially he assumes a constant price 
level, now let something produce a widespead increase in nominal demand
Figure 1.1 Demand and Supply in the Labour Market
which leads employers to seek to hire more workers. As the workers have no 
reason to suppose a change in the price level their supply schedule will 
not shift. It will remain the solid supply curve in Figure 1.1. If we 
interpret P* as the price level perceived or anticipated by workers. To 
them it will appear as if the demand for labour has shifted to the right, 
to the dashed demand curve. At each nominal wage rate (also each real wage
rate as perceived by them) employers are seeking to hire more labour. The
new equilibrium will be A , involving a higher nominal and perceived wage
rate and a higher level of employment. This situation is only temporary as
employers come to recognise that prices in general have risen which leads
them to slide back down their supply curve from A to 0.w
Hence the direction of causality runs from an increase in prices and
then wages to an increase in employment and a reduction in unemployment.
This hypothesis has become widely accepted amongst monetarists in particular
Gordon writes that, with respect to a rational expectations model, the
monetary authority cannot cause even temporary changes in unemployment
unless it does the unexpected, any feedback type monetary type policy rule
which systematically incorporates past information becomes part of the
information set upon which expectations are formed, and hence cannot cause 
• • ethe deviation of P^ from P^, which is necessary for unemployment to diverge 
from the natural rate. Thus here too the direction of causality is from 
inflation to unemployment.
Friedman himself holds that the line of causality runs from something 
increasing demand in the product market, leading to increased demand in the 
labour market to increased wages, to increased employment, to reduced 
unemployment. Hence he appears to be criticising the Phillips-Lipsey 
framework in as much as unemployment is not a valid proxy for excess demand 
in the labour market. He appears to accept the fact that excess demand 
determines wage inflation, i.e. comes before a rise in wages in the logical 
chain of events. This then leaves us with several possibilities. If we are 
trying to establish a link between unemployment and wage inflation then the 
correct formulation within a Friedman framework would be
Ut = U° + f(W® - w") (1.8)
e nwhere is the worker's real wage as he perceives it, and is the real
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wage consistent with the natural rate of unemployment. Alternatively if we 
are attempting to explain wages then this should be linked to excess 
demand for labour. It is not valid within a general monetarist framework, 
based upon Friedman's work, to use unemployment as the independent variable 
and inflation as the dependent one, although this is what may economists, 
including monetarists, have done. However it may be valid to use some other 
measure of excess demand as the independent variable.
There are, however,serious difficulties with Friedman's theory, which 
is essentially a static one, despite his claims to the contrary. It is 
developed in terms of wage levels and not rates of change, the latter being 
a dynamic concept. Moreover the theory is developed within a market 
clearing framework, yet, and this applies equally as well to Lipsey, the 
market does not clear, at the end of the period there are always some 
unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies.
In order to cope with inflation the theory must be made dynamic. One 
simple way of doing this is to take the simple static analysisof Friedman 
in successive periods. We will begin with the same assumptions as Friedman. 
Figure 1.1 represented the labour market as seen by the workerand is 
reproduced below, but this time with money wages on the vertical axis.
Figure 1.2 The Effects of an Increase in Demand
Money 
wages D
G,n E ' Employment
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Initially we suppose the economy to be in equilibrium, at the natural rate 
of unemployment, with no inflation. Let us then suppose that something then 
happens to cause an increase in demand in the goods market, leading to an 
increase in prices, which leads to entrepeneurs attempting to increase their 
labour force, in the process of which they offer higher money wages to the 
employee. He, in turn, has not yet percieved the rise in prices and believes 
the demand curve has shifted to D'D', employment then increases to E'. Let 
us further assume that in the next period product market conditions are 
such that prices again rise, leading the demand curve to shift to D ^ D ' 1, 
what happens to the supply curve? This depends upon what happens to 
expectations. If employees are forming expectations in an adaptive manner 
about the price level, then the curve SS will shift up by an amount 
determined by how quickly expectations adapt. But Friedman's argument is 
not couched in terms of price level expectations, but price change expecta­
tions, which seems to imply that people fully percieve the price level in 
any one period and base their expectations of future price levels by adding 
to the present price level the expected rate of change. Yet if people fully 
perceive the price level the curve SS begins shifting up as soon as prices 
change. Thus, if one insists on introducing expectations of inflation into 
the picture, there is no relationship between unemployment and inflation.
A further criticism of both Friedman and Lipsey is that their theories 
are developed within market clearing frameworks. Figure 1.1 tells us 
nothing about unemployment, indeed it is based upon the assumption that 
there is no unemployment, i.e. the market always clears. The reasons why the 
market does not clear are simple, a worker is not in general looking for 
employment for one period only, but perhaps for an indefinite number of 
periods into the future. In a sense a worker who accepts a job in one period 
is not only committing himself to such a sale for that one period, but also 
probably for many periods after that. Perhaps this in itself, although 
making the commodity labour somewhat unique, would not prevent market
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clearing if it were not combined with certain other properties of the 
labour market, in particular the fact that it is not perfectly competitive. 
Workers do not have perfect information about what jobs are available, the 
characteristics of those jobs, nor, most importantly perhaps, the wage they 
are being offered at. Similarly employers do not have full information about 
unemployed workers searching for jobs, their characteristics, nor the wage 
they will accept the job at. Because full information is not available 
workers and employers may feel that there are gains to be made from search.
But if one is going to analyse unemployment within a search theoretic 
context then the whole of the analysis must be conducted within this context. 
It is not valid to add it on to a static market clearing theory, almost as 
an afler thought, as Lipsey and Friedman have done in a few "intuitive" 
paragraphs. Admitting that the market does not clear is also an admission 
that the market clearing hypothesis is not relevant. If one is going to 
justify the existence of both unemployment and vacancies on search theoretic 
grounds, then any relationship between unemployment and inflation will 
probably also have to be examined within a search theoretic context, it 
certainly cannot be examined within a market clearing one.
1.5 Search Theories
Interest in search theories began with a study by Stigler (1962) which 
emphasised the fact that labour markets were not characterised by perfect 
information and that individuals in order to gain information about the 
market needed to undertake search activities. Using this as a base Phelps, 
Mortenson, Holt and others (1970) produced a remarkable group of essays, 
which gave rise to what has become known as the "new micro-economic" approach 
to macro-economics. Much of this work is aimed at providing a theory 
consistent with the joint occurrence of unemployed workers and unfilled 
vacancies, and a negative relationship between wage changes and unemployment.
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The gist of Phelps' theory is that, given a constant differential 
between the firms wage rate and wages paid by other firms, a fall in the 
unemployment rate will tend to increase quits. At a sufficiently high quit 
rate, corresponding to a low level of unemployment, the firm will want to 
increase the differential between the wage it pays and the average wage 
paid elsewhere. Thus one role of unemployment in this theory, stems from its 
effect on quit rates, rather than any supposed underbidding for jobs by 
unemployed workers. The number of vacancies will also be relevant,as the 
more vacancies it has the more anxious it will be to fill them, in addition 
vacancies may affect quits. Hence the desired differential will be a function 
of the level of unemployment and the number of vacancies. The actual rate 
of wage change is then a constant proportion of the average desired 
differential. If we also take into account that wage contracts may last for 
some time into the future, then,in setting this differential, the employer 
will take into account expected future labour market conditions as well as 
present ones. Therefore, as with Friedman's model, expectations play a 
major role. However the relevant expectations are not about prices, as in 
Friedman's model, for Phelps believes that inflationary price expectations 
affect money wages only through their effect on expected vacancy and 
unemployment rates. Given the latter, a rise in the expected rate of 
inflation will have little or no effect upon the wage increases which a 
firm grants, provided that it expects other firms to hold the line over the 
money wage rates they pay. In Phelps' world it is therefore expectations of 
wage inflation, with a unit coefficent, which enter the wage equation, in 
order to maintain the desired differential over the wages others are 
expected to pay. The other variables in this equation being unemployment 
and vacancies.
Holt is also concerned with providing a theoretical basis for the 
Phillips curve. In doing this he pays slightly more attention to the specific 
problems of search than Phelps. Important, in this context, is the concept
of an aspiration, or acceptance, wage, which declines with the length of 
search. If the wage at which a job is offered to a specific worker is above 
his acceptance wage then he will accept the job, if not he will refuse it. 
Holt assumes that the wage from the last job is the initial reference for 
setting the acceptance wage, but that this is adjusted to take account of 
the worker's initial perception of his job opportunities. For example, when 
the labour market is tight, workers may reasonably raise their initial 
aspirations. Information on the state of the labour market being conveyed 
by factors such as the number of vacancies, the duration of unemployment 
that other workers have experienced, and the wages that are being offered. 
Thus for an individual worker the longer he is unemployed the lower his 
acceptance wage will be. Holt then assumes that the wage the worker is hired 
at will vary directly with his acceptance wage, and hence the hiring wage 
will also vary inversdy with the time he has been unemployed.
It follows from this that, upon aggregation, the average rate of change 
of wages between jobs, for all workers passing through the market, varies 
inversely with the average duration of unemployment. To obtain a Phillips 
curve relation from this, Holt links the average duration of unemployment 
to the number of unemployed workers, proposing that the two vary directly. 
Hence we get a relationship between the average rate of change of wages 
between jobs and the level of unemployment. To obtain the average rate of 
change for all workers, he also examines those workers who search and 
obtain other jobs whilst still employed, and those who obtain wage changes 
whilst remaining in the same job, because of a potential quit threat. Both 
of these problems are handled in similar vein to that of unemployed job 
searchers, and a Phillips curve emerges at the end of the analysis. It is 
perhaps worth noting that neither expectations of wage, or price, inflation 
enter Holt's analysis, although these could easilly be incorporated. If they 
were our initial impression is that it would be wage inflation expectations
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which would be most relevant.
Like Phelps and Holt, Mortenson was concerned with providing a search 
theoretic rationale ior the Phillips curve. Although, compared with these, 
he prefers to emphasise the optimisation problem facing the firm. In doing 
this, he makes the assumption that the job searcher acts as if he knows 
with certainty what his next offer will be. His optimisation problem then 
consists of comparing this with his current wage offer. Using this theory 
he then analyses the various flows in the labour market, and concludes that 
the rate of change in the firm's labour force depends upon the firm's own 
relative wage, and upon the unemployment rate in the market.
Mortenson then states the ith firms problem as one of maximising nett 
present worth
V = f !°R. (t)e-rt dt (1.9)
Jo i
where
Ri(t) = Pjit) F^N^t)) -W.(t)Ni(t) (1.10)
and F (N^) is the rate of production, Pi the price, the wage and the 
labour force. The firm's optimal wage employment policy is one for which 
the time path of Wi and maximise V, subject to the rate of change of 
the labour force equation and the initial employment level. As a result of 
this optimisation problems solution, by the various firms in the market, 
the rate of wage inflation is related to the unemployment rate, the ratio 
of the average product price to the average market wage, the rate of 
product price inflation expected by the firms in the market, the expected 
unemployment rate and the real interest rate.
There are several things to note here. Firstly, the ratio of the 
average product price to the average market wage is relevant, as this repr­
esents an improvement in the value of labour productivity relative to cost, 
and therefore increases the target level of employment. The real interest
rate enters because there are implicit costs in adjusting the level of 
unemployment. An increase in the real interest rate reduces the incentive 
to incur such costs, and therefore reduces both the target employment level 
and the rate of adjustment to it. Thus there are two concepts here, the 
target level of employment and the desired speed of adjustment. Given a 
constant adjustment rate, an increase in the target level of employment 
increases the desired rate of change of the labour force and hence the rate 
of inflation. Similar comments apply to an increase in the desired rate of 
adjustment given a constant target employment level.
Secondly it is the expected rate of product price inflation that 
Mortenson thinks is relevant. However he makes the assumption that firms 
expect their own product price and the average market wage rate to inflate 
at the same rate, hence one could reinterpret this conclusion as implying 
that both sets of expectations are in fact relevant. As to the direction of 
causality in Mortenson's paper, both unemployment and wage inflation are 
endogenous variables within a simultaneous system. Thus whilst the 
unemployment rate partially determines the desired differential of each 
firm and hence the rate of wage inflation, changes in the unemployment rate 
itself are partially determined by the difference between the actual rate 
of inflation and the rate of inflation expected by job searchers. Whilst in 
Phelps and Holt the direction of causality is from the levels of employment 
and vacancies to the desired differential and the rate of inflation 
(although there seem to be hints of a simultaneous relatiionship, but this 
is not really emphasised). Thus it is not true, or at least not the whole 
story, to say, as Gordon has, that in the Holt, Phelps and Mortenson papers 
the explicit line of causality is from prior wage changes to subsequent 
quit decision and resulting increase in unemployment.
These papers by Phelps, Holt and Mortenson appear to us to represent 
the most detailed theoretical analysis which has been done on wage inflation, 
in fact almost the only analysis which stands up to rigorous probing.
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Having said that, there are of course weakness's in these papers, both 
individually and collectively. The Phelps and Holt papers, for example, 
do not analyse the employer's decision problem in as great detail as 
Mortenson. Mortenson on the other hand does not give as much emphasis to 
the unemployed searcher's problem as Holt does, neither does he analyse the 
search process in as great detail as Holt. Rather he makes use of the 
fact that unemployed workers do not accept every job offer without really 
explaining why not. Finally none of these authors, or any since, has really 
succeeded in integrating into one theory the interaction of employer and 
employee search and the way this interaction affects the flows in the market 
and the rate of inflation. In addition there is also some truth in the 
comment that the models strain reality by forcing all entry to unemployment 
through the mold of voluntary quit decisions, with no explanation for firing 
or lay-offs.
1.6 Wage Bargaining Theories
A completely different approach, which to some extent predates the 
excess demand type of analysis, is to view wage determination as the 
outcome of a bargaining process, between employers on the one hand and trade 
unions on the other. A relatively early formulation of such a theory can, 
for example, be found in Shackle (1949). The survey presented here is not 
meant to be comprehensive of all the work done in thi§ tradition. Rather it 
aims at being representative or illustrative of such work in order to 
highlight the differences between this approach and the excess demand one.
Within this approach there are several different strands of development, 
not all of which we shall be concerned with here. For example, we shall not 
be examining the key sector hypothesis. Nor shall we be concerned with models 
which postulate that the principal thrust of union policy is to establish 
and maintain a certain differential over non-union wages, or to be 
involved in a fight over income shares. It may well be that, as a result of
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unionsi actions, a union/non-union differential is established. It may also 
be that, again as a result of unions' actions, the share of labour's income 
in the national cake increases over time. But it does not seem to me that 
these are a result of intentional planning, but rather a consequence of 
unions' actions in maintaining their workers standards of living. Thus 
explanations of inflation couched in terms of unions attempting to increase, 
either the union/non-union differential, or the share of labour in national 
income, seem to me to be ill concieved. These may well be the consequences 
of their actions, but they are not the cause. In partial support of this 
view is the considerable volume of evidence which shows that the union/non- 
union differential varies over time with the business-cycle (Lewis (1963)). 
Although, of course, this evidence is consistent with alternative theories.
However, we shall be looking at the literature which concentrates more 
directly on the baragining process itself and the economic variables which 
influence the outcome. One such variable, which has figured prominently in 
nearly all the literature, is profits. Kaldor (1959), for example, put 
forward the view that the rise in money wages depends upon the bargaining 
strength of labour which is closely related to the prosperity of industry. 
This determines both the eagerness of unions to demand higher wages, and 
the ability of employers to grant them.
A slightly more sophisticated analysis can be found in Eckstein and 
Wilson (1962). They analyse the variables, both labour and product market 
ones, which influence the cost of settlements and strikes to the bargaining 
participants. Thus on the trade union side members expect large settlements 
in good times, and make it difficult for union leaders to settle for less. 
Similarly, for employers, the disutility of large settlements varies with 
economic conditions. When demand is high and the market is considered tight 
firms have little concern that they will lose sales to their rivals, on the 
other hand when demand is low prices cannot be easilly raised, and wage 
increases are more likely to come out of profits. Secondly when profits
are low high wage settlements increase the risk of managements having to 
disappoint stockholders, and generally complicates managements’ financial 
problems.
In addition they also feel that the costs of strike action and the 
probability of winning vary with economic conditions. Thus in good times, 
when operating rates are high, the loss of profits during a strike are great. 
However alternatively, in many situations the hazard of losing customers to 
competitors is greater when the product market is not prosperous and 
competition is keener. On the union side the loss of payrolls is greater in 
good times, but the employees may be better able to stand the loss.
More recent work in this tradition has grown slightly more sophisticated.
Thus Johnson (1972) and Johnson and Timbrell (1973) propose a model whereby
0
the union makes a claim for a wage increase of amount AW . The employer's 
response is assumed to be determined by the principle of minimising his
expected costs. Important here is the employer's assessment of the real 
r©claim, AW , which is defined as the size of the offer that has to be made 
in order to reduce the probability of a strike to zero. The main conclusions 
of the theory are that the size of the wage settlement will be positively 
related to the employer's estimate of the real claim, the rate of time 
discounting used by the employer, the current rate of profit per unit of 
output or per man, the employer’s estimate of 6, the union's propensity to 
endure a strike and the subjective costs imposed by a strike on the 
employer. It will also be negatively related to the time-span over which 
the employer discounts.
The role of most of these variables is fairly obvious, and we shall not 
discuss them in great detail. Of special interest however, is the employer’s 
estimate of the real claim, which is largely unique to this model. There are 
several determinants of this, and in their analysis Johnson and Timbrell lay 
special emphasis upon price expectations. They argue that if unions are 
concerned with the real wage, then the higher they expect the rate of
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inflation to be the greater will be their wage claims and the vigour with 
which they are pursued. Thus leading a rational employer to increase his
They also lay special emphasis upon the effects of tax changes on real 
income. During the post-war years the retention ration, the ratio of nett 
to gross income, has been steadily falling for all workers. They put forward 
the hypothesis that unions attempt to allow for unfavourable movements in 
the retention ratio. Alternatively they suggest that unions have a target 
level of real wage growth and if actual growth falls short of this target, 
whether due to changes in the tax structure, unforseen price movements or 
whatever, then in succeeding years they will attempt to compensate for this 
shortfall. This latter argument is an extremely important one and the fore­
runner of more recent work in this direction.
As has been emphasised before this chapter is not designed to be a 
survey of all the literature, and the work we have examined so far only 
represents a small sample from a large population. Yet they are fairly 
representative of that population in several respects. Firstly the 
arguments are often phrased in rather loose verbal terms with a distinct 
absence of rigour. The main reason for this is probably the difficulty of 
assigning a specific role to trade unions within a general economic model - 
a problem we shall return to later. Secondly, in as much as they do examine 
the effects of trade unions upon wage inflation, they concentrate upon the 
variables which influence trade unions'demands, for example the level of 
profits and the rate of unemployment. An alternative strand of the literat- 
is more concerned with what might be called "militancy variables".
An obvious example of this kind of variable, which has been widely 
used, is some measure of strike activity (Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), 
Ashenfelter et al (1970), Taylor (1970) and Godfrey (1971)). There are 
obvious empirical problems in the use of such a variable, for example what 
is the appropriate measure, the number of strikes, days lost or workers
r©estimate of both AW and 6
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involved, should the measure be restricted to strikes over pay or should 
it include all strikes. But apart from these problems a major problem with 
the variable is that it lacks any firm foundation in economic theory. It 
has been used because it seems "intuitively plausible" that increased trade 
union militancy will be associated with an increase in strike activity. Yet 
is it not just as plausible to assert that increasing "employer militancy" 
might also be coupled with an increase in strike activity? A strike over 
money wages occurs because the employer makes an offer, which may merely 
be the continuation of the old offer, which the union finds unacceptable 
and no suitable compromise can be reached. It is by no means obvious that 
this will always be because the trade union is being more militant in its 
demands, rather than the employer becoming more militant in his offer. In 
the former case we would, of course, expect increased strike activity to be 
associated with larger than usual wage inflation, but in the latter case 
the reverse would be true.
An alternative measure,which does not suffer from this objection, has 
been proposed by Hines (1964). The gist of Hines’ argument is that trade 
union militancy is manifested in areas other than the actual wage bargaining 
process. Specifically he argues that unions would regard a successful 
membership drive as a prerequisite for success in the wage bargain.
Therefore when a union puts in a wage claim, it would seek immediately 
before and during the period of negotiation to increase it's bargaining 
power, by increasing the proportion of the labour force over which it has 
direct control. A measure of trade union militancy is therefore provided by 
the rate of change of the labour force which is unionised.
When tested empirically, by Hines and others, there does appear to be 
a significant relationship between wage inflation and this measure of 
militancy, both in the U.K. and the United States. However this has not 
resulted in any general acceptance of the hypothesis by economists, and eva- 
sinceit was first proposed there has been a constant battle between Hines
and his many protagonists. In particular his results have been criticised
on statistical grounds. But it remains true, that even when all the 
statistical irregularities have been removed from the regressions, the 
change in union density remains a significant variable within wage inflation 
equations (Purdy and Zis (1973)). Consequently much of the debate has 
centred around the economic interpretation that should be attached to this 
significance.
Purdy and Zis argue that workers will tend to join unions as a 
defensive measure to secure strike benefit when a strike seems likely. If 
the strike leads to an increase in wages this would then explain the 
statistical findings. It has also been suggested that,when trade unions 
secure wage increases, for whatever reason, the union may attract an 
increase in it's membership. However it seems to us that neither of these 
alternative explanations are any more convincing than Hines' orignal one, 
especially when it comes to explaining the very large increases in union 
membership lYhich occurred simultaneously with the wage explosion at the 
beginning of the 1970's.
A further criticism of this whole approach to the wage bargaining 
process is that the term militancy seems to be a catch-all phrase for almost 
anything which tends to increase wages or wage demands. One distinction 
that has been made, again by Purdy and Zis (1974), is between power and 
militancy. Power reflects the capacity to influence the bargaining process 
via, for example, strike action, whilst militancy reflects the will to 
exercise such power. However a second distinction may also be made, as we 
have already observed to some extent the militancy proxy variables have 
been used as substitutes for other variables, such as profits and unemploy­
ment, which influence the size of the union's claim and eventual settlement 
wage. But this concept of militancy is not in accord with the ordinary usage 
of the term. Perhaps a better practice would be to try and differentiate 
between unions' actions when faced with essentially the same set of
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economic conditions. If, in such a situation, one union pursues a wage 
claim in excess of that pursued by another union, then we can say that the 
first union is in some sense more militant than the second. If, however, the 
same union in one year is faced with a situation where profits are higher 
and unemployment lower than in a previous year, and it attempts to secure 
a higher wage increase than previously, is the union more militant than 
before, in the sense that it is somehow more aggressive? There are also 
questions of exactly who is being militant, the leaders of the union or the 
membership, and what exactly is the relationship between these two groups? 
These are questions which we shall consider later, but they bring us to a 
much more general point, which has been mentioned before. Trade unions have 
not been satisfactorily integrated, in any of these models, into 
economic theory (see, e.g., Rees (1962)).
Within an economic model trade unions are generally regarded as 
suppliers of labour, but what policy do they attempt to follow in selling 
that labour? Marshall (1920) suggested that in negotiating the wage bargain 
they would have regard to the necessity of retaining a sufficient supply of 
"capital and business-power" in the industry. Others speak of unions' aims 
as establishing a fair, just or standard rate for the job (the Webbs (1897)). 
However all these concepts are rather inexact, especially when compared with 
other actors on the economic stage, whose behaviour can be proxied by 
maximising models. Consequently economists have searched for some maximand 
which can be attributed to be at the base of union behaviour. Hicks (1932) 
suggested the wage rate. But perhaps the only example of a union following 
this policy irrespective of what is happenning to employment in the 
industry is the United Mine Workers in the United States.
Alternatively it has been suggested that unions take into account both 
the wage rate and possible effects on employment. Some economists have 
argued that these two aspects can be combined into one maximand - the wage­
bill. But there seems no compelling logic as to why this should be so, in
ithe same way as there is with utility maximising individuals, or even 
profit maximising firms. It must be recognised that the union is not one 
individual, but a collection of individuals each with their own interests, 
some of which may conflict with, or at least not coincide with, those of 
other members. In addition the union is an organisation with a hierarchy of 
"elected leaders”, whose interests are not entirely those of their member­
ship.
It is the recognition of this fact, in an extrordinarily perceptive 
paper by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), that has led to perhaps the best 
attempt at incorporating trade unions within an economic model. Although 
their paper is not basically concerned with wage inflation, but the related 
problem of strikes, it nonetheless contains a fairly concise staement of a 
bargaining theory of wage determination. Their starting point is that there 
are three parties involved in labour-management negotiations, the management, 
the union leadership, and the union rank and file. The objectives of the 
leadership are firstly, the growth and survival of the leadership as an 
institution, and secondly, the personal political survival of the leaders 
themselves. These two objectives are accomplished by satisfying the expect­
ations of the rank and file as well as possible. From an employer's point 
of view they argue that a strike could perform the function of reducing the 
minimal wage increase which is acceptable to the rank and file.
They then go on to argue that, initially, this wage will depend 
negatively on the unemployment rate as, when this is low the typical worker 
has the chance of moving to a higher paid job, but he will first try and 
secure a wage increase from his present job. In addition the leadership 
will be less likely to reduce this minimal wage aspiration when unemployment 
is low, because the employment effects of a large wage increase will have 
little effect upon their political stature, and a sizable strike fund may 
replace part of the workers' lost income. Finally there will be decreased 
opposition, among the rank and file, to a militant course of action, since
___  4
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there will be part-time opportunities for potential strikers.
They then argue that a second determinant of this wage should be a 
moving average of previous changes in real wages. Profits are also likely 
to be relevant on the grounds that, if the firms profits have been high in 
recent periods, the typical union member may feel that he deserves a larger 
wage increase. Also the motivation of the leadership to attempt the task 
of persuading the membership to be content with a lower settlement will be 
diminished.
Other studies which can be placed within a bargaining classification 
concentrate upon the different aspects of the bargaining problem, rather 
than view the problem as a whole,as Ashenfelter and Johnson have done. 
Nonetheless several useful concepts have emerged from these studies.
Runciman (1966), for example, introduced the notion of relative deprivation, 
by which when the growth of real income is low relative to expectations 
people come to feel "relatively deprived". These expectations are determined 
by people's own earlier experience, and on observations of other people's 
real incomes. Individuals then attempt to obtain wage increases which will 
bring their real wages in line with their desired real wage. Laidler and 
Parkin (1975) dismiss this hypothesis on the grounds that it either requires 
that people suffer from money illusion, or is in all essentials equivalent 
to Friedman's expectations hypothesis. Unfortunately they do not expand on 
this criticism, which to us is far from obvious. Indeed this concept of 
relative deprivation links up with important work by Henry, Sawyer and 
Smith (1976), to which we turn later.
1.7 The Effects of Incomes Policies
In addition to these two basic approaches to the problem of wage 
inflation,there are several questions which arise independently of them.
One of the most important of these being the impact of incomes policies, 
whether within a bargaining or excess demand framework. There has been
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considerable discussion, within the literature, as to whether there are any 
effects and if so whether they are only temporary in the sense that when the 
controls are removed there will be an effort, by workers and their 
representatives,to make good lost ground. Within a theoretical context 
incomes policies may affect inflation in different ways depending upon 
which model of inflation is being used.
In a Friedman-type excess demand framework incomes policies may work 
by changing the coefficients on the independent variables, unemployment and 
price expectations, by changing price expectations themselves, or by 
replacing this relationship with an altogether new one. Similarly,within a 
search theoretic framework, incomes policies may affect the coefficents on 
the independent variables, those independent variables directly or simply 
replace the search theoretic relationship with another. Similar comments 
apply to bargaining models. However such a description of the way incomes 
policies work is not adequate, it is not sufficient to say that with a 
specific model the coefficients may be changed by incomes policies, we want 
to know what theoretical reasons there are for supposing such a change.
Within the literature discussion of the theoretical rationale for such 
policies has been limited when compared with the empirical work on their 
effects. One place where there is some discussion of these theoretical 
aspects is in a paper by Lipsey and Parkin (1970). This is to some extent 
surprising, as the paper as a whole has come in for a good deal of 
criticism. However much of this criticism has been directed at the empirical 
content of the paper and it remains true that the theoretical analysis does 
make a valid contribution.
They adopt what is basically an excess demand framework, although they 
confuse matters by introducing a proxy for trade union pushfulness. Their 
justification being,that in such non-competitive situations as bilateral 
monopoly, there is a substantial range over which wages can be determined 
independently of economic variables and such considerations as bargaining
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strength, strategies adopted and possibly union aggressiveness become 
important. They also include the present period rate of change of prices 
as a proxy for expectations.
Within this general framework they then delineate a similar classific­
ation of the ways incomes policies can affect inflation as we have already 
done. They feel that the most likely result is that the "norm" established 
by the incomes policy, although intended as a maximum only, triggers off 
two other reactions. First some sectors of the economy regard the norm as a 
minimum as well as a maximum and other sectors may be forced to give higher 
wage increases than they would otherwise have done in order not to fall too 
far behind in relative wages. Secondly,the norm is not fully effective as a 
ceiling, but it does exert some downward pressure when wages would 
otherwise have exceeded the norm. The nett effect of this will be to make 
the Phillips curve flatter.
For the purposes of the empirical work they denoted the following 
periods as being ones when incomes policies wer in operation: 1948(3) - 
1950(3), 1956(1) - 1956(4), 1961(3) - 1964(3) and 1964(4) - 1967(2), this 
last date being the end of the sample period. Of these, they concluded that 
only the first, the policy operated by Cripps, exerted a significant 
downward effect on wages. In addition they found that the Phillips curve 
was swivelled in an anti-clockwise direction,during periods when incomes 
policies were operative, so that it became nearly horizontal and thus 
confirming their a priori expectations.
The Lipsey-Parkin paper aroused a great deal of criticism, much of it 
on statistical grounds. One of the most serious was that they included the 
current rate of change of prices in the wage equation, whilst ignoring the 
simultaneity problems that this gives rise to. There were also problems of 
serial correlation with the disturbance term, partially induced by their 
use of a four quarter moving average of wage inflation as the independent
variable.
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Godfrey (1971) in a follow-up paper allowed for both of these problems 
and concluded that it was not the case that incomes policies had been 
successful in breaking down the relationship between wage inflation and 
unemployment, but that no such relationship had existed since 1948. Against 
this, Parkin (1970), in a further paper, overcame both the statistical 
problems, though by using a different method to Godfrey, and found that 
the original conclusions remained substantially unaltered.
These contradictory results are reflected in the more general empirical 
work on incomes policies. For the U.K., Parkin, Sumner and Ward (1976) 
identify two periods of incomes policy, 1961(3) - 1962(2) and 1966(3) - 
1967(2). They found no significant effect for either. Similarly Tarling 
and Wilkinson (1977) claim that "incomes policies have repeatedly failed 
to achieve any of their stated objectives". Other authors, however, do find 
a significant role for incomes policies, for example Burrows and Hitiris 
(1972) and Sargan (1977). Finally Henry and Ormerod (1978), using a version 
of Henry, Sawyer and Smith's model (1976), which we shall discuss later, 
find that whilst some incomes policies have reduced the rate of inflation 
during the period in which they operated, this reduction has only been 
temporary.
Similar confusion is present with respect to the United States 
experience. Sheahan (1967) reported that a majority of the studies that 
attempted to measure the impact of the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts, 1962 - 
1967, supported the conclusion that the guideposts restrained the rates 
of wage and price inflation by between o.8% and 1.6% a year. However Gordon 
(1972) using different explanatory variables found no significant effect. 
Mcguire (1976) when investigating the effects of the Nixon wage controls, 
August 1971 - June 1973, found that they increased the rate of wage 
inflation. On the other hand he also found some evidence for an announcement 
effect on price expectations, which would tend to reduce the rate of
inflation.
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From this it can be seen that there is no clear agreement as to 
either the short or the long term effects of incomes policies upon wage 
inflation. Indeed there is even disagreement over the correct way in which 
to measure these effects within an econometric exercise. Most researchers 
have tended to use shift dummy variables. But Oi (1976), for example, thinks 
this is invalid, as it requires that the slope coefficents on the 
independent variables be equal during policy-off and policy-on periods. An 
assumption he thinks unlikely in view of his own empirical analysis and 
the theoretical arguments advanced by Lipsey and Parkin. Indeed, the whole 
practice of using dummy variables to proxy the effects of incomes policies 
is open to question and this is one of the points we shall be concerned 
with at a later stage.
1.8 Recent Developments
The recent trend has been away from excess demand based models of 
inflation, not only towards bargaining models, but to other ones as well, 
not all of which are economic in origin. Thus Williamson and Wood (1976), 
for example, question whether the expectations augmented Phillips curve 
is capable of explaining inflation in the U.K. between 1966 and 1975, They 
conclude that it is not and moreover that none of the accepted theories of 
inflation, as expounded by Laidler and Parkin (1975), seem capable of 
explaining the wage explosion which occurred in late 1969. They also 
conclude that sociological factors, such as the frustration of wage earners 
at having their expectations of real income growth disappointed, or the 
increasing militancy of trade unions in pursuing a set of mutually 
inconsistent claims, seem to offer a more plausible explanation of the wage 
explosion than alternative theories.
Such a conclusion is similar to the wage bargaining theories which 
we examined previously, particularly Runciman's theory of relative income 
deprivation. One of the first tests of this type of hypothesis was by
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Johnston and Tirabrell (1973). They found that the extent to which annual 
percentage changes in real wages, nett of taxes, fell short of some 
postulated constant had a significant effect on wage inflation. Though this 
result is somewhat qualified, as a simple tax retention ratio gives better 
results in terms of statistical significance. A more recent paper which 
develops a similar theme is that of Henry, Sawyer and Smith (1976), herafter 
referred to as HSS. They take a hypothesis originally developed by Sargan 
(1964), that trade unions bargain for real wages, but that the means to 
achieve a given real wage is to strive for a particular money wage increase 
in the light of expected price developments. This target money wage is then 
tempered by the prevailing level of unemployment, either reflecting the 
effects of excess demand or the bargaining strength of unions. Like Johnston 
and Timbrell they use real wages, or earnings nett of taxes. In the empirical 
work they further postulate that the desired real wage grows at a constant 
rate, which they find to lie between 2% to 2j% per annum, it tending to be 
higher when more recent periods are used.
HSS test this model and find that it outperforms several alternative 
ones. They conclude that the expectations augmented Phillips curve does not 
provide an adequate explanation of money wage changes in the U.K., nor does 
this approach indicate the presence of a negative relationship between 
unemployment and wage inflation. Neither do they find any support for the 
trade union pushfulness measure used by Hines. They do find "impressive 
support" for the modified Sargan model, and believe that their results lend 
support to a trade union bargaining approach.
On the policy side they find that the pay standstill of 1966(3) - 
1967(2) had an important effect on money wage movements. Thus providing 
evidence for the effectiveness of incomes policies. They also suggest that 
income tax concessions raising real take-home pay would slow down money 
wage increases, a point previously emphasised by Jackson, Turner and 
Wilkinson (1975). Finally they conclude that aggregate demand policies aimed
at reducing wage inflation via an increase in unemployment will produce
little or no effect upon the rate of wage change.
1.9 Conclusion
The most obvious point to emerge from this chapter is that, within the 
economic literature on inflation, there have been two distinct strands, the 
excess demand approach and the wage bargaining one. Until 1970 most 
economists accepted the excess demand approach as providing a fairly 
satisfactory explanation of inflation. But since then wage bargaining 
theories have become more accepted, as the view has grown up that the Phillips 
curve "no longer works”. Although in the rush to find an explanation for 
inflation in the seventies it is often forgotten that it did work for nearly 
a hundred years. It should also be mentioned that in recent years, even 
amongst economists, a multi-disciplinary approach, incorporating aspects of 
political science, sociology and psychology, has come into vogue (see, for 
example, Hirsch and Goldthorpe (1978)). However, fundamental to much that 
follows is the assumption that inflation is essentially an economic 
phenomenon. This is not to deny a role to other disciplines, but their's is 
essentially a supporting role and not a central one. For this reason these 
alternative approaches will not be developed here.
Also central to the thesis is an attempt to combine the two economic 
strands of inflation into a coherent whole. The basis for this idea is the 
belief that both strands seem to contain certain elements of truth and that 
more is to be gained from seeing how they can be regarded as complementary 
rather than, as they are generally presented, alternatives. If we may briefly 
expand on this, we will argue that in many cases the wage rate is the 
outcome of a bargaining process between employers and trade union leaders.
The objective of the trade union leaders in this is to secure a wage which 
will satisfy some minimum proportion of their membership, this we shall call 
the union leader's target wage. The employers on the other hand, will be
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willing to give a wage very similar to that which they would have given 
in a perfectly competitive labour market, taking into account the relative 
ease of attracting and retaining labour, this we will call the competitive 
wage. If this is sufficient to satisfy the trade union side then this is 
the wage that will get established. If, however, it is not, if the union 
leader's target wage exceeds the competitive wage, then we will argue that 
we are in a more genuine bargaining situation. Hence we are here faced with 
a rather unique example of a switching regimes model.
We then go on to argue that in the post-war period, until 1969, the 
competitive wage did in fact exceed the target wage. But that after that 
date there were several periods when this was not so. This we shall argue 
is the reason why excess demand type models work well until 1969. It is also 
the reason why after that date wage bargaining models seem to provide us 
with a better explanation. We can therefore claim to have reconciled two 
apparently conflicting models in a synthesis which is consistent with the 
evidence both prior to and after 1969. It is therefore this synthesis which 
is the central linking theme of the thesis.
To develop this synthesis we must look at the determinants of both 
the competitive and target wages. The next five chapters are devoted to 
the first of these concepts. In the second chapter the basic model is set 
out, this is, basically, a neo-classical search theoretic model whereby the 
existence of trade unions acts more as a catalyst rather than changing 
anything substantial. The neo-classical approach assumes that individuals 
are essentially rational in their decision making. Many economists believe 
that such a degree of rationality as is often assumed is unlikely and are 
critical of the whole approach. None the less it has been, and continues to 
be, widely used in economics and this is both our justification and defence in 
using it. The search theory itself is similar to others, but the interaction 
between employer and employee is developed more extensively than hitherto, 
particularly with respect to the hiring decision. One of the implications
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of the theory is that the higher the profit contribution of the average 
worker, the keener an employer will be to fill any vacancy, as the greater 
is the opportunity cost of not having it filled in terms of foregone 
profits. But in order to fill the vacancy more rapidly the employer must 
make it more attractive, possibly by increasing the wage rate at which it 
is offered. Hence we would expect high profits to be associated with rapid 
wage inflation. An alternative way of putting this, more in keeping with 
Lipsey's terminology, is that the speed of reaction of wages to excess 
demand varies directly with the net revenue contribution of the average 
worker. Moreover because productivity growth will tend to increase this 
over time we can expect, ceteris paribus, a gradual shifting outwards in the 
short run relationship between, for example, wage inflation and unemployment.
In the following chapter we present an initial test of this search 
theory in an area seperate to that of wage inflation. The reason for this 
is that most, if not all, of the variables which the search theory indicat­
es as being important, are also consistent with other, for example, bargai­
ning theories of inflation. Therefore any significance of these variables 
within a wage equation cannot be regarded as proof of the validity of the 
search theoretic interpretation, as opposed to a wage bargaining interpre­
tation. Indeed these cautionary remarks are valid for almost all of the 
empirical work that has been done on wage inflation. The significance of 
certain variables within the inflationary process can be established, but 
once this is done there is considerable licence as to what theoretical 
framework one chooses to interpret that significance. It is for this 
reason that we have devised an alternative test of the theory.
This initial test is based upon the fact that the theory is about 
the labour market as a whole, and as such it has implications for areas 
other than inflation. In particular we test its implications for the relat­
ionship between unemployment and vacancies. Thus if the theory can be 
accepted in this alternative context it would enable us to proceed to test
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its implications for inflation. It would also provide important confirm­
ation for our interpretation of any significance of the resulting explan­
atory variables, as furnishing proof for the validity of our search theory, 
as opposed to, for example, a bargaining theory. If, however, the theory 
cannot be accepted in this alternative context, there would be little 
point in pursuing it further.
An important role in the search theory is played by expectations of 
inflation, and it is with these that the fourth chapter is concerned. 
Basically it is a critical review of the theoretical and empirical litera­
ture on expectations. There is, as far as we know, no such summary article 
which has been published, and certainly nothing which attempts to combine 
these two strands of the literature.
The fifth chapter is concerned with empirical work on expectation 
formation, using data derived from the Financial Times Survey of Business 
Opinion.lt is from this empirical work that we are able to derive a series 
on expectations which can be used in the main empirical work in chapters 
seven and eight. In chapter 6 we are concerned with the degree of 
certainty with which expectations are held. There has been very little 
work in this area, and as such there were relatively few precedents upon 
which we could build. For this reason alone the arguments in this chapter 
are put forward very tentatively, with many reservations. But we feel that 
the area is potentially a very important one whose neglect is a matter of 
concern. A concern which is apparently shared by others, for example 
Laidler and Parkin (1975):
"Thus we have an important unsolved problem. The analysis 
of anticipated inflation needs to be so conducted that 
it covers all the varying extents to which inflation may 
be anticipated, including unequal expectations, and lack 
of certainty about them. We do not pretend to know how 
such integration is to be achieved, but a much clearer 
idea than we have at present of the way in which economic 
agents form expectations and the way in which they change 
their behaviour in the light of changed expectations will
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be required before we can expect to get very far with 
this problem."
This section of the thesis is then a first attempt to tackle certain 
aspects of the problem.
The next chapter represents the main empirical work aimed at testing 
the search theoretic model of inflation developed in chapter 2, particular 
emphasis being placed on the correct specification of the error term, an 
area which has also been relatively neglected. Initially this empirical 
work will be based on a sample base extending from 1951(1) - 1969(2), the 
latter date being chosen as it was about this time that excess demand based 
theories are supposed to have broken down. After having ascertained 
whether the theory is consistent with this earlier period, we will then 
turn to examine whether it is also consistent with events after 1969, or 
whether it too "breaks down".
In the event the theory also breaks down and in chapter 7 we face 
the task of explaining why this is so. As we have already said, this 
explanation takes the form of a synthesis between wage bargaining and 
excess demand models of inflation. Thus we argue that both these approaches 
contain certain elements of truth, which the other misses. For example, 
excess demand based theories fail to take account of trade unions in an 
adequate manner. Wage bargaining theories, on the other hand, give scant 
attention to the role of the employer and his reaction to excess demand 
conditions in the market.
In developing this synthesis we shall pay special attention to the 
relationship between trade union leaders and their membership. Important 
here will be the concept of the worker's aspiration wage, which is the 
minimum wage the worker will be satisfied with. Recent theories have 
suggested that this is growing at a constant rate over time, we shall 
suggest the alternative hypothesis that it will be such as to maintain his 
standard of living, i.e. his planned consumption pattern will be attainable.
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We then link consumption with permanent income and reach the conclusion 
that the aspiration wage will be just sufficient to maintain his permanent 
income.We are then left with the task of examining Friedman's original 
concept of permanent income. The empirical work, besides testing this hypo­
thesis, also looks at the critical assumption that prior to 1969 the 
competitive wage exceeded the union leader's target wage. Finally in 
chapter 9 we present a summary and conclude the thesis.
\Chapter 2
A Search Theoretic Model of Inflation and the Labour Market
2.1 Introduction
We saw in the previous chapter that there are several competing 
theories of wage inflation. We shall begin this analysis by assuming that 
one in the excess demand tradition is capable of explaining wage inflation 
between 1950 and the end of 1969, an assumption we shall later attempt to 
justify. In particular we will develop a search theory along the lines of 
Phelps (1968), Mortenson (1970) and Holt (1970). The reasons for choosing 
this approach, in preference to others within an excess demand tradition, 
were expounded in the prvious chapter. In short we do not feel that these 
alternative theories are mutually consistent within themselves, without 
considering the further question of whether they are consistent with events.
In order to understand how the labour market generates inflation, we 
must first ask the broader question of how the labour market allocates 
workers to jobs. There are three basic flow concepts through which this 
allocative procedure takes place, these are hires and quits, which have been 
the subject of some examination by Phelps and others, and fires, which have 
not been the subject of such examination. In our approach the analysis of 
all three variables revolves narrowly around the concept of a wage 
aspiration level as a main determinant of individual decision making under 
conditions of imperfect knowledge. Holt introduces it in the following 
way:
-48-
"In predicting the decision behaviour of workers in changing 
from one state to another: one job to another, unemployed 
to working, working to unemployed, or familly to labour 
force, we assume the following decision process. If the 
alternative is enough "better" to outweigh the costs of 
transition, the change is made, otherwise not. The accept­
ance of an alternative state depends upon an aspiration
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level. Alternatives below this will tend to be rejected 
and those above accepted. For example, the present state 
might be "unemployed and searching” and the alternative 
state might be "accept the offer that has just been 
received."
The wage aspiration level is essentially a subjective notion, reflecting 
the workers' perception of labour market conditions. The way these 
perceptions are formed,Holt describes as follows:
.. thWe postulate that the aspiration level of the i unemployed
worker is given by the relation
Wt+T(i) = V i)Ai
W, _ D.T t+T - l
' t+T
where wt+ ,^ is his aspiration wage level at the time t+T; t 
the time when the worker entered the labour market; T the 
length of time he has been unemployed; w^Ci) his wage at 
the end of the previous job; A. a constant, usually greater 
than one, that sets the initial aspiration level; W /W 
the ratio by which general wages have changed during 
his unemployment, D^a constant which is the rate at which 
expectations decline exponentially in response to unemplo­
yment; and r a random variable whose geometric mean is 
unity to reflect sporadic and non wage factors that 
influence the wage aspiration level."
Thus Holt's initial wage aspiration level is determined by his previous 
wage, the duration of unemployment, and A^ (later he goes on to say that A^ 
may be expected to vary with the level of unemployment and/or vacancies) .
It would seem, however, that this formulation ignores the central 
theme of search theory: that an individual can expect to find a better 
alternative state if he plans to search for a longer period. But information 
is not a free good and whilst search is being undergone income is not 
earned and thus there is a trade-off choice involved. In determining his 
expected period of search the individual must balance these losses and gains 
so that he could not make himself any better off by changing his expected 
period of search. Thus the individual's problem can be looked at as having 
to determine his optimal expected period of search, however as we shall see 
this also amounts to determining a wage offer which the unemployed worker
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is prepared to accept, for the two are jointly determined.
Of course others have seen this problem and in the years since Holt's
original paper appeared in the Phelps volume a large body of literature on
search theory has appeared (for a summary of this see Lippman and McCall
(1976)). Our approach has largely been developed independently of that
literature, and therefore differs in certain crucial aspects from much of
it. For example much of the literature seems based upon the limiting
assumption that the individual is restricted to one interview per period.
This assumption does not appear here and partly because of this our analysis
of hires, where employer and employee interact in their decision making
process, is rather different from what has appeared elsewhere. We assume
instead that the individual can expect to get a number of interviews per
(1)
period, which we will denote X^ . This is shown in figure 2.1 which represents 
the individual's expectations concerning the distribution of wages in his 
particular market, which we assume to be normal. If he receives one interview 
then the wage he expects to be offered will be equal to the mean of this
Figure 2,1 The Distribution of Wage Offers
distribution. But if he has two interviews, he will expect a higher offer 
in at least one of them, for example Wg, and for three interviews a higher 1
(1) The important point being that the expected number of interviews will 
vary with the economic conditions.
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offer still. This mechanism was made explicit first by Stigler (1962), and 
then by Alchian (1970), thus for markets in general:
"If potential prices are normally distributed with mean m 
and with variance 0, then the expected maximum observed 
bid W(n) at the nth observation is approximately
W(n) = m + a / 2 log n
W(n) starts at m and increases at a decreasing rate with n. "
Analogously if a worker expects to receive X^ interviews per period of time
G X twe can replace n by X^t and let WQ , which is defined as the maximum wage 
offer which the worker expects to receive after planning to search for t 
periods, be determined as follows:
W®Xt = VVX + CJj/2 logX1t (2.1)
The maximum expected wage offer will be a function of W^, 0^ and X that is, 
the mean of the distribution of the worker's expectations of wage offers, 
its variance and the expected number of interviews per period. We can assume 
to bear some relation to actual wages currently being offered by 
employers, and 0^ to be constant (although it is possible that it will vary 
with the cycle). It is, however unlikely that X^ will be constant. It seems 
more reasonable to assume that the expected number of interviews per period 
will be positively related to the number of potential interviews, i.e. 
vacancies, and inversely to the number of potential competitors for those 
interviews. These we assume to be those unemployed, although it should be 
noted that workers can search for better jobs whilst remaining employed.
We make this assumption to facilitate the empirical work, there being no 
real quantative data on "employed searchers". Thus the greater the number 
of vacancies the greater will be the expected number of interviews, whilst 
an increase in the number unemployed will have the opposite effect:
X 1 = f(U,V) ; fy < 0, fy > 0 ( 2 . 2)
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An increase in vacancies is likely to lead to an increase in the expected 
number of interviews per period, ceteris paribus the number unemployed, and 
as is shown in figure 2.2(a) this in turn leads to an increase in the wage 
an individual can expect to be offered after t periods of search. On the
Figure 2,2 The Effects on Search Productivity of Unemployment and 
Vacancies
, , e l t
other hand the expected wage will be inversely related to the number 
unemployed, given the number of vacancies. This is shown in figure 2.2(b), 
where an increase in V relative to U will shift the curve up to V^, and a 
decrease down to V
Having discussed what factors influence the wage aspiration level in a 
particular period, we will now attempt to analyse its role in the three 
labour market variables, quits, fires, and hires. Beggining with quits.
2.2 Quits
We begin by assuming, although the importance of this assumption will 
not become fully apparent until we consider fires and hires, that workers 
are not homogenous and that there will be differences in their productivity. 
But that the individual employer has no means of knowing in advance the 
productivity of a worker, this only becoming apparent after he has become 
employed. This assumption could at a later stage be relaxed, and we could
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attempt to incorporate some of the literature on job signalling (see,for 
example, Spence (1973)). The reason for not doing so here is that we are 
not so much concerned with search theories in themselves, but only in as 
much as they can help our understanding of the inflationary process. The 
assumptions that we make are simplifications, but they do, in our view, 
facilitate the analysis without subtracting anything substantial from that 
unders tanding.
We shall also make the assumption that the individual behaves as if 
he maximises discounted expected lifetime income. Given this assumption an 
employed individual will then quit his job if he expects to be better off 
in the long run by doing so, that is if he expects that the discounted gain 
in income from accepting an alternative state will more than compensate him 
for the transition costs, i.e. the income foregone during the period of 
search. Using discrete time we can illustrate this with the following
The left hand side of 2.3 measures total income foregone during the expected 
period of search. The right hand side measures total gains, discounted over 
the number of years that the worker expects to keep his new job,v if the 
expected gains outweigh the expected losses then the individual will quit,
otherwise he will not. His decision will therefore depend upon expected
elNand present wage rates, WQ and , the rate of discount, r^, social
security benefits, , and I, the date at which he expects to quit his new
job. Of crucial importance is N, the expected number of periods he will have
to search for. This will be decided in the following manner, take for
(1) A summary of all the variables and parameters used within this chapter 
can be found in an appendix at the end of the chapter.
(1)inequality
N
1 i < i  < n--- . l L 0l (W0 - B ) 
i=0 (1 + r ) i=N+l
(2.3)
where i = 1,2,....N-l,N,N+1,....,N+X^“1,I and Xj = I “ N.
f  V
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example, the situation where the individual is considering whether to spend 
two or three weeks in expected search. The expected additional loss by 
extending the expected time of search by one period will be the best wage 
offer he could expect to get after searching for two periods, less any 
benefits he might qualify for. The expected additional gain will be the 
difference between the wage he expects to receive after searching for 
three periods, and that after searching for two, suitably discounted over 
the length of time he expects to hold the job. On this reasoning the 
individual will not search for more than t periods if:
and not search for less than t periods if:
Together both inequalities determine the optimal length of search (N), 
as illustrated in figure 2.3 below
Figure 2,3 Determination of the Optimum Search Time
Note; individual will search for two periods, i.e. N=2.
Hence we can determine the optimal length of time for being"unemployed
(2.5)
Marginal Benefits/ 
Costs B A
A - A Marginal Costs 
Curve
B - B Marginal Benefits 
CurveB
A
1 2 3 t (period of search)
and searching" once we know the expected wage rate, and the values for the
other - institutionally determined variables. On the other hand, we also
know from equation (2.1), that t is a major determinant of the expected
minimum wage rate. Both variables are thus interdependent, and combining
elN(2.1) with (2.4) and (2.5) gives a system in which N and are simultan­
eously determined.
To acquire a better understanding of the system it may be useful to 
analyse the effects of a change in V or U, and B seperately. An increase in 
V, or a decrease in U, will lead to an upward shift in the expected maximum 
wage rate curve as in figure 2.4. This shift can be interpreted in two ways. 
For a previously determined optimal period of search an individual can now 
expect a higher number of interviews, which will raise his expectations. Or
Figure 2.4 The Effect on the Worker's Search Strategy of an Increase in 
Vacancies
given an unchanged expected wage rate the individual might also wish to 
adjust the period of search. The most likely outcome seems to be a combinat­
ion of both options. We can therefore expect to see an increase in the 
equilibrium number of quits, as well as a shortening in the expected time 
spent searching. The effects of an increase in unemployment benefit has, 
following the work of Gujarati (1972), attracted considerable attention and 
discussion. The way it should work out in our model is as follows. First it 
is clear that the expected wage rate curve will in this case shift neither
up nor down. What is affected is the left hand side of equation (2.3),
and this can be visualised by a downward shift of the cost curve in figure
2.3. Hence the increase in benefits will therefore bring about an increase
in N, and indirectly - through a movement along the curve in figure 2.4 - 
elNalso an increase in WQ . This, in turn, will lead to an increase in the 
equilibrium number of quits, and an increase in the average duration of 
unemployment.
This conclusion is not much different from that reached by most other 
theorists, (see, for example, Lippman and McCall (1976)). In addition what 
empirical work has been done also suggests this conclusion. Most of this 
empirical work has been done for the United States. Thus Classen (1977), 
Holen (1977) and Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) all provide strong evidence 
for a small but positive effect of the size of weekly benefits on 
unemployment duration. Whilst for the U.K. Cubbin and Foley (1977) and 
Nickell (1979) both find similar effects.
There is a danger that the effects of vacancies and unemployment may be 
exagerated. The reason for this is that as the economy moves out of a 
recession there will be a backlog of quits to be cleared before the 
equilibrium rate has been attained. This backlog will temporarily 
exagérate the number of quits. This mechanism can be analysed within the 
framework of our model. We first make the assumption that the relevant 
labour market for any individual is only part of the total labour market. 
For instance, office managers are usually only interested in vacancies for 
office managers and they will compare their wages with what is currently 
being offered for office managers. For illustrative purposes we again make 
the assumption that these wages are normally distributed as in figure 2.5.
0 ]WWQ is defined as before, with N again being the expected period of search.
elNThe individual will not quit immediately, when his wage falls below W^ , 
due to search costs in the form of foregone income. Instead he will quit 
when his present wage falls below a , where Ot is determined by equation
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Figure 2.5 The Employed Workers Perceptions of Current Wage Offers
As an individual gains experience in a job so he will begin to compare 
himself with those on the next rung of the ladder. Thus after five years as 
an assistant office manager he will begin to compare his salary with those 
being offered to managers of small offices, who in turn will begin to 
compare themselves with managers of large offices, and so on and so forth. 
Therefore the mean wage of the group that an individual compares himself 
with is continually drifting towards the right. This is illustrated 
in figure 2.6. In figure 2.6(a) an individual gets more than those he 
compares himself with, two years later he gets the average, and five years
Figure 2.6 The Changing Relationship Between the Employee's Own Wage
(2 3).
and Current Offers
(c)
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la ter he is ready to quit as his wage coincides with a .
Consider now what happens as the economy moves out of recession, the
number of vacancies increases, then either the expected duration of search,
N, will fall, or the wage he expects to get after an optimal period of 
elNsearch, , will rise, or both. In other words either the costs of search
elNwill fall, in which case the gap between a and WQ narrows, or the benefits
elNwill increase, in which case both a and WQ shift to the right. In either 
case a will have moved to the right, from cx to a ' in figure 2.5. Thus all 
those individuals whose wages lie between these two points will now quit. 
This is in addition to the normal volume of quits generated by the continual 
movement of a to the right, along with the whole distribution. These 
additional quits represent the backlog we have been discussing.
Thus the initial effect of an increase in vacancies will be to increase 
quits above the new equilibrium level by an amount proportional to the 
shaded region of figure 2.5. Once this increase has been absorbed quits will 
have risen to a new equilibrium value at a higher level than the previous 
one. (It is at a higher level as people will now quit at more frequent 
intervals than before). But this increase in the equilibrium level of quits 
will be greatly exagerated in the initial stages of a boom. Similarly 
as the economy moves into a recession there will be an exagerated decline 
in quits.
Summarising. According to the theory so far developed quits will 
depend upon the level of unemployment and vacancies, cyclical changes in 
those variables, the rate at which future earnings are discounted, any 
benefit the individual might qualify for, and expectations of wages 
currently being offered for jobs they feel qualified for. We will now turn
to an examination of fires.
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2.3 Fires
When a worker quits his job he does so in order to find a better one. 
The analysis of fires is slightly more complicated because there are several 
reasons for firing workers. Workers are in general fired due to a lack of 
demand for the goods they produce. This situation can arise in several ways.
1. Due to a change in aggregate demand, i.e. cyclical factors. (Fc>
2. Due to seasonal factors. (F )s
3. Due to a changing pattern of aggregate demand, which leaves some 
industries expanding and others declining.
4. Due to a changing pattern of production which leaves some firms 
expanding and others declining.
5. Due to a changing locational pattern of production, as firms 
move from one area to another.
It is a combination of these factors which form the category known as 
"layoffs", which has already been discussed by several writers, and to 
which we shall briefly return later. However there is another category of 
firing which can be thought of as the analytical counterpart to quits, 
replacement fires, which we will term F^. An employer may fire a worker 
not because of changing demand conditions, but due to a desire to replace 
the worker with a better one. A decision closely related to that of an 
employee who quits his job to replace it with a better one. The analysis 
of replacement fires is therefore similar to that of quits.
An employer will fire a worker, even if he has not yet found a suitable 
replacement, if he believes that the discounted gains of doing so will 
outweigh the losses. The gains will be the expected increase in net 
revenue discounted over the expected duration of the contract. The losses 
equal the amount which the fired worker would have contributed to net 
revenue over the expected length of search, plus any redundancy payments
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the employer has to pay, which are related to the length of service. In 
algebraic form therefore the j'th worker will be fired if the following 
inequality holds.
where i = 1 , 2 n,n+1....n+x2~l,I
and X2 = I-n
IT. represents the expected net revenue contribution of the j ' th worker.
the appendix at the end of this chapter).
Thus the introduction of redundancy payments will have made the 
employer less willing to fire unsatisfactory workers. This is not likely to 
be important as regards newly hired workers, but it could become very 
significant for workers who become less satisfactory because of age.
It is also important to note that the contribution to net revenue the 
employer can expect a worker to make if he searches for t periods will 
increase as t increases. This is because the wage he can expect to pay falls 
with length of time he may plan to search which can be formulated as:
The minimum pay offer after searching for t periods, is a function of the
expected number of interviews, A^, per period. All variables differ from 
the corresponding variables in equation 2.1 as the expectations are held by 
the employer in this case and not the employee.
n I-n
l "j — 1—  ■
i=0 (1 + r2) i=n+l
( 2 . 6)
J
e2nnQ represents the expected contribution to net revenue of a worker hired 
e2nat a wage of WQ . (Again for an exact definition of all these symbols see
W2 - 0 2/2 logy (2.7)
mean, W and variance, 0 , of the distribution of wage offers, and the * 2  2
As before it seems reasonable to assume that the expected number of 
potential interviews per period will be related to the number of vacancies
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relative to the number of unemployed. An increase in the number of 
vacancies, ceteris paribus, will lead to a decrease in the expected number 
of interviews that the employer can expect for his own vacancy. Whilst an 
increase in the number unemployed will have the opposite effect. Hence
Given the analysis set up so far we are now faced with a similar 
problem already tackled in the section on quits, namely how is the expected 
optimum period of search, in this case n, decided? As before an individual 
will determine his expected period of search so that he could not make 
himself better off by changing it. In the unemployed worker's case the 
expected optimum search period corresponded to that value of t which 
satisfied inequalities (2.4) and (2.5). In the employer's case it satisfies 
the following inequalities:
The left hand side represents the cost of searching for one more period, and 
the right hand side the gains.
Again we may wish to find the effects of a general increase in vacancies 
or a decrease in unemployment. Both will lead to a reduction in the 
productivity of search time. An employer who might be unwilling to change 
his habitual period of search can expect to have to pay higher wages in 
order to become a successful recruiter. He may on the other hand have to
*2 = g(U,V) ; gy > 0, gy < 0 ( 2 . 8)
e2(t+1) 
W0 (2.9)
i=0
and
( 2 . 10)
extend the expected period of search. A rational employer will probably do
both. In any case, it is clear that the cost of search is bound to rise, 
which will decrease the left hand side of inequalities (2.8) and (2.9).
The right hand side may also decrease, though not necessarily, but to a 
smaller extent. The net effect will be to cause an increase in the 
optimal search period, as well as a reduction in the replacement firing 
rate.
A rather different motive for firing workers is to be found in a 
downward adjustment in the desired labour force, because of cyclical 
variations. The extent to which an employer may decrease his labour force 
depends upon his expectations regarding the fall in demand, for both now 
and in the future, and on hiring conditions. Some employers may find it 
more profitable to hoard labour (Taylor (1972)). But for those employers who 
do decide to adjust their labour force this adjustment can be brought about 
in two ways. They can fail to make good losses through voluntary quits, 
retirements etc, or through firing existing staff. Which method is resorted 
to will depend upon how the employer balances the costs and gains of each 
course of action, an analysis we shall not undertake, apart from mentioning 
that the scales must have been tipped against firings by the introduction 
of redundancy payments in December 1965.
Another major category of firings will be those due to seasonal 
factors. In this case there is little scope for a trade-off relation 
between firing workers and not making good losses through natural wastage. 
There might be a relationship between the level of unemployment and 
seasonal firings as, given a constant workforce, if the economy is running 
at a high level there will presumably be more seasonally employed people 
of all kinds. But on the whole we might regard seasonal firings as being 
fairly constant.
The final category of firings will be those associated with a dynamic 
economy. There are several sub-categories in this group, for example workers 
might be fired due to a changing pattern of aggregate demand, due to
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changing technology which does not affect all industries equally, or due to 
a changing geographical distribution of production. In the empirical analysis 
these will largely be ignored on the grounds that, apart from the effects af 
the business cycle which have already been dealt with, this category of 
firings may be supposed to be largely constant, except for sudden and large 
changes in demand and supply conditions which might have been brought about 
by the introduction of S.E.T., where an exploratory attempt will be made to 
discern any possible effect.
2.4 Hires
Of the three concepts, hires, fires and quits, this is the most 
difficult to analyse as it depends upon the interaction of the two sets of 
decision makers, employers and the unemployed. We shall begin the analysis 
by presenting Holt's (1970) concept of acceptance curves, but in discrete 
time.
The worker's acceptance curve is shown in figure 2.7 and it plots his 
acceptance wage over the length of time he has been unemployed. In the first
Figure 2,7 The Job Searcher's Acceptance Curve
maximum wage offer he expects to receive after searching for
duration
It equals the 
N periods,
where N is the optimal search time. But this acceptance wage will not be
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constant throughout the entire time he is unemployed for, rather it will 
be adjusted in a Bayesian manner. Thus if at the end of the first period 
of search he is still unemployed, even if he has had several interviews, 
then all the wage offers will have been less than his acceptance wage. 
Because of this, and because, if his expectations of the distribution of 
wage offers had been correct, he would have expected some of those offers to 
be in excess of his acceptance wage - the first of which he would have 
accepted - he will revise his expectations of the distribution, and 
probably adjust the mean downwards. This reflects the fact that search 
performs two functions, the prime one being to find an acceptable offer of 
employment, but there is a secondary one of providing the individual with 
up to date information about the market. Thus in equation 2.1, will be 
lower in the second period of search than it was in the first. This will 
also cause his acceptance wage to fall, i.e.
elN elN
W1 < wo ( 2 . 11)
The same process will be repeated at the end of the second period of 
unemployment, and the third and the fourth and so on,until he finds 
employment. Therefore the acceptance wage will be inversely related to the 
duration of unemployment.
It is just possible that if, in the i 'th period, all the wage offers 
- elNhave fallen between W and W.^  the individual will revise his expectations 
of the mean upwards and the variance downwards, the net effect being to 
increase the acceptance wage in the following period. But on average we 
would expect the mean to fall and we have drawn the acceptance curve 
sloping downwards.
The assumption is also made that all the unemployed, voluntary or 
involuntary, whether they have quit or been fired, have the same acceptance 
curves. In our analysis no reason has been put forward to suppose otherwise. 
The acceptance curve is derived from an income maximising process the
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parameters of which are presumably the same for all unemployed workers.
We can also derive an acceptance curve for an employer. This plots his 
acceptance wage over the length of time his vacancy remains unfilled. In 
figure 2.8 we have drawn the employers and the employees acceptance curves
Figure 2.8 The Employer's and Employee's Acceptance Curves 
acceptance Awages i______
on the same diagram. It can be seen that the employer's curve slopes 
upwards, the rationale for this is based upon the same Bayesian type adjus­
tment process we have used to justify the downward slope of the worker's 
acceptance curve. If we assume that hiring takes place discretelly over 
each period^ we can write the expected number of hires, H^ , that will take 
place from those vacancies which have been available for less than one full 
period, VQ , as:
The probability component of this equation, P , consists of two elements:
a probabilistic concept relating the probability of an interview within each
A-A employers accept­
ance curve
B-B employees accept­
ance curve
B
1 2 3 4 5 duration of search
R
( 2 . 12)
(2.13)
where X ^  is the actual number of interviews over a full period of search 
that the average employer will experience. f^iX^) can then be interpreted as
(1) We can suppose that there are R subperiods during which interviews 
might occur.
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r th subperiod to X ^ , it approximately equals A^/R, being slightly less in
the later stages of the period as some will have jobs and not be searching.Thus
the greater the average number of interviews in a full period of search,
the greater will be the probability of an interview in any sub-period. The
second component of (2.13), S^, reflects the probability of an interview
proving successful, i.e. the offer, which we assume always follows the
interview being accepted. This probability will depend upon the acceptance
elN e2nwage of the unemployed worker, W^ _ , and that of the employer , where
elNt, in Wt , varies from one unemployed searcher to another, reflecting the 
different lengths of time for which they have been unemployed. The relation­
ship is straightforward: the probability of a successful interview equals 
the number of potential interviews which will result in acceptable offers, 
divided by the total number of potential interviews.
The interviews which will result in acceptable offers are those where 
the employee's acceptance wage is lower than that of an employer whose 
vacancy has been available for less than one full period of search. In 
figure 2.8 this means job searchers who have been unemployed for four or 
more periods, we denote the number of such searchers by U^ . The total 
number of potential interviews is simply equal to the total number of 
searchers, i.e. the total number unemployed, which we denote by U. Therefore 
the probability of a single interview resulting in an acceptable offer is
S0r = UOr/Ur
Thus equation (2.11) now becomes
H0 = £ V0rfr(X2> ^ o / V  (2>14)r=0
In words then, this relates the number of hires from those vacancies which 
have been available for less than one full period to their number and the 
probability of any one of them being made an acceptable offer. This latter 
probability is equal to the joint probability of an offer being made and
it proving acceptable.
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In (2.l4) \f the number of acceptable vacancies is not constant throughout
the period, as after part of it has elapsed some of these vacancies will 
have been filled. therefore declines as the period progress's, as does V 
and UQ . This is the reason for including them as part of the summation, i.e. 
the reason for the subscript r.
An analysis can also be made to find the number of hires made from 
those vacancies which have been unfilled for between one and two periods. 
These will have a higher probability of generating an acceptable offer, as 
their acceptance wage will be higher than those vacancies which have been 
unfilled for less than one period.
Further analyses can also be made of vacancies unfilled for a longer time 
still. The total number of hires in any one full search period, can then be 
found by summing hires over all such categories of vacancies.
Thus the total number of hires will be related to the number of vacanc­
ies,directly from (2.16), in a positive manner, and also inversely via its
prove dominant, and that as vacancies rise so will the number of hires. It 
will also depend upon the level of unemployment, mainly through its effect
in unemployment, at least up to a limit, will almost certainly cause an 
increase in hirings.
Besides depending upon the total numbers of unemployed and vacancies, 
hirings will also vary with their "age distribution". For instance, a sudden 
increase in vacancies will at first have a muted effect on the number of 
hirings as they will be characterised by an acceptance wage less than that 
of the average vacancy which has remained unfilled for some time. The same
R
", • « v vr =0
(2.15)
R
(2.16)
indirect effect on A®- However it seems likely that the direct effect will
on A®, the average number of interviews per period. In this case an increase
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remark applies to sudden changes in the number unemployed. Thus sudden 
increases in unemployment will cause hirings to be below their equilibrium 
level, and vice versa
Hirings will also depend upon the two acceptance curves in figure 2.8.
We have already seen that the employer’s acceptance curve will depend upon 
average net revenue per worker, his discount rate, his expectations of the 
number of interviews per period, which in turn will depend upon the levels 
of unemployment and vacancies, and the mean and variance of current wages 
being accepted by unemployed workers (in effect their acceptance wages). The 
employee's acceptance curve will depend upon any benefits he might qualify 
for, his discount rate, his expectations of the probable number of interviews 
per period and his expectations concerning the mean and variance of current 
wage offers.
2.5 The Hiring Wage
We begin by denoting the hiring wage from each class of hires, H ^  as
We2n, this is the wage paid to job searchers who accept a job which has
been vacant for i periods. The average wage paid to newly hired workers, Wh,
© 2ncan be found as a weighted average of the W^ s. Where the weights are 
simply the number of workers hired at that wage divided by the total number 
of hires, i.e. H./H. Hence:
I I I Virfr(X2)(Uir/Ur)Wi 
H i=0 r=0
e2n (2.17)
The problem now is to explain each W. , i.e. the acceptance wage of an 
employer who has been searching for i periods, and from (2.7) we can see 
that this is defined as
we fit 2it - 021/2 log X^n
(2.18)
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where n is the number of periods he expects to continue searching, Wgit 
and are t*le mean and variance of the distribution of unemployed
workers acceptance wages and ^2tis exPected number of interviews per
period, as opposed to which is the actual number. We now make the 
assumption that W2it, the employer’s a priori belief as to the average 
acceptance wage of unemployed job searchers is formed as in (2.19)
(2.19)
where W ^ t ^  is the actual average acceptance wage of job searchers in 
the previous period. Hence we make the assumption that, basically employers 
make the right guess, on the information available, as to the job searcher's 
acceptance wage. This assumption is slightly qualified by the second term, 
gt(i), which raises this estimate at a decreasing rate, with the length 
of search the employer has already undertaken, due to the Bayesian type 
adjustment process already discussed. The final term in (2.19) updates the 
wage by the employer's expectations of the rate of increase of the job 
searcher's acceptance wage. Inserting this into (2.17) we get, (omitting the 
t subscript when its presence is clear implicitly):
Wh = 1 I I V V ^ )  (Uir/U) (i1(, 1} + gt(i) ♦ AW2t
H i=0 r=0 _________
- o 2i/ 2 1oB X2 n) (2.20)
 ^ is the actual average acceptance wage of job searchers in the previous
period and we can further decompose this in a similar way to W2i in (2.19):
5l(t-l) = S2(t-2) " g(t-l)( V + AWl(t-l) ( 2 . 21)
Inserting this into (2.20) we get:
-«
-M
W*
 ■ 
■..
..
..
.■ 
- 
- 
....
.
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w t = 1 J V (v. f (X®) (u. /u ) (¡5 - g ( I )t 77 L L ir r 2 lr r 2(t-2) 6t-l 1 M i=0 r=0
+ AWl(t-l) + ° 1/ 2 1ogX1N + gt(i2) + AW®t
- a 2/2 log A ^ n) ( 2 . 22 )
if we make the simplifying assumption thato^ and are independent of i 
then this simplifies to
CO R
" I  -  * 2 (1 -2 )  “ i  l  L ' V ' r ^ « ’ <Ul / V  < 2S ,< ‘ 2> '  ¡ W  V
* wK.-i) * »2, * v '21°BV
- C  2 ^ 2  log ^ 2n (2.23)
This then relates the hiring wage in period t to the average employers 
acceptance wage in period t-2, and various other variables. The labour 
market variables of unemployment, profits and unemployment benefits 
operate through the last two terms. Ceteris paribus, an increase in profits 
will reduce n, the optimal expected search time for the employer, and 
hence increase Wh. Similarly an increase in unemployment benefits will 
increase N, the optimal expected search period for the employee, and 
hence also increase Wh. An increase in vacancies and/or a fall in 
unemployment is more complex, as it will tend to increase X^ and reduce 
X2> the expected number of interviews for the employee and employer 
respectively, both of these effects tending to increase Wh. But the effects 
on N and n, the optimal search times for employee and employer will work 
in the opposite direction. However the overall effect will be to increase 
X^N and reduce X2n, and therefore to increase Wh . (Vacancies will also have 
a direct effect, of course, via the first term in the summation. This will 
however tend to reinforce the indirect effects just discussed as we will see).
As with other theories of inflation expectations enter the picture, 
in this case of wage inflation. Ostensibly they enter with a unit
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coefficient. However this is misleading as expectations of wage inflation 
may also affect the two standard deviation terms in (2.23). This will not 
be the case if employers believe that each job searchers acceptance wage 
will increase by a given absolute amount. In this case the distribution of 
their beliefs as to this acceptance curve just shifts to the right with 
the variance staying the same. But if employers have in mind expectations 
concerning the same relative or proportionate increase then not only will 
the distribution shift to the right, but the variance will increase as well, 
similar comments apply to as well. Hence in this case expectations will 
not have a simple unit coefficient, but one that varies with labour market 
conditions via ist association with the last two terms in (2.23). Thus, 
for example, if labour market conditions are "tight", the coefficient on 
expectations would exceed unity. This is rather a surprising conclusion, 
and one which we shall return to examine later.
Finally we come to the first term, the two terms in brackets reflect 
the effects of unsuccessful job search on the acceptance wages of the 
two groups .The first term has a positive effect, the longer the employer 
has been searching for then, ceteris paribus, the higher will be his 
acceptance wage, because his estimate of the job searchers acceptance wage 
will be revised upwards in a Bayesian manner. A similar argument explains 
the negativity of the second term, i.e. the longer the employee has been 
searching the lower will be his acceptance wage, and this will have a 
negative effect on the rate of inflation. Thus when labour market condit­
ions are favourable to job searchers the term in brackets will be positive 
and thus the first term as a whole will tend to increase the rate of 
inflation. The opposite being the case when conditions are more favourable 
to the employer.
2.6 The Quit and Firing Wages
So far we have concentrated on the effects of labour market conditions
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upon hires and the hiring wage. However there are two other channels by 
which labour market conditions can affect the wage rate, one important 
one being through their effects upon quits. Indeed this is the transmiss­
ion mechanism favoured by Phelps (1968) himself. He put forward the hypoth­
esis that firms in setting the contract wage would take into account 
conditions in the labour market, as these would determine the number of 
quits over the period which the contract is operative. The firm then sets 
the contract wage taking into account the likely number of quits, and also 
presumably the likely costs of those quits in terms of lost production 
whilst not having the job filled, and balancing these costs against the 
cost of increasing the contract wage. This is an approach to which we 
shall return to later. But first we shall turn to an analysis which has 
more in common with that of hires which we have just completed.
The underlying idea of this analysis is that when an employee informs 
an employer that he wishes to quit, the employer may respond by making him 
an improved offer in the hope of making the job sufficiently attractive to 
retain his services. It is this wage, when accepted, which we call the quit 
wage. The employer would do this if, in discounted terms, the cost of this 
course of action was less than the expected cost of hiring a new worker. 
Turning to equation (2.3) we can see that the decision to quit depends upon 
the present wage which partially determines both the expected costs of 
search and the expected gains. Therefore if the present wage is increased 
this will increase the costs of search and reduce the gains, such action 
may well persuade the worker to remain in his present job.
So much is fairly obvious, what is not so obvious is how much the 
employer will be prepared to offer to tempt the worker to remain in his 
service. Using the notation and terminology previously defined, the 
employer will be prepared to increase the wage as long as, in discounted 
terms, the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. This can be expressed 
in an algebraic formulation by slightly modifying inequality (2.6) to
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(2.24)
where the j denotes the j'th worker who has just informed the employer of 
his intention to quit, Tlj is the nett revenue contribution of the j'th 
worker at a wage of Wj. The left hand side of the expression represents 
the discounted costs of foregone revenue during the expected period of 
search. The right hand side represents the expected gains, which may be 
negative, of not employing the j'th worker at the wage Wj, but of searching 
for a replacement. As long as the costs outweigh the gains, the employer 
will offer the wage Wj to the j'th worker. The upper limit to what the 
employer is prepared to offer is reached when the inequality no longer 
holds. (It should also be noted that in practice there may also be training 
costs involved in hiring a new worker, these will tend to increase the 
quit wage even further).
There are several implications arising out of this analysis some 
obvious and some not so. Firstly, the longer the expected period of search, 
the greater will be the costs of foregone revenue (provided Ilj is positive), 
and hence, ceteris paribus, the higher will be the wage the employer will 
be prepared to offer. Similarly the more productive the worker, the greater 
will be IT’, which will again tend to increase the wage the employer will be 
prepared to offer.
If now we assume that the j'th worker has an average productivity 
level it follows that when Wj is equal to the employers acceptance wage, 
i.e. the wage he expects to have to pay to hire a replacement worker, the 
term in the brackets on the right hand side of (2.24) is equal to zero.
Hence the whole of the right hand side is equal to zero. Therefore provided 
that at this wage Ilj is positive, this inequality will be automatically 
satisfied. It is indeed likely that it will continue to be satisfied at 
certain wage levels above the acceptance wage. We thus get the interesting
result that the limit to the wage an employer is prepared to offer to an 
employer who threatens to quit, and who has an average level of productiv­
ity is at least equal to, and probably greater, than the wage he expects 
to have to pay in the hiring market. This possible premium exists because 
the expected cost to the employer of replacing this worker is not just 
the wage he expects to have to pay in the hiring market, but also his 
foregone contribution during the expected period of search. The minimum 
wage that will be acceptable to the worker will, of course be equal to 
his acceptance wage during the first period of search, suitably adjusted to 
take account of the costs of foregone revenue whilst searching. The hiring 
wage will be in excess of the employers initial acceptance wage, but 
nonetheless the existence of this premium of the quit wage over this 
initial acceptance wage, points to the possibility that in some circumstan­
ces it might also exceed the hiring wage.
We therefore have an upper and lower limit to the quit wage, the 
exact point within this range might presumably depend upon bargaining 
factors, random or otherwise. But there is no reason to suppose that it 
will depend upon cyclical factors, hence we can assume it to be stochastic­
ally constant. The quit wage is therefore a function of the same 
variables as the hiring wage, in addition it may be greater than the hiring 
wage. This will depend upon whether the premium discussed earlier, over 
the employers' initial acceptance wage, outweighs the increase in this 
acceptance wage after several periods of unsuccessful search.
There is a third mechanism by which wages might change, which concerns 
the reaction of a worker who is being fired. The j’th worker faced with 
dismissal because his productivity and wage rate are such that the inequa­
lity (2.6) holds, could theoretically offer his labour at a lower rate 
so that this inequality no longer held. A lower limit will again be set 
by that worker's acceptance wage during his first period of search, 
suitably adjusted for foregone income during the expected period of search.
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An upper limit to this wage will be set by the necessity that it must 
invalidate inequality (2.6).
It should be noted that there are two possible reasons why this 
inequality might hold in the first place. Firstly the j'th worker may have 
a low level of productivity, in which case it is possible that he has been 
dismissed several times in the past, with the possibility that he will 
be dismissed again when he is hired for a new job. With this in mind the 
worker might well accept a lower wage to that suggested above. The second 
possible reason is that this workers wage rate is higher than the average. 
Perhaps he was employed at a time when the employer had difficulty in 
filling the vacancy because the market was tight. Or alternatively it 
might be that all wages are falling in a depression.
According, therefore to the analysis so far developed, the aggregate 
average wage rate will change from period to period due to some workers 
changing jobs and other potentially mobile workers' accepting alternative 
wages instead. More exactly we get the following approximation
ion is only an approximation as those who do not receive wage changes might 
not have been receiving the average wage in t-1.
The rate of inflation can then be found by dividing through by wt_1> 
which gives us
(2.25)
where is the average wage paid in period t, L^ . the employed labour 
force, the number who receive higher wages after having threatened to 
quit, ft the number who accept lower wages as an alternative to being 
fired, and and W* the quit and firing wages respectively. This express­
Lt W
(2.26)
All of these terms depend upon the basic labour market variables which 
have predominated our analysis so far, the numbers of unemployed and 
vacancies, the average nett revenue product per man, unemployment benefits, 
expectations of wage inflation and changes in unemployment and vacancies. 
H/L is simply the number of hires expressed as a proportion of the 
employed labour force. Q/L has not been examined explicitly, but it 
represents the number of workers who are dissuaded from quitting by an 
increased wage offer, again as a proportion of the employed labour force.
We may suppose that it is related to the actual number of quits, although 
the exact ratio of the two at any particular time will depend upon our
Abasic labour market variables. Similar comments apply to FA.
2.7 Conclusions
Thus far we have established a theory which generates wage increases 
to the mobile part of the population, i.e. those who change jobs, and 
eventually to the remainder of the population who are potentially mobile.
At this point it is perhaps worth illustrating what happens as the economy 
moves out of recession. The initial increase in vacancies will make 
hiring more difficult for any individual employer by reducing the value of 
X , the number of interviews per period the employer can expect to receive. 
This, in turn, will increase the minimum expected pay offer the employer 
can expect to have,to make after having searched for t periods, which will 
result in a worker being hired (see equation (2.7)). This, in its turn will 
reduce the left hand side of inequalities (2.9) and (2.10), whilst 
increasing the right hand side. The nett effect of all this being to 
increase both the optimal length of search and the acceptance wage. Partly 
because of this the hiring wage will also rise. This increase in the 
hiring wage, together with the increase in the number of vacancies, will 
cause an increase in the number of quits and a reduction in the number of
fires, which will be particularly marked if the recession has been
prolonged, as there will then be a backlog of quits to clear up. Faced 
with these quits the employer will attempt to persuade the worker to remain 
in his employ by increasing his wage. If the boom continues then eventually 
every worker, even the least productive, will have received a wage increase, 
either from his present employer or by changing jobs. A reverse process 
would operate when the economy moves into a recession, with generally 
falling wages in the hiring market being disseminated throughout the 
entire labour force via the firing mechanism.
It is also of some importance to examine the profit variable, this 
is in fact the nett revenue contribution per worker. If profits in general 
are buoyant, then this too will be high, and employers will be anxious to 
retain and attract labour. Profits will vary in a cyclical fashion, there 
may even be longer run trends, for example in the U.K. there has, in the 
post-war years, been superimposed upon cyclical fluctuations a long run 
secular decline in profits. This would have tended to reduce the rate of 
inflation consistent with given values of other labour market variables.
But there is likely to be a second secular effect connected with the 
growth in labour productivity. This will have the effect of increasing the 
nett revenue contribution per worker, and hence lead to an upward drift in 
the wage equation. Specifically the growth in labour productivity makes 
each worker more productive, this increases the opportunity cost to an 
employer of having an unfilled vacancy. In an attempt to fill the vacancy 
more rapidly he will increase his acceptance wage. Similarly when faced 
with a worker who wishes to quit he will be prepared to offer him a higher 
wage than in the absence of labour productivity growth in order to retain 
his services. This conclusion, that there will be an outward drift of the 
wage equation which is linked with productivity growth, is we believe a 
most important one.
Also of some importance is the conclusion that the coefficient on 
expectations will vary with the labour market conditions. This is at
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variance with the conclusions reached by nearly all other theorists. Thus 
Phelps, for example, talks of the necessity of a unit coefficient on expec­
tations in order for an employer to maintain his desired differential over 
what he expects other employers to be paying. However on reflection it 
becomes apparent that this will only succeed in maintaining the absolute 
differential. An example may clarify this, if an employer desires to 
maintain a differential over other employers of 10% when they are paying 
£20, then he will have to pay £22. If however he expects them to increase 
their wages by 5% to £21, then in order to maintain a desired differential 
of 10% he will have to pay £23.1. If he were merely to increase his wages 
by the desired differential plus any general percentage increase in wages, 
he would pay £23, merely succeeding in maintaining an absolute differential 
of £2, but not a relative differential of 10%. It is therefore our belief 
that the ease with which labour can be "attracted and retained" is related 
to the relative and not the absolute differential. In addition we believe 
that our interpretation of the theory is more in keeping with the spirit 
of search theories than are alternative models such as Phelps'.
The theory has, of course, been very neo-classical in nature, with 
many strong assumptions being made. For example, that job searchers are 
restricted to the unemployed, that employers cannot differentiate between 
different workers prior to hiring them and the exclusion of trade unions 
from the analysis. Nonetheless several interesting, and in our view plausible 
conclusions have emerged from the analysis, which cannot be found elsewhere. 
The role of profits within an excess demand framework has not previously 
been stressed, neither have the concepts of a backlog of quits as the 
economy moves out of a recession, or the non-unit, variable coefficient on 
expectations been discussed alsewhere. In addition the analysis of hires 
has illuminated the interactive nature of this process, highlighting, for 
example, the effects of a sudden increase in the number unemployed or of
vacancies.
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However at least one of these restrictions on the analysis will need 
to be relaxed, and we shall at a later date consider the impact that trade 
unions have on the inflationary process. Meanwhile we are faced with the 
problem of testing the search theoretic model of inflation developed in 
this chapter. This is done in chapter 7. As we have seen expectations of 
inflation play a crucial role in this theory and in chapters 4 - 6 we will 
be examining these in some detail, with a view, in part at least, to 
deriving a workable data series on expectations that we can use in chapter 
7.
However, as we argued earlier, even if we find the coefficients of 
our model to be significant, this does not allow us to conclude that the 
search theory is a valid representation of the inflationary process. For 
the variables of that model are all perfectly consistent with other, e.g. 
wage bargaining, theories of inflation. It is for this reason that we need 
to conduct a second test of the search theory, in an area where these 
alternative approcahes have no implications. If then we find that this 
test also supports the theory we may with some confidence attribute the 
significance of the coefficients in chapter 7 as confirming our interpret­
ation of inflation. This then leaves us with the task of finding a suitable 
alternative test of the theory. A task we approach in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
An Initial Test of the Search Theory
3.1 Introduction
So far we have formulated a search theoretic approach to wage format­
ion. The theory has linked the rate of inflation to such labour market 
variables as unemployment, vacancies, profits, unemployment benefits and 
expectations of wage inflation. However besides being consistent with the 
theoretical framework which we have developed, any empirical significance 
of such variables would also be fairly consistent with several alternative 
theories, particularly a bargaining based one. Thus on the empirical side 
it becomes very difficult to directly test a bargaining theory against an 
excess demand type theory.
But there is an indirect test, the bargaining theories of, for example, 
Eckstein and Wilson (1962), Johnston (1972) and Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969) have little or no relevance for the more general problems concerning 
the determinants of labour market flows. These are concerned solely 
with the generation of wages from a series of conflicts, actual or potential. 
The roots of our search theoretic approach however lie in these flow 
concepts. It was formed by analysing these flows, and as such it is as 
much a theory about them as it is about wage inflation. If therefore we 
were to test the implications of our theory as to these flows and the 
results were significant, this could be interpreted as proof of the 
general validity of the theory. In other words the search theoretic approach 
to wage inflation has implications for other areas of the labour market, 
about which bargaining theories have little or nothing to say. If the theory 
is vindicated in these other areas, this would be some indication that the 
theory is also relevant as regards the wage formation process. It is not
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a complete test, it could still be that our search theory is relevant for 
the analysis of labour flows, but is superseded in the wage formation 
process by a bargaining theory. On the other hand, if the search theory was 
not found to be vindicated in an analysis of labour market flows, then 
severe doubts would be cast on its relevance for wage inflation. In fact 
there would be little point in testing its implications, and consideration 
would need to be given to some other approach to inflation.
3.2 The Relationship Between Unemployment and Vacancies
Unfortunately direct data on labour market flows is difficult to 
obtain. However we can, to some extent, overcome this problem by making 
use of the following accounting identity
AU = Q + F - H (3.1)
Thus changes in unemployment are a simple function of the three flow 
concepts discussed in the previous chapter. Implicit in this identity is 
the assumption that the flow of new entrants into the labour force exactly 
match the flow of withdrawals. This is a simplifying assumption which 
will not be valid in all periods. The effect of this will be threefold, 
firstly to make equation (3.1) stochastic, secondly to introduce seasonal 
factors and thirdly to introduce trend or cyclical factors if the size 
of the labour force varies, either with time or with the cycle. We make 
the assumption as it simplifies the theoretical exposition which follows, 
however we shall return to it when discussing the empirical work.
We have already examined hires, fires and quits and found them to be 
differing functions of the level of unemployment, the number of vacancies, 
underlying cyclical changes in these variables, average nett revenue per 
worker, unemployment benefits, employers and employees rates of discount, 
and seasonal and cyclical firings. It therefore follows that the change in 
unemployment will also be a function of these same variables
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(3.2)
1 ■The main disequilibrium forces within this equation are U , V and Ft t ct
If these variables remain unchanged, i.e. = F “ 0, and if we also
ignore seasonal firings, Fgt, then given constant values for JT t . rlt
and r , we can relate changes in unemployment solely to the level of 
unemployment and the number of vacancies
We have now defined the locus of points in the unemployment, vacancies 
plane, which will result in no changes in unemployment,and by implication, 
no changes in vacancies either. This is what Phelps (1968) has defined as 
the U-V curve, i.e. a semi equilibrium relationship between unemployment 
and vacancies.
Several economists, including Phelps himself, have attempted to 
estimate this relationship, and also to test hypotheses about the labour 
market, by regressing, either unemployment on vacancies, or vice versa.
The first work in this tradition was by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958), who 
were also the first to put forward the hypothesis of an equilibrium relati­
onship between unemployment and vacancies. Many studies followed, for 
example Bowers et al (1972), Gujarati (1972), Taylor (1972) and Knight 
and Wilson (1974). Many of these papers have centred on possible explanat­
ions for observed shifts in the U-V curve. These range from the introduction 
of earnings related benefits and redundancy payments, both in 1966, to 
changes in the age structure of the labour force.
However it has recently been realised that it is not valid to regress,
1. Where U and V represent the underlying cyclical changes in U and V .t t i t
A U t = h(Ut,Vt) (3.3)
and setting AUt = 0
0 = h (Ut,Vt) (3.4)
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either unemployment on vacancies or vice versa. This is because neither 
unemployment nor vacancies can be regarded as independent variables in 
such a system, and treating them as such leads to estimation bias (see 
Parikh (1977)). However we can still test the theories we have put forward 
about labour market flows by estimating equation (3.2) directly. Moreover, 
from this estimate we can also derive estimates of the U-V curve by setting 
A U t to zero and solving for U in terms of V.
This approach is essentially similar to that of Warren (1977), who 
relates percentage changes in employment to both U and V. He finds "no 
significant equilibrium relationship between unemployment and unfilled 
vacancies". However there are a number of factors which might tend to 
invalidate his analysis. Firstly he regresses changes in employment upon a 
composite unemployment and vacancies term, thus forcing any potential 
relationship to take a specific functional form. Secondly he allows for 
no disequilibrium effects, such as a backlog of quits as the economy moves 
out of recession. Indeed he includes no other explanatory variables, other 
than a constant term, seasonal dummies and a relatively unexplained time 
trend. Finally when the dependent variable is a flow concept the time 
period over which it is defined is of importance. In particular, the 
longer the period, the more difficult it is to discern any underlying 
relationship. Now whilst his basic time period, a quarter, does not 
seem excessively long, it would have been preferable to adopt a still 
shorter unit still, e.g. one month, as we do here.
In deciding upon an appropriate functional form for this estimation 
it is important to realise that most observations will be found within a 
narrow range of values, for example between lines 0 A and 0 B in figure 3.1 
and we can only speculate about the position of possible values outside 
this segment. However we can theorise about the possible shape outside 
this narrow range of values, even though they are extremely unlikely ever
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Figure 3,1 The Observed Segment of the U-V Curve
to be observed. We know, for instance, that unemployment will never equal 
zero, for even in the absence of other kinds of unemployment, there will 
always be some frictional unemployment as people change jobs. Hence we 
would expect some minimal level of unemployment which forms a theoretical 
horizontal asymptote in figure 3.1, Indeed it may even be that above a 
certain minimum level of vacancies, unemployment actually increases, with 
workers quitting more often in a very tight market.
One can, however, envisage a situation where there are no vacancies, 
but this would correspond to an economy with no employment at all. For even 
if there were only a very small number of jobs, say equivalent to one 
percent of the workforce, some of these would become vacant from time to 
time as workers retired or died etc. Hence the relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies is such that there is some minimum level below 
which unemployment will not fall, and perhaps which it approaches asymptot­
ically. In addition the number of vacancies will approach zero as unemploy­
ment increases to one hundred percent. But it should be re—emphasised that 
the segment of the relationship over which we have details is only relatively 
small, and the functional form which best fits this segment may have
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asymptotic properties which differ from those we have just described. We 
will therefore experiment with several functional forms in an attempt to 
discover which corresponds most closely to the observed data. However all 
of these functions will imply a convex negative relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies, and it is to the justification for this that 
we now turn.
3.3 Negativity and Convexity Conditions for the U-V Curve
The U-V curve is usually drawn downward sloping and convex with 
respect to the origin as in figure 3.1, and in this section we will 
discuss the conditions for this. The technical structure of our approach 
is similar to the one employed by Phelps . The economic interpretation 
differs however, and relies heavily on the discussion of quits, fires and 
hires made in the previous chapter.
We have already learned that each of the variables on the right hand 
side of equation (3.1) depends upon total unemployment and vacancies, among 
a range of other explanatory variables which we will ignore in this 
section. Hence
Z = Q(U,V) + F(U,V) - H(U,V) (3.5)
(where Z stands for changes in unemployment). Therefore along the steady
state U-V curve
dZ = 6ZdU + 6ZdV = 0 
<$U 6V
(3.6)
so that
dU = -(¿Z/6V) 
dV (6Z/ÓU)
(3.7)
and it is the condition for negativity which demands that this should be
negative. In examining whether this condition holds we will begin with the
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numerator .
6_z = 6F + 6q - 6 h (3.8)
5 V 6 v  6 v  6 v
It follows from the discussion in the previous chapter that we can expect 
that
6F < 0, 6Q > 0 and 6H > 0
Hence for the whole expression on the right hand side of (3.8) to be 
negative, the following condition should hold
In other words, in equilibrium, an increase in the total stock of vacancies 
should lead to an increase in hiring and hence a reduction in the level of 
unemployment, which is big enough to offset the difference between the 
increase in voluntary unemployment and the decrease in involuntary unemplo­
yment (replacement firings only). This requirement is not an unrealistic 
one, for even ignoring fires, it would be surprising indeed if an increase 
in vacancies were to increase quits by a greater amount than hires.
Similarly for the denominator in (3.7) to be negative, it is required
that
An increase in unemployment will have a positive effect on replacement 
fires and a negative effect on new hirings. The only counter effect is 
again found in the behaviour of quits. But again it would be surprising if 
this were to outweigh the other two effects. Hence as both the numerator 
and denominator in (3.7) are likely to be negative, dU/dV should be negat­
6 v  <Tv 6 v
(3.9)
SH - I > 6Q 
<5U 6U $U
(3.10)
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ive and the condition for a downward sloping U-V curve seems likely to be 
satisfied. (Besides Phelps, this conclusion is also in agrreement with 
that of other theorists, see for example Corry and Laidler (1967)).
The condition for convexity is that, in addition to the first
derivative being negative the second one should be
condition works out to be 
2 2 „ 2 2 k 2d U = - 1 6 z 6Z + <5 z US) ■dV2 (6z/6u)3 6v2 6u2 (<$u<Tv <$V ÔU j
(3.11)
Which is a formidable looking expression, the exact meaning Phelps himself 
seemed unsure of. But taking the terms in turn it may be possible to 
unravel its complexities.
-3Beginning with -(6Z/6U) , we have seen that6Z/6U is likely to be
negative, therefore this expression is likely to be positive. Thus in order 
2 2for d U/dV to be positive the expression inside the brackets must also be
2 2 2positive. The first term in the brackets is (6 Z/6V ) (¿Z/gU) . The
squared term is necessarily positive, the other term is equal to
¿2Z = ¿2F + ¿2Q -  iS2H
<$v2 6v2 6v2 6v2
(3.12)
Assuming that the functions relating fires, quits and hires, for a given
level of unemployment, to vacancies are as shown in figure 3.2 (i.e. they
are themselves continuous convex or concave functions), which seems
2 2 2 2intuitively plausible, then 6 F/6v will be positive, 6 Q/<$V negative and 
2 26 H/6V negative. Therefore this term will be positive if
1 62f - i!»l > i«!s| (3,13)* 2 6VZ 5v2 6v2
On balance we would expect this to be the case as again there are two
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Figure 3.2 The Relationships Between Vacancies and Fires, Quits and 
Hires
Fires
(a)
Quits
6 F < 0, 6 f > o
6 v (S V
(b)
6 v 6v
(c)
<5 V
terms on the left hand side and only one on the right hand side, and also 
hires are a quantitatively greater term than quits. But it is possible that 
for certain values of V, probably high ones, as for low ones the curve in 
figure 3.2(c) is likely to rise faster than the curve in figure 3.2(b), 
this condition will not hold and in equation (3.11) the first term in the 
square brackets will be negative.
A similar argument applies to the second term, on balance we would 
expect this to be positive, but at certain levels of unemployment, probably 
high, it may be negative. Thus the first term in the squared brackets may 
be negative at high levels of vacancies, and the second at high levels of 
unemployment, but it is unlikely that they will both be negative at the 
same time, as along the U-V curve high levels of vacancies and unemployment 
cannot be observed together.
2
The third term in the squared brackets is - 2( (6 Z/6u) (6z/6v) (6 Z/6V6U)). 
We have seen that both 6Z/6U and 6Z/6V are likely to be negative, the third 
term is equal to
62Z = ¿ F _  + <$^ Q_ " ¿2H
6V6U iv6u 6v6u 6v<5u
(3.14)
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Again we assume that the relevant functions are as depicted in figure 3.3
Figure 3,3 The Combined Effects of Unemployment and Vacancies upon 
the Labour Market Flow Variables
(a) (b) (c)
U V U
In figure 3.3(a) as vacancies increase the curve swivels downwards and the
2slope decreases, therefore 6 F/6V6U is likely to be negative. Similarly
26 Q/(5ViU is also likely to be negative. However in figure 3.3(c) as
vacancies increase the curve swivels upwards and the slope increases, ther-
2 2 efore 6 H/6v6u is likely to be positive. Hence 6 Z/6V6U will be negative.
Therefore all three terms within the squared brackets are likely to
have a positive effect, and the term as a whole is likely to be positive.
Thus on balance we would expect the convexity conditions in (3.11) to be
satisfied. However it is possible that for high values of V or II the
convexity conditions may not hold, but for the range of values with which
we are concerned in this study, these qualifications are unlikely to be
important.
This conclusion is strengthened by consideration of the fact that 
we are considering the national labour market as a whole, which will be 
composed of a great many individual labour markets, aggregated across skills 
and geographically. In this case the condition that the curve be downward 
sloping is
dV dV.i
< 0 (3.15)
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and the additional convexity condition is 
.2 „ r d V
±JI = L ___1 > 0 (3.16)
2 2 dV dV l
These conditions are not as stringent as those for the individual markets, 
as given that we can expect the conditions to be satisfied for the majority 
of the time in individual markets, on the occasions when they are not, for 
specific markets, we can expect this to be balanced by the majority of 
markets where they are satisfied.
Hence for the purposes of the empirical work we will procede on the 
assumption that the part of the U-V curve we are studying is both convex 
and downward sloping.
3.4 The Data
The data was originally for the period January 1966 to mid 1972. The 
regressions themselves were carried out for the period February 1967 to 
mid 1972 (February 1967, as we used up thirteen observations in calculating 
lagged values). It was thought advisable to restrict the empirical work to 
either a recession or a boom as this would reduce the number of disequilib­
rium factors which invalidate, or complicate the accounting identity (3.1) 
and the functional relationship (3.2) . Thus by restricting the analysis to 
a recession we have only cyclical fires to allow for, and not, for example, 
additional workers entering the labour force as employment prospects improve, 
nor would the backlog of quits as the economy moves out of recession prove 
such a problem. With respect to cyclical fires we make the assumption that 
downward adjustments in the desired labour force are mainly achieved by 
failure to make good losses through natural wastage. To the extent that 
this is not so it is hoped that any effects they might have on the analysis 
can be captured by the disequilibrium variables within that analysis, for
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example underlying changes in unemployment. We chose a recession rather 
than a boom as in recent years this will yield more observations. Finally 
the reason why a sample period coinciding with a more recent recession was 
not chosen was that inthe early 1970's data on adult male vacancies alone was 
discontinued and being as the analysis is restricted to the "adult male 
labour market", for reasons we explain later, this precluded a more up to 
date sample base.
A more detailed set of definitions are given at the end of the paper. 
At the moment our wish is to emphasise a few general points. The data for 
unemployment and vacancies relate to monthly statistics, for reasons 
mentioned earlier. The unemployment data has been corrected to exclude 
adult students who registered as unemployed during the vacations, but are 
not otherwise seasonally adjusted. We have preferred to account for any 
seasonal effects explicitly within the regressions by using eleven seasonal 
dummy variables, each of which took a value of one for a particular month 
and zero otherwise.
The unemployment and vacancy figures relate to adult males only. We 
have excluded females on the grounds that fewer of these register as 
unemployed, as many of them do not qualify for unemployment benefits. 
However even the male figures are not perfectly recorded. A recent survey 
by the Department of Employment (1975) found that on average only 16% of 
employers used the employment exchanges. Similarly the unemployment figures 
must understate the true number of unemployed, the principal omission being 
amongst those who quit there job voluntarily, as they will not be able to 
claim unemployment benefit for six weeks.
As already mentioned the unemployment data relates to the monthly 
figures. Sometimes, however, we found a five week gap and sometimes a four 
week gap between the dates on which the counts are made. This will obviously 
make a difference to the regressions when the independent variable is the 
monthly change in unemployment. Consequently these monthly changes have been
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standardised by dividing them by the number of weeks since the previous 
count and multiplying them by four.
Underlying cyclical changes in unemployment and vacancies will have 
disequilibrium effects on U—V observations due to their temporary effects 
on quits, hires and fires. To allow for these effects we need variables 
which reflect the underlying trends in vacancies and unemployment. For 
unemployment we defined such a variable as the change in unemployment over 
a twelve month period, lagged one period, i.e.
YRUNL = Ut_1 - Ut_13 (3.17)
However there seems no reason why the effect of an increase in unemployment 
should be the same as a decrease. We therefore subdivided YRUNL into 
two further variables, the first, INYUL, took the value of YRUNL when it
was positive and zero otherwise. The second FAYUL took the value of YRUNL
when it was negative and zero otherwise. We defined similar variables for 
vacancies based upon YRVAL (defined similarly to YRUNL), but since in the 
regressions there was, on the whole, no significant difference between them, 
we continued to use YRVAL. Also whilst INYUL proved significant, FAYUL did 
not and has been omitted from the results. We feel that it would be wrong
to draw any conclusions from this, due to the fact that the period under
study is one of typically increasing unemployment, thus FAYUL took non-zero 
values for only eight periods.
The unemployment benefits data relates to a single person. In general 
all the rates, for married people with or without children, and single 
persons tend to move together. Hence those relating to a single person "were 
chosen as a proxy for all the rates. To isolate the effects of unemployment 
benefits we have divided the benefits available in any particular period 
by an index of nett earnings. This approach can be justified if we look 
again at inequalities (2.4) and (2.5), which determine the optimal length 
of employee search and his acceptance wage. We reproduce (2.4) below
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wl*' - Bt > l (W®1(t+1) '‘'eltw0 ) 1
(1 + rx)i+1
611dividing both sides by WQ we get
i - f s _  > f
„elt i=0
el(t+1)
( 0 - 1
W.elt Cl + rx)
i+1
(3.18)
(3.19)
For any levels of vacancies and unemployment we can assume the right hand 
side of these equations to functions of t, the length of search. Therefore 
(2.4) and (2.5) can now be written as
1 - Bt > h(t)
...elt
(3.20)
and
1 - Bt-1 < h(t-l) (3.21)
Wel(t-l)
. elt el(t—1)An increase in benefits relative to and may result in these
inequalities no longer holding and to restore them the expected length of
search will have to be lengthened. The relevant variable for representing
©Itthe effects of unemployment benefits would be B^/Wq , although we
eltused a proxy, average nett earnings, for WQ
To represent the employers side of the problem we need a measure of 
the expected net revenue contribution made by the average worker. Again this 
is a variable about which we have no direct measure. As a proxy we have 
taken two measures of profits, before and after stock appreciation. It was 
found on the whole that total gross profits before allowing for stock 
appreciation gave the best results, and it is these which are reported 
below.
There were a number of factors which the theory indicated should be
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included in the regression, but which have been omitted. Firstly we 
argued that over time the average net revenue contribution of the worker 
would be increasing, due to productivity growth. We have failed to take 
any account of this because we felt that the time period within which we 
were working was too small for this effect to be of importance. Although 
when we come to the empirical work on the wage equation itself we will be 
allowing for it. Secondly we have also omitted to include the employers' 
and employee's own discount rates in the regressions. Unfortunately we 
failed to find a satisfactory measure for these concepts. In particular we 
do not regard the use of institutionally determined interest rates as 
fulfilling this purpose. Therefore no attempt was made to account for this 
factor in the regressions. Finally we were, as we have already said, unable 
to find a usable measure for cyclical fires and this had to be excluded 
from the regressions as well.
3.5 The Results
A representative sample of the results is given in Tables 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3. The first point to report is that of all the functional forms
tested, linear, double log and semi-log, the latter, using unemployment
2 ,and log vacancies gave the best results in terms of R s and t statistics.
In Table 3.1 the regressions with changes in unemployment as the 
dependent variable are given. Both unemployment and log vacancies are 
significant in nearly all the regressions, and the coefficients have the 
correct signs. The addition of a profit variable met with success, as did 
the introduction of INYUL, both were significant and both had the correct 
signs, the negative sign on INYUL being possibly due to the temporary 
effect on quits of a sudden increase in unemployment. Unemployment benefits 
were not significant and therefore an alternative way of isolating its 
effects were tried. The month to month changes in the ratio of benefits 
were fairly small, except when either the basic rate of benefit or the
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earnings related components increased. In these months we would expect a 
sudden and large jump in the number unemployed. To isolate this effect we 
included the variable DIBDI in the regressions, this is constructed by 
taking the monthly change in total benefits, zero in most months, and 
dividing it by earnings. This variable did then prove significant and had 
the right sign.
The two variables DEVDU and DEVD1 were included to reflect the effects 
of the 1967 devaluation. In a more general context it seems possible that 
certain events might have such an effect upon confidence that they would 
temporarily disturb the smooth running of the labour market. Widely 
publicised strikes and general elections are two other candidates for such 
effects. But in the event, the 1967 devaluation seems to have had the most 
pronounced effects. This, as we shall see later, confirms, in another field, 
the recent findings of Carlson and Parkin, who found that devaluation had 
a very strong impact on the public mind as far as expectations of inflation 
are concerned.
What seems to have happened in the labour market, in the months 
following devaluation, was that the uncertainty generated had an impact 
effect on hires, fires or quits. Of the three quits seem the most likely 
candidate, with workers defering the decision in a time of general 
uncertainty. As this uncertainty vanished there would be a backlog of 
quits appearing. Hence immediately following devaluation one would expect 
to find U-V observations below the curve, to be followed by a period when 
they were above the curve. DEVDU was therefore operative for the first 
four months following devaluation, and DEVD1 for the four months following 
that. Both of these dummy variables proved significant, moreover the 
coefficients were pleasingly similar in absolute magnitude, with DEVDU 
being slightly larger which is as it should be.
One other event seems to have had a particularly destabilising effect 
upon the labour market. This was the miners' strike of early 1972, which
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led to power cuts and rationing of electricity supplies. It is hardly 
surpising that this should be so, employers, for example, might not be so 
"keen" to fill their vacancies if their existing workforce is not being 
fully utilised. As this event occurred right at the end of our period we 
decided to omit these observations altogether, restricting the regressions 
to the period ending February 1972.
We have now achieved the principal objective of this chapter, i.e. 
to provide an initial test of the search theory developed in chapter 2.
This has been done and the results do on the whole provide a considerable 
amount of support for the theory. However having done this we shall now 
turn to examine these results within the context of the U-V curve. In 
figure 3.4 three representative estimates have been plotted in the unemploym­
ent vacancy plane. First, as curve 1, is the U-V relationship derived 
from the sixth regression in Table 3.1 In this derivation all the disequil­
ibrium terms, INYUL, DEVDU, DEVD1 and DIBDI were set equal to zero. The 
coefficient of II , the profit variable, was multiplied by the average value 
of this variable over the period, and added to the constant term, a process 
which was repeated with . The average value of the seasonal dummies was 
then also calculated and added to the constant term. This gave us
AUt = 1807110 - 0 2612 Ut_j - 146150 log Vt_^ (3.22)
setting A Ut = 0 we get
0 = 1807110 - 0.2612Ut_£ - 146150 log Vt_j (3.23)
from which we get
Ut = 6918490 - 559533 log Vt (3.24)
For comparison purposes the U-V curve was also estimated directly by
regressing U on log V and vice versa. The results of this are shown in
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Tables 3.2 and 3.3. But before examining these it should be noted that the 
two devaluation dummies are not defined in the same way as before, as in 
this case the U-V curve is being estimated directly. DEVDU was, therefore, 
operative for the first three months following devaluation, then there is 
a two month gap as the U-V observations cross the curve with the restoring 
of confidence, and DEVD1 is operative for the three months following that.
The principal difference, then, between these results and those in 
Table 1 is the greater significance of the benefits term. Using a similar 
method as before we can calculate a relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies and unemployment. For the fifth regression in Table 3.2, which 
was the closest counterpart to the regression used to derive (3.24), this 
is
Ut = 5390090 - 429677 logVt (3.25)
and for the fifth regression in Table 3.3
Ut = 5629850 - 449762 log Vt (3.26)
Both of these curves were then superimposed upon figure 3.4. As can be 
seen all three curves are reasonably similar, but the first one is flatter 
and lies farther to the N.E. than the other two. Besides the statistical 
biases which underlie the regressions, a major reason for this difference 
may be due to the different assumptions which form the basis of the differ­
ent estimation techniques. The first curve which was estimated by regress­
ing changes in unemployment on unemployment, vacancies and the other 
independent variables, rested upon the assumption that downward adjustments 
in the desired labour force are mainly achieved by a failure to make good 
losses through natural wastage, or alternatively that cyclical fires can 
be proxied by the disequilibrium variables such as INYUL.
On the other hand the other two curves were derived directly from 
estimating unemployment, or vice versa. This procedure may have difficulty
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in taking account of cyclical effects, particularly in a continual, or 
almost continual recession, as this period was.
Before leaving this section we should point to certain weakness’s in
the analysis. In particular all of the regressions were estimated by O.L.S.,
wheras there is reason to believe that there is some simultaneity between
the variables. This is particularly likely to be the case in the regressions
in Table 3.1, where we are regressing changes in unemployment on U , , which
t “ 2
is the average of unemployment in period t and t-1. However, formulating a 
properly specified simultaneous model would have made this section altogether 
too lengthy, hence the use of O.L.S.. In doing this,we might note, that we 
are in sympathy with a substantial body of recent empirical work which 
prefers the simplicity and robustness of O.L.S. to the more sophisticated 
simultaneous techniques. Thus, for example, Davidson et al (1979) use 
O.L.S. in work on the consumption function. Similarly the London Business 
School in their large scale econometric model have found O.L.S. to give 
more robust results than other methods, and therefore seem to prefer it 
over those other methods. One might also note in passing that use of 
simultaneous equation estimators does not necessarily remove the problem, 
2SLS, e.g., gives asymptotically unbiased estimators, however in small 
samples the bias still remains.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented an initial test of the search theory 
developed in chapter 2. If this had proved unfavourable to the theory, then 
there would have been little point in proceeding to analyse its implications 
for inflation. However, the results did, on the whole, provide significant 
support for the theory. Thus if, when we come to examine these implications, 
we find the relevant variables to be significant, we can with some justific­
ation claim this as further verification of our search theoretic approach
to inflation.
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Thus we can now proceed to an empirical analysis of wage inflation 
itself. This we shall do in chapter 7, however prior to that we shall 
devote the next three chapters to expectations of inflation, which of 
course play a central role in theoretical and empirical analyses of inflat­
ion. In particular we shall, in the next chapter, be concerned with an 
examination of the various theories of expectation formation, and the 
literature which surrounds them.
However before we leave this chapter we should note that in testing 
the search theory, we were also testing the implications of that theory 
for the U-V curve. Thus out of this arise several further conclusions 
which are of relevance for the U-V curve itself. Most importantly we can 
conclude that, contrary to the conclusion of Warren (1977), there does 
seem to be some sort of semi equilibrium relationship between unemployment 
and vacancies. However the position of this within the U-V plane is to 
some extent determined by the values of certain other variables. The 
influence of a profit variable in particular seems very strong, thus the 
greater are profits, the closer is the U-V curve to the origin. Also 
important, seems to be the ratio of unemployment benefits to nett earnings, 
although the effect of this is less certain than that of profits.
The position of the U-V curve will also be determined by the parameters 
of search activity, thus anything which improves the efficiency of search 
by, for example, increasing the number of interviews for any given levels 
of unemployment and vacancies, will shift the U-V curve towards the origin. 
Thus any body concerned with the more efficient working of the labour 
market should consider, amongst other points, ways of improving the 
dissemination of information concerning jobs and also ways of improving 
the transport facilities available to the unemployed. This could be done 
either by providing them with free transport passes or by improving the 
transport network as a whole. The former conclusion, concerning the 
importance of information has, of course, been widely realised, and to some
extent acted upon. But the latter conclusion does not seem to have been
widely appreciated.
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Data Appendix to Chapter 3
Vacancies; These are adult male vacancies reported to the employment 
exchanges. Source: Department of Employment Gazette.
Unemployment: Adult males who register as unemployed at the employment 
exchanges, less any students who register as unemployed during the vacation. 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette (Up to April 1971 the number of 
adult students are estimates by the Department of Employment).
Profits*: These are gross trading profits seasonally adjusted, arising in 
the U.K. before allowance is made for stock appreciation. These are quart­
erly figures, to obtain "monthly estimates" we have used linear interpola­
tions. Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement.
G.D.P.*: Gross domestic product at factor cost seasonally adjusted.
Unemployment Benefits: These are for a married couple with no children. The 
amount of earnings related supplement has been calculated on the assumption 
that the average weekly earnings for October in the relevant tax year 
represent the average for that year. Source: Department of Health and 
Social Security.
Earnings: Average weekly earnings of adult male manual workers as estimated 
by the Department of Health and Social Security, based on the average gross 
weekly earnings of male, adult, full-time manual workers as determined by 
the Department of Employment's October inquiry into the earnings of manual 
workers employed in manufacturing and certain other industries, and the 
monthly index of average earnings. Source: Department of Health and Social 
Security.
»Note, to obtain both G.D.P. and profits the following procedure was used 
to arrive at underlying trends: to get the quarterly figures we used a three 
month moving average. Thus if for a year actual profit figures are
I 2000
II 2500
III 2800
IV 3000
Then the second and third quarters are amended thus
Profits in II = 2000 + 2500 + 2800 — 2433
3
Profits in III = 2500 + 2800 + 3000 = 2766
3
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and June = 2433
July = 2433 + 111 = 2544
Aug. = 2544 + 111 = 2655
Sept. = 2766
A
f
ï
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Chapter 4
A Review of the Literature on Expectations of Inflation
4.1 Introduction
Expectations as a concept seem to be growing increasingly important, 
and much of economic theory is now being phrased, or rephrased in terms of 
expectations. Indeed in future years when economists look back at this era, 
it may well prove to be that the more complete integration of expectations 
into economic theory proves to be the thread that links together much of 
the work being done, in a similar manner as the rejection of the assumption 
of perfect knowledge characterises much of the work done in the inter-war 
period.
However this awareness of the importance of expectations is not a new 
phenomenon. Marshall (1920), for example, was aware of the importance of 
the concept, though as Shackle (1967) comments, this was a trumpet he chose 
not to blow too hard. But it was really in Sweden that the importance of 
expectations in the economic process was first fully appreciated, with the 
work, amongst others, of Gunnar Myrdal (1939). Whilst in England,at about 
the same time,Keynes was of course, beginning the journey down the road that 
was to lead to the General Theory in which expectations are of prime import­
ance .
Most of this work was concerned with the effects of expectations, but 
not so much with how those expectations were formed. Keynes, at least, 
thought that some expectations were closely akin to a random variable and 
hence unexplainable, that is unless a theory of animal spirits can be 
provided. Since then, and particularly since 1960 a substantial volume of 
literature has appeared concerned with how expectations are formed. This can 
be divided into two fairly distinct parts, that dealing with theoretical
considerations and that which is mainly empirical in nature. There has, of
course, been some interchange between these two avenues of research, but 
unfortunately this has not been common, and they have by and large remained 
seperate areas. 11 is hoped in this survey, not only to summarise these two 
approaches, but to forge links between them and to reach conclusions based 
upon conclusions from both of them. We shall also briefly be examining 
empirical work which has attempted to incorporate expectations within a 
model of wage inflation.
4.2 Theories of Expectation Formation
One of the first studies to put forward a hypothesis of expectation 
formation was Exekial's study of the cobweb theorem (1938). He assumed that 
expectations were "naive", that is the expected price is equal to the most 
recent known price, although if it were being put forward today, it would 
probably relate, not to the price level, but its rate of change.
A slightly more sophisticated model was proposed by Hicks (1946), and 
is known as the extrapolative expectations hypothesis, this can be expressed 
as :
Pt = a0 + 3lPt + W  Pt-1) (4.1)
Hicks assumed that aQ = 0 and a1 = 1. An alternative version propsed by 
Metzler (1941) allowed these parameters to take alternative values. Hicks' 
original model asserted that inflation for the next period equals the rate 
of inflation in the current period plus an adjustment which allows for
the rate of change of inflation. In other words people are forming their 
expectations not about the rate of change of prices, but the rate of change 
of that, i.e. this is basically a second order expectations mechanism. Viewed 
in this light it seems a rather over sophisticated hypothesis for times of 
normal inflation. Since Hicks wrote the term extrapolative hypothesis has 
been used to describe any method of expectation formation which is based
upon a distributed lag of actual price changes, i.e.
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E a . Pi t-i (4.2)
In this form it is probably more acceptable than Hicks' formation and in 
particular does not necessarily imply that expectations are being formed 
about the rate of change of the inflation rate.
A third approach to expectation formation, which can be viewed as a 
special case of the extrapolative hypothesis, has come to dominate much of 
the work done in expectations. This is the adaptive expectations hypothesis. 
It was first proposed by Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1958) and formally states 
that expectations are revised in accordance with the last recorded error, 
hence its alternative name, the error learning approach. Algebraically it 
can be represented as
which is equivalent to an extrapolative model with geometrically declining 
weights:
X is the adjustment parameter and the larger it is the more rapid is the 
adjustment of expectations to the actual rate of inflation, or alternatively 
the more rapid the weights decline in (4.4).
Another variation on the extrapolative theme, which has achieved some 
prominence recently, is the regressive-extrapolative expectations hypothesis. 
This was first suggested by Duesenberry (1958), and expanded upon by 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966). They suggest that there may be both extrapolative 
elements, in the narrow sense, as defined in (4.1), and regressive elements 
simultaneously. This regression implies a reversion of expectations towards 
a long-run "normal" level which may in itself be a given parameter of the 
system, or a lagged function of actual price changes, where the lag may be
(4.3)
00
p® = E d -  x ^ p
i=l t-i
(4.4)
an extended one over a period of several years. In the latter case the
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hypothesis merely becomes a special case of the more general extrapolative 
hypothesis as defined in (4.2).
There is one further major theory of expectation formation, the rational 
expectations hypothesis. This is somewhat different from the other 
hypotheses that we have examined in that expectations are not formed on the 
basis of the present and past behaviour of prices. It was originally 
proposed by Muth (1961), who argued that expectations are formed in 
accordance with the "relevant economic theory". In Muth's own words
"In particular the hypothesis asserts that the economy does 
not waste information and that expectations depend specif­
ically on the structure of the entire system."
In more formal terms the rational expectations hypothesis proposes that 
expectations, or more generally the subjective probability distribution'of 
outcomes tends to be distributed,for the same information set,about the 
prediction of the theory, or the objective distribution of outcomes.
These are the major theories of expectation formation, however some 
economists, for example Carlson and Parkin (1975), have suggested that actual 
expectation formation does not correspond to any single one of these 
hypotheses in their pure form. But elements of several theories may be 
relevant in the formation of expectations. Thus we have, for example, 
the rational-adaptive hypothesis, whereby expectations are formed partly by 
an adaptive mechanism and partly by taking into account non—price information 
in a rational manner.
How then does one decide between these differing theories? There have 
been two approaches, the first examines theoretical considerations and the 
second looks at the empirical evidence. We shall develop the theoretical 
approach first.
4.3 A Theoretical Evaluation of the Differing Theories
The majority of the work aimed at providing a theoretical justification
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for any of these hypotheses has been couched in terms of optimal forecast­
ing considerations. The exceptions to this being papers by Turnovsky (1969) 
and Cyert and DeGroot (1974), who both adopt a Bayesian framework for their 
analyses. These two papers, although they develop a different approach to 
the rest of the literature, in several respects also characterise that 
literature. For example, they concentrate upon the adaptive expectations 
and the rational expectations hypotheses, which is an approach which 
characterises much of the literature which we are going to review.
We will begin this part of the review with the two papers already 
mentioned, namely Turnovsky's and Cyert and DeGroot's. This order of 
approach is not based upon chronological considerations, but these papers 
do not fit in easily with the rest of the literature and it was decided to 
deal with them at the beginning rather than at the end of the review.
Turnovsky's paper shows that if we can regard expectations as being 
altered in a Bayesian manner over time, and the prior distribution is normal, 
an assumption he goes some way to justifying, then at period t the 
expected value in t+1, P®, of a variable P, in his example prices, will be 
given by the following equation
p; - Vi =(i wt/wt-i) (pt - pt-i) (4.5)
where W is the variance of the (normal) distribution of expected prices 
and P® is the mean of that distribution, and
t
(4.6)
where a^ is the varaince of prices in period t, which is known by the 
decision maker.
This is very similar to the adaptive expectations hypothesis, the 
only difference being that the rate of adaption is not a constant, but
the relative precision of expectationsvaries at a rate which depends upon
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in period t and t-1. For this to be a constant, k, we require that
1 - Wt/Wt_1 = k (4.7)
that is
Wt = W0(l - k)* (4.8)
which is unlikely to happen in Turnovsky's example.
Turnovsky's paper is interesting in as much as it shows how the 
parameters may be arrived at within an adaptive expectations formula.
However its more general relevance is somewhat limited by the fact that it 
takes as a basis a time series which is generated by random fluctuations 
around a given mean. The decsion makers problem is then to find that mean. 
Then, given, more observations he will become more confident in his estimate 
and respond less and less to temporary fluctuations, which is what equation 
(4.5) implies. The problems faced by real world decision makers are 
however, at least as regards forecasting future inflation rates, generally 
more complex. More realistic analyses can be built around variants of 
autoregressive moving average processes with which the remainder of the 
literature has been primarily concerned with and which seem more capable of 
generating time series similar to those which we observe in the real world.
Cyert and DeGroot also develop a Bayesian analysis, but to explain 
the process by which rational expectations may be developed within a 
market. The model they take is essentially the one Muth used to illustrate 
the concept of rational expectations which we shall discuss later. Their 
version of Muth's three equation model is
ct = dl - ept (demand)
(4.9)
Qt = d2 + Ypt-i + Ut (supply)
(4.10)
Qt = Ct
(market equilibrium) (4.11)
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By solving the market equations we obtain the relation
(4.12)
D P
By taking expected values at t-1, we get
(4.13)
If we make the further assumption that the statistical concept of an 
expected value coincides with psycho-economic concept of expectations, i.e.
Suppose that the posterior distribution of D (D = d^ - dg) at the end of 
period t-1 is normal with mean m  ^and precision h^^, then Cyert and 
DeGroot show that, using Bayes theorem, the expected will be given by
The main difficulty with this result is again its lack of generality. 
The problem here has been to estimate parameter values within a model. But 
in general the rational expectations hypothesis supposes that certain 
variables depend upon the values of certain other variables, and Cyert and 
DeGroot have little to say about this relationship. Indeed in as much as we
(4.14)
and that each U. has a normal distribution with zero mean and knownt
precision, it follows that
(4.15)
b + y
pt-i = (ht-i + (Fy(6 + Y))mt-i + rppt (4.16)
and that
plim Et_1(Pt) D (4.17)
t -X» b + y
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can regard the rational expectations hypothesis as having an extrapolative 
foundation, a statement which is expanded upon later in this section, it 
would seem that Turnovsky's work has more relevance for the rational expect- 
ions hypothesis.
The remainder of the literature is mainly concerned with optimal 
forecasting considerations. The basis for this approach was laid by Muth 
(1960). In this paper he showed that, if a time series can be regarded as 
following the process shown below
then an adaptive expectations measure of expectations is optimal, where 
the adaptive expectations coefficent is equal to 3, i.e.
noted that the time series in (4.18) corresponds to a linear function of 
random shocks, where the shock associated with each time period has a weight 
of unity. Its weight in successive time periods however is constant, and 
lies somewhere between zero and one.
He also shows that the same type of forecasting rule is optimal if 
the time series approximates a random walk with noise superimposed, i.e.
00
(4.18)
and E ( e t )  = 0 ,  V a r ( E t ) = 0 2
+ B ( Y 0 < t < 1 (4.19)
00
Y (4.20)t
important in all of this literature is the criteria of optimality which 
they employ, and here again Muth sets the pattern which most of the studies 
are to follow. His criteria of optimality is to minimise the error variance,
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Min E(Yt - Y®)2 (4.21)
The criteria of optimality chosen obviously has important implications for 
the conclusions reached as to the optimal forecasting mechanism, and later 
we shall consider the specific implications of choosing a minimum variance 
criteria.
The time series considered by Muth are rather limited in character 
and some work has been done extending his results to cover more general 
cases. This work has been summarised by Rose (1972), who examines the 
optimal forecasting method when the time series can be described as an 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) process. The principal 
conclusion is that the optimal current period forecast will, in general, be 
a weighted average of n previous errors, where n will depend upon the exact 
properties of the time series to be forecast. The adaptive expectations 
mechanism is then only optimal when the process is such that n equals one.
Denoting the lag operator by B we may write an ARMA (p,q) process as
or a linear transform of it to remove the mean of the series. If (4.22) has 
d unit roots we may rewrite it as
In this form we have an ARIMA (p,d,q) process, which is basically an 
autoregressive moving average process stationary, not in y^ as with an 
ordinary ARMA process, but in the d'th difference of y .^
If then the time series we are interested in can be described by such 
a process, the optimal forecast, in terms of minimising the error variance 
is as we have already said a weighted average of n previous errors, where n
0(B)y(t) = <(>(B)at (4.22)
where 0(B) and (¡>(B) are both finite lag operators of order p and q
respectively, is a random disturbance term and yt the dependent variable,
0(B) = 0(B)(1 " B)d (4.23)
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will depend upon the characteristics of the ARIMA process, for example, when 
we have an ARIMA (0,1,1) process, only the previous error will be considered. 
This is the adaptive expectations mechanism used by Cagan and Nerlove.
An alternative way of looking at the problem of expectation formation, 
which is usefull for the different perspective that it gives to the 
problem, is that we can regard it as being a special application of the 
Kalman filter. Given a model
where lower case letters denote vectors and upper case ones matrices, 
y ^  is a vector of lagged dependent variables and x^  a vector of exogenous 
variables. And also given an observation an observation equation
which relates the dependent variables' to their observed counterpart s^ . 
and where the disturbance terms have the usual properties. is assumed to 
be a known matrix. The problem then is to find the mean vector
(4.24)
(4.25)
Because the problem is to predict ytfrom st, we might consider the 
regression of y on st> and if the solution is to be a revision of the 
estimate at time t-1, it is appropriate to consider the regression of on
s given s . The linear regression can be written as 
t t-1
E(ytl st) = E(yt| st) + Dt(st - E(sJ s ^ ) ) (4.26)
where D is the matrix of regression coefficients. Now from (4.25) we get
E(st|st-i) = MtE(ytl st_1) (4.27)
and inserting this into (4.26)
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E<ytlst) = (I " DtMt)E(ytlSt-1) + Vt (4.28)
Now taking conditional values of (4.24)
E ( y t ) = E<yt |st _ 1) = ^t E ( y t _ 1l s t _ 1) ♦ V t  + bt (4.29)
and combining this with (4.28)
E(yjst) = (I - D ^ X A ^ . J s ^ )  + + +
= (AtE(yt_i|st_i) + Ct*t + bt) +
Dt (3t " W t - l K - l  + V t  + bt }) (4.30)
This is the principle result of the Kalman-filter and it was derived as a 
conditional expectation of y^ given s^. As such it is an optimal estimator 
of y , in the sense of being a minimum variance estimator. (The Kalman- 
filter was originally put forward by Kalman (1960), our analysis of it has 
drawn heavily on that of Chow (1975)).
The relevance of the Kalman-filter to the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis was made explicit by L Taylor (1970) and Nerlove (1972). Its use 
requires a slightly different perspective on expectations to that generally 
adopted. It requires us to think of a variable as being divided into 
permanent and temporary components. The permanent component satisfies a 
p'th order linear stochastic difference equation. We can convert this into 
a first order system of p equations:
yt = Ayt-1 + Ut
(4.31)
however the observed series is generated by
st = Myt + nt (4.32)
where M = ( 1 0 0 0)
pplying the filtering equation (4.30) to this we have
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E(yt|st) = (I - DtM)A(E(yt_1|st_1)) + Dtst (4.33)
where is a vector of coefficents in the regressions of the p elements of 
yt on st. When p = 1, E(y^|st) will be a linear combination of the 
prediction in the last period and the currently observed s^.
This mention of the Kalman-filter is interesting in several respects, 
in the first place most economic analyses of expectations seem unaware of 
it and it is therefore of some interest to those concerned with the 
development of economic ideas. Secondly this alternative way of looking at 
expectations, as being essentially the filtering out a permanent element 
from a time series, emphasises something which underlies most theories of 
expectations, but is seldom made explicit. Namely that we implicitly regard 
the observed time series as behaving something like (4.32),with permanent 
and temporary components, and in some sense it is this permanent component 
which we are trying to isolate. Finally the Kalman-filter provides a 
justification for the adaptive expectations hypothesis using a different 
rationale than Muth's and based upon a time series with different properties
Taken together these results do seem to provide some justification for 
the hypothesis that expectations are based upon the past behaviour of the 
variable being forecast. However this result is not without its qualificat­
ions. Nelson (1975) shows that if the variable can be regarded as being 
endogenously determined within an economic model, then in general,rational 
expectations based upon that model will provide optimal forecasts,and 
not expectations based upon the past history of that variable. In particular 
this is so even when the variable can be specified as a linear function of 
random disturbance terms. For example, consider a structure with only two
inputs, xt and yt, where
xt = ¿ V t - f  and yt
00
T. 0
i=0 i t-i
(4.34)
so that
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zi- = xt + y+
(4.35)
we could write z a s  a linear function of its own past history
Z* '  ¿ ‘ ■ 'H
(4.36)
where w is a sequence of uncorrelated distrubances with variance a . This t w
follows from the decomposition theory of Wold, since x^ and y are both 
stationary and independent, z^ must be stationary and has a representation 
as a linear stochastic process of the form
Zt = if17TiZt-i + Wt (4.37)
thus both rational and extrapolative expectations may be formed. It was the 
gist of Nelson's paper that rational expectations based upon (4.35) will 
have a smaller mean square prediction error than extrapolative expectations 
based upon (4.37).
This result has since been generalised by Wallis (1977) to apply to all 
cases where the exogenous variables in the model follow an ARIMA process. 
This would seem to be the coup de grace, and indeed in the context of the 
ground rules within which the debate has been conducted it is. If one 
accepts that the criteria of optimality be based solely upon minimising 
the error variance then we must conclude that wherever an economic model is 
applicable then expectations are formed in accordance with that model.
However if we return to Muth's original paper we see that one of the 
principal justifications for his hypothesis was that
'If expectations were not moderately rational there would 
be opportunities for economists to make profits in commod­
ity speculation, running a firm or selling the information 
to present owners."
Yet we now observe this last phenomenon, economists are now employed by
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private agencies to formulate forecasts which are sold to firms. This would 
therefore seem to weaken the foundations upon which the rational expectations 
hypothesis is built. This conclusion is even more justified if we consider 
how professional economic forecasters arrive at their forecasts. Do they take 
advantage of computer technology to construct full scale economic models, 
the parameters of which are found by regression techniques? Unfortunately 
they do not, in general forecasts are based upon extrapolative models, for 
example Box-Jenkins models which have come into vogue in recent years.
There are several possible reasons as to why they do this, Nelson 
himself suggesting one important possibility
"Of course unlike the hypothetical rational economic agent 
who knows the parameters as well as the form of the econo­
mic structure he deals with, econometric models may be 
subject to errors of specification and parameter estimation.
We can only speculate that these errors are great enough 
at the present state of the art to prevent structural 
models from attaining their potential as tools of prediction"
What Nelson seems to be saying here is that the superiority of rational 
over extrapolative forecasts is only valid as long as all the parameters 
are known with certainty, as well, of course, as the correct economic model 
to use. If this is not the case then he seems to be implying that the problem 
is indeterminate. However the very fact that professional forecasters use 
an extrapolative model would seem to suggest that for many time series 
this at present, and presumably in the past also, represents the optimal 
method to use in the formation of expectations.
A second, but related, consideration is that of the time profile of 
the availability of the data. In the simple model described by equation 
(4.35), for example, where one time series, zt, depended upon two others, 
it may be that zt is known sooner than xt or y^. In this case even with 
complete information about parameter values the extrapolative scheme based 
upon more up to date information might provide better estimates than those
based upon rational expectations.
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A further problem with the rational expectations hypothesis is just 
how individuals obtain their knowledge of the economic system, its structure 
and parameter values. Unfortunately this has only been partially dealt with 
in the literature. Some consideration has been given as to how individuals 
might obtain estimates of the parameters, generally within a least squares 
or a Bayesian framework. Thus Blanchard (1976) used a discrete time model 
to investigate the problem of agents discovering the correct specification 
of the model generating the behaviour of the overall system. His results 
showed that even given an infinite amount of time in which to learn, agents 
beliefs about the specification will not necessarily converge to that of 
the true model, so that expectations will not necessarily become rational 
in Muth's sense. Taylor (1975) used a continuous time model in which agents 
already know all aspects of the system except the value of a single parameter 
in the (correctly) specified equation, describing the behaviour of the 
monetary policy authority. In this case estimates of the parameter did 
eventually converge to the true value.
Both these examples are based on extremely simplistic assumptions.
More relevant is the question of how individuals, uncertain as to the exact 
economic structure as well as the parameter values, obtain that information. 
Moreover even if we could assume that they do,what characterises their 
expectations during the learning process? This latter question has been con­
sidered by Friedman (1979) who concludes that it is extremely unlikely that 
expectations in the recent past can have been rational, in Muth s sense, 
particularly in view of the many drastic changes that have taken place 
in economists views as to the underlying economic process which generates 
inflation.
4.4 An Evaluation of the Optimality Criteria
Throughout the literature only one type of cost has been considered
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that of the expectations being in error, and in general this has been 
considered in only one context, the error variance. This implicitly assumes 
that the formation of expectations is a costless activity. At first sight 
this might not appear unreasonable, after all the costs of adapting the 
previous periods expectations by a proportion of the resulting error are 
surely minimal. But if one considers the more general extrapolative scheme, 
this involves the calculation of several parameters, perhaps an infinite 
number, which weight the same number of lagged observations of the time 
series, which must also be remembered. Is it reasonable to consider that 
this is a costless operation, and that it remains costless no matter how 
many lagged values are included? Or is it not more reasonable to assume that 
there are costs involved, and that these costs probably increase with the 
number of parameters being used?
When we consider the rational expectations hypothesis these comments 
seem even more valid, for here we have not only to consider several sets 
of parameters, but thought has to be given as to what variables to include 
within the economic model. Here again we have the analogy with the profess­
ional forecasters, for their preference for extrapolative methods of 
forecasting might also reflect the fact that such methods are probably 
considerably cheaper than building full scale econometric models. 
Considerations of cost might also explain why professional forecasters were 
not very numerous in 1961, when Muth's paper appeared, but have since 
proliferated rapidly. The reason is not that expectations were rational in 
1961, but for some reason have got steadily less so. But simply that with 
the progress of computer technology such forecasts have become cheaper to 
produce and hence profitable for firms to purchase.
In slightly more specific terms the cost function should therefore be 
amended in the following manner
Ci = Cu  + f(E(y® - y)2) (4.38)
where the i denotes the method used to form the expectations and C theli
'formation cost" of that method. The second term on the right hand side 
denotes the cost of being in error. The individual would then choose the 
forecasting method which minimised the sum of these two costs. This would 
then be the optimal method of expectation formation. This approach then 
helps us to explain why individuals do not form expectations on all possible 
time series. Why for example non-car owners are unlikely to form expectations 
about petrol prices. This kind of behaviour is incapable of being explained 
by the standard approach, indeed it has nothing to say about which variables 
individuals form expectations about and which they ignore. However the 
modified cost function approach adopted here tells us that individuals will 
form expectations for those series where the total cost, of the optimal 
method is less than the cost to the individual of being uninformed about 
the future values of that series.
Thus in reaching a conclusion about optimal methods of expectation 
formation two points must be borne in mind, the formation costs of any 
particular method and its accuracy. Moreover for methods where parameter 
values have to be learned over a period of time, the transition costs to 
the final parameters and model (e.g. the incresed error in transition), 
should be borne in mind. Thus it will not always be the case that the 
most accurate method, i.e. the minimum variance one, will be optimal, 
for it may well be that this also involves heavy formation costs. The great 
advantage of the adaptive expectations hypothesis lies in its simplicity 
and hence its relatively small formation costs, knowledge is only required 
of the current value of the time series being forecast and a single 
parameter. Compare this with the large number of parameters and variables 
which must be used in calculations using extrapolative, large order error 
learning or rational schemes, and we have, I think, the real reason for 
the popularity of the adaptive expectations hypothesis amongst economists.
These two hypotheses have so far been put forward as competing theories
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and indeed this is largely how it has been approached in the literature.
Yet as often happens this has served to obscure how much commom ground 
there exists between the rational expectations hypothesis and the various 
extrapolative theories.
The rational expectations hypothesis as propounded so far is not, in 
general terms, an alternative to an extrapolative hypothesis, it cannot be 
for it is often based upon extrapolative expectations. An examination of 
equation (4.35) reveals that expectations for z^ are based upon expectations 
of two other variables, x^ and y^, this is the rational content of the 
hypothesis. But expectations of x^ and y are formed in an extrapolative 
manner, they are based upon the past history of x and y. Although note 
should be made that when the value of z depends upon lagged values of x 
and y, which are already known, then we can use those values to forecast z, 
and in this case there is no extrapolative element. But the general point 
remains that the real debate should not be about whether expectations in 
general are formed in an extrapolative or a rational manner. Rather it should 
be which expectations are formed in a rational manner and which are formed 
by an extrapolative mechanism.
Few economists would deny that some expectations are formed rationally. 
Although the theory probably has most relevance within the context Muth 
originally placed it, the decision making process of the firm, it would seem 
that even outside the firm there are grounds for believing that some 
expectations are formed in a rational manner. However with respect to the 
theory of inflation, the most important set of expectations are those which 
concern future price levels and are held by the average working man. We are 
now far removed from the simple single good, supply and demand context within 
which Muth introduced his hypothesis. The most striking difference is that 
there is no universally accepted model of inflation. What we do have are a 
number of competing theories, none of which seem capable of explaining the 
inflationary process in a completely satisfactory manner. For any economist
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to assume that such expectations are formed in accordance with the particular 
theory he favours seems completely unjustifiable, even more so when they 
call for the working man to have a detailed knowledge of the money supply 
and how it interacts with the price level.
However it would seem almost as unlikely that individuals base their 
expectations upon a pure extrapolative scheme. One cannot dismiss Tobin's 
(1972) claim that people obtain information about the economic system 
through the newspapers thateasilly. The media is important, and when they 
read or hear of a forthcoming prices and incomes policy, of the devaluation 
of the pound, or of oil price rises, then it seems likely that they will 
use this information in forming their expectations. However Tobin's 
statement, in order to be taken as a justification for the rational 
expectations hypothesis, must establish two facts. Firstly, the newspapers, 
and this means basically the tabloid newspapers, and television, need to 
give regular price forecasts based upon the "relevant theory”, and 
secondly these have to be seen and believed by the working population as 
a whole. Neither of these propositions seem likely to be true. What seems 
more likely is that expectations are formed in a semi-rational, semi- 
extrapolative manner, the rational-extrapolative hypothesis. By this is 
meant that, as Muth stated,the economic system does not waste information 
and though it would seem likely that expectations are based partly upon an 
extrapolative mechanism, outside factors such as those already mentioned 
may have an effect upon expectations.
Here then we conclude this section by foreshadowing a conclusion 
which we might make in more definite terms at a later stage in the analysis.
It is, for applied economists, not an encouraging conclusion, but it seems 
inescapable. The problem of modelling peoples expectations is an extremely 
difficult one. It does not seem likely that one particular mechanism is 
used all the time. The most likely mechanism is the rational-extrapolative
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one with the weights of the different components varying with time. It may 
be that the rational component is increasing with time as knowledge of the 
economic system increases both among the general public and amongst econom­
ists themselves. It may also be that the parameters within the extrapolative 
scheme vary with time, so that in some periods expectations adapt more 
slowly to the actual rate of inflation than in others. But exactly when 
this change in behaviour takes place, and how people take account of 
external information such as commodity/raw material price rises, devaluati­
ons etc is not obvious. This implies that it is going to be very difficult, 
if not impossible, to generate a series for expectations, for use in time 
series analyses. Nor can we easilly get round the problem by trying to 
estimate expectation formation parameters within the complete model of 
the inflationary process. But the attempt must be made, if the theory 
indicates that expectations are an important explanatory variable, then 
those expectations must be proxied. But success will not this time be 
measured principally in statistical terms, but as should always be the case, 
in terms of how well do the estimated parameters fit in with the predictions 
from theory.
4.5 Empirical Evidence on Expectation Formation
Empirical work on expectation formation has proceeded in two general 
directions. The first uses actual data on expectations, whilst the second 
and more indirect method, includes the expectation mechanism within the 
structure of the model being estimated. We shall here concentrate upon the 
first of these two methods before turning, briefly, to examine the second.
Direct tests on the formation of expectations have been comparitively 
limited. This is principally because of the difficulty of obtaining data 
on expectations. There have been two general methods of proceeding, the first 
is to obtain data directly from sample surveys. The second derives the data 
indirectly by observing the consequences of peoples behaviour when
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expectations enter the decision making process. In practice this generally 
implies observing the difference between the interest rates on price 
indexed and non-price indexed bonds.
One of the first studies to use survey data was Turnovsky's (1970).
He derived the data from the Livingstone Survey of Business Economists 
in the United States. This is a bi-annual survey, whereby business 
economists are asked for predictions of a number of economic series, 
including the consumer price index. Using this data Turnovsky found that 
there appeared to be a change in behaviour around 1963/4. Prior to this 
neither the adaptive expectations or the extrapolative hypotheses worked 
very well. Expectations appeared to be constant with some correction being 
made for past trends, when businessmen tended to extrapolate. However in the 
later period both the adaptive and extrapolative models fared better, by 
the standard statistical measures. In addition the sum of the coefficents 
in the adaptive expectations model is not statistically different from one. 
The coefficent of adaption is approximately 0.78, which suggests rapid 
adjustment of expectations to the actual rate of inflation. However it 
should be noted that they are forced, by the nature of the data, to assume 
that expectations are revised at six monthly intervals, and it is possible 
that if expectations are in fact revised at more frequent intervals, the 
estimate of the adjustment coefficent will be biased. This is a point to 
which we will return later. Finally it should be noted that he also 
included the rate of unemployment in the regressions, but this was not 
significant.
Turnovsky also used the Livingstone data in a second paper in 
conjunction with Wachter (1972), where they test extrapolative, adaptive 
and rational theories of expectation formation. The results are shown in 
Table 4.1 and suggest, that in this case rational expectations furnish a 
superior explanation of expectation formation than simple adaptive or 
extrapolative schemes. The particular model proposed is a simple
Table 4.1 Turnovsky and Wachter's Results
Model Equations K D.W.
Extrapolative = 0.809Wt - 0.318(Wt - *t-i> 0.148 1.12
(9.566) (2.293)
Adaptive = 0.533Wt + 0.337W®_1 0.242 1.86
(4.896) (2.798)
Rational = 1.531 + 33.617U”1 - 30.713U~^ + 0.503Pt 0.490 1.59
(1.262) (3.493) (3.335) (3.256)
= 1.185 + 28.88U”1 - 23.27311”^  + 0.624P® 0.527 2.14
(1.009) (2.985) (2.440) (3.76)
Notes: The expectations are revised bi-annually and are for six months
ahead. They relate to the period 1949 - 69. The figures in 
brackets are t statistics.
expectations augmented Phillips curve. The most plausible explanation for 
the two unemployment variables is that both the level of unemployment and 
its rate of change are considered within the rational model.
However in evaluating these results it should be borne in mind that 
there are a number of shortcomings with the data. These have been analysed 
in a paper by Carlson (1977) who points out that the data collected by 
Livingstone relate to price levels, and that it is from these that the 
expected inflation rates are derived. The main difficulty with this is that 
the predictions are made for June and December, i.e. six months after they 
are published. But the predictions are not made in the months in which they 
are published, but in the previous months, that is November and May. 
Moreover the latest data available in those months relates to the months 
before those, that is October and April. Carlson therefore concludes that 
the forecasts should more correctly be regarded as eight month forecasts.
But the chief qualification to these results must be that they are 
formed by business economists, therefore they may not be representative of 
the way the population as a whole form their expectations. This qualificat~ 
ion is important for economists are much more likely to form their
expectations in accordance with the relevant economic theory than the rest 
of the population. In addition Livingstone provides the respondents with 
up to date information about the economy and therefore the problem of how 
people perceive the rate of inflation is not tackled. These considerations 
impose serious limitations on the results, yet it does not render them 
completely invalid, and it seems possible that several of the characteristics 
of these expectations might be carried over to expectations in general.
For example the relative insensitivity of these expectations to actual 
price changes between the end of the Korean War and 1965 may reflect a lack 
of concern with price changes by the population as a whole during this 
period. Within the theory developed in the previous section this could be 
explained by the total cost of the optimal expectations mechanism exceeding 
the costs of remaining ignorant about future price trends. Hence either 
no expectations are formed at all, or alternatively a constant expectation 
is held.
The second characteristic which we might bear in mind for future 
discussion is that typically the expectations appear to underestimate 
the actual change. This appears to have occured primarily in periods of 
"unusually high inflation", such as the Korean War or early seventies.
Apart from these periods the expectations do not seem to either consistently 
overpredict or underpredict the actual rate of inflation.
Carlson and Parkin (1975) were faced with a different set of problems 
from those trying to use the Livingstone data. They had qualitative data 
for the U.K., on a monthly basis, over the period 1961-73. The data was 
obtained from Gallop Poll's surveys of approximately 1000 quota sampled 
individuals who were asked whether they expected prices to rise, fall or 
stay the same. The principal problem that Carlson and Parkin were faced 
with was how to convert this data into a quantitative form which would be 
more amenable to empirical analysis. In solving this they made a number of
assumptions:
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1) Some fraction of the population are incapable of developing any view 
about what will happen to prices.
2) Each individual, of those who are capable, has a subjective probability 
function over the expected price change. It may vary across individuals and 
across time.
3) There is a range of price change about zero which the respondent 
cannot distinguish from zero. This range of imperceptibility is what 
experimental psychologists have called the difference limen, and is 
defined as the increment in physical stimulus necessary to produce a just 
noticeable difference in sensation.
4) The expected rate of price change over all individuals is distributed 
normally
5) Finally they assume that over the entire sample period the expected 
rate of inflation is equal to the actual rate of inflation.
Given these assumptions Carlson and Parkin are then able to derive a 
quantitative data series on expectations. They then use this data to test 
several versions of the adaptive expectations hypothesis. Their results are 
shown in Table 4.2.
Equation 1, in the table, represents the simple adaptive expectations 
model with a dummy variable added to represent the effects of devaluation 
in 1967. This dummy variable is highly significant, but the coefficents on 
actual inflation and lagged expectations sum to only 0.877, as opposed to 
their theoretical value of one. Although there is a constant term in this 
regression, which has no theoretical justification and might be biasing 
the coefficents downwards.
The other regressions are all testing a second order learning 
mechanism which the authors suggest could be appropriate if people took 
account, not only of the current recent rate of inflation, but also its 
rate of change. However this is not an entirely correct interpretation of 
the model they actually estimate. This can easilly be seen by an examination
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of their equations, for example equation 3. The second order error
component will only affect expectations when P® is not equal to P
Yet these two variables can still be equal when people are taking into 
account the rate of change of inflation in forming their expectations. This 
will be the case, for example, when expectations are correct.
One way of incorporating the rate of change of inflation into the 
mechanism of expectation formation is to do so directly. Assume that 
expectations are formed about the rate of change of inflation, the expected 
rate of inflation can then be found by adding this to the present rate of 
inflation
pe _ pe + \ ( pe -  P )*t " t-1 M  t-1 V
and P® = P t  + P®
An alternative interpretation of their conclusion that a second order 
learning mechanism appeared to be operative after June 1967, but before 
that date a simple autoregressive interpretation seems appropriate, may be 
that the rate of inflation was more variable and on average much higher after 
1967. It might be that this reflected an underlying change in the inflation 
generating mechanism -i.e. viewing inflation as an ARIMA process, a change 
in the parameters - or at least a perceived change. As a result of this 
perceived change the optimal method of forecasting changed to a second order 
learning mechanism.
We therefore have two possible interpretations for the apparent change 
in forecasting techniques after 1967. The first is that the ARIMA process 
changed, or was believed to have changed from an ARIMA (p,l,q) process to
= (1 - X)P®_1 + (1 + 2X)Pt - (1 + A)Pt_1 (4.39)
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an ARIMA (p,2,q) one, and that as a result of this change individuals began 
forming their expectations, not about the rate of change of the price level, 
but about the rate of change of the rate of change of the price level. In 
the terminology adopted by Fleming (1976) people had changed up a gear in 
their expectation formation mechanism. Alternatively we could view the 
process as having changed in such a way that the expected error variances 
of the various methods of expectation formation had changed. Because of 
this a more complex second order learning mechanism was now optimal and 
was being used to form expectations.
This study, by Carlson and Parkin, also provides some evidence in 
favour of a mixed rational-adaptive hypothesis. This comes from the 
significance of the devaluation dummy variable, D, in Table 4.2, which 
suggests that the devaluation of sterling in Novemeber 1967 increased 
peoples expectations of inflation. Thus taken as a whole these equations 
furnish some support for the hypothesis that, although expectations of 
inflation seem to be formed in an adaptive manner and not in a rational 
way based upon some model of the economy, nonetheless external factors are 
sometimes taken account of. Thus implying that, though the population as a 
whole are not in possession of a complete economic model of the inflationary 
process, neither are they in complete ignorance of such a model. They are 
able to link certain events, such as a devaluation of the currency, with 
changes in the inflation rate.
However these conclusions rest upon the quality of the data Carlson 
and Parkin use, and this in turn rests upon the method they use to convert 
the qualitative responses from the survey into quantitative form. This method 
has been criticised in a paper by Foster and Gregory (1977), who question 
the assumptions they make, particularly the normality assumption. Foster 
and Gregory conclude that the nature of the distribution is not a theoretical 
question, but an empirical one. They cite evidence by Carlson (1975), who 
rejects the normality property for the Livingstone data, and reports
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distributions showing more positive skewness in periods when inflation 
was strong or accelerating, and more negative skewness when deflation was 
considered possible. The reason for the skewness being one or two outlying 
predictions which he characterises as legitimate "wild hunches”. On the 
basis of this evidence Foster and Gregory conclude, firstly that over the 
inflationary cycle as it existed up to 1969 the Carlson-Parkin series would 
produce systematic downward bias in the average expected rate of inflation 
at cyclical peaks, and an upward bias in troughs. Secondly, as the overall 
trend of prices throughout the whole period was upwards, this will result 
in a downward bias for the whole period, and particularly for the second 
half of the period. But because the average expected rate of inflation 
is made equal, by assumption, to the average rate over the whole period, 
this will result in underprediction from 1970 onwards, to be offset by 
overprediction prior to this.
There are also difficulties in applying the method when there is a 
zero response in any interval. Carlson and Parkin encountered several such 
periods, and Foster and Gregory feel that the method adopted to cope with 
these will also result in an upward bias. These criticisms cast some 
doubt on the validity of the Carlson-Parkin data. The normality assumption 
in particular seems unlikely to be valid. This seems to be borne out by the 
data as shown in figure 4.1, for although the general trend in expectations 
seems to follow that of the actual inflation rate there does seem to be a 
systematic downward bias from the beginning of 1971 onwards. In particular 
one notes that in the three years 1971 - 1973 the expectations series 
exceeded the actual series in only four months. Moreover during the first 
half of this period inflation was falling, hence these underpredictions are 
not solely attributable to expectations lagging behind the actual rate of 
inflation.
The Carlson-Parkin method is faced with particularly strong difficult­
ies when there is a high inflation rate which is mirrored by high
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expectations . They, themselves seem to favour an adaptive expectations 
hypothesis. In which case differences in expectations presumably arise due 
to differences in adjustment coefficents, perceptions and individual shopping 
baskets. But such differences cannot possibly result in anybody expecting 
prices to fall when prices themselves have not fallen for any length of 
time during the whole of the post-war period. Much the same comments apply 
if one assumes that expectations are formed either extrapolatively or ration­
ally. If then we are to accept any of these hypotheses we must also accept 
that the expectations of those who expect prices to fall are formed in 
some way which is not representative of those of the majority of the 
population, and as such we can deduce little about the behaviour of the 
majority from these deviants.
This does not invalidate all of Carlson-Parkin's conclusions, for 
example it seems likely that if the exogenous impact of devaluation was 
great on the deviant it probably also influenced the calculations of the 
majority. But considerable doubt is cast upon the parameters they obtain 
from the adaptive expectations formula, and it would also seem to invalidate 
the use of these expectations within a general wage inflation equation.
A similar method for converting qualitative into quantitative data was 
developed by Knobl (1974). He essentially uses the same method as Carlson 
and Parkin, although it is described within a slightly different framework.
It is therefore open to much the same criticisms as is theirs. The data is 
based upon the responses of German businessmen, for the period 1965 - 73, 
to the question of whether they expect the selling price to rise, fall or 
stay about the same in the next three to four months. The survey itself 
seems to be carried out every quarter. Unlike Carlson and Parkin's data 
this does not represent the opinions of the general public about the 
future course of prices as a whole, which of course they have no direct 
influence upon. Instead it relates to the expectations of one specific sector 
of the community, whose behaviour may or may not be representative of the
A
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remainder, about one specific good or a limited number of goods, with 
which they have intimate knowledge and whose price they ultimately determine.
When they tested methods of expectation formation using this data 
they found that the adaptive expectations hypothesis did not give good
results and that when the lagged inflation rate was used as the only 
explanatory variable the following regressions were adjudged the best
P® = 0.7256 P + 0.5272 (Pt - P ^ )
(16.271) (2.830)
R2 = 0.807
DW = 0.598 (4.40)
P® = 0.2976 + 0.6608 Pt + 0.5451 (F>t - P ^ )
(1.500) (10.747) (2.981)
R2 = 0.815
DW = 0.601 (4.41)
When in addition to past actual rates of inflation, a demand pressure 
variable was included in the regression the results were
P® = 1.1146 + 0.2876 ¿>t + 0.3536 (i>t - P ^ )  + 0.2589 DP t l 
(4.830) (3.093) (2.426) (4.651)
R2 = 0.892
DW = 0.598 (4.42)
where DP  ^ is a lagged measure of the pressure of demand. It should be 
noted that the Durbin Watson statistics are far from satisfactory in these 
equations. However if we ignore this we may construe these results as 
providing further evidence for a rational-extrapolative hypothesis.
One final study which we must look at is that by Paunio and Suvanto 
(1977). They derive a monthly series for expectations in Finland from 
the different interest rates on indexed and non-indexed bonds issued by 
the Finnish government. The index clause generally provided for fifty percent 
compensation for rises in the consumer price index. Because the number of
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dealers in the bond market is small, consisting mainly of banks and 
private bankers, they felt that these expectations were representative of 
those held by the well informed section of the business community and not 
by the public as a whole, and in interpreting these results this should 
be borne in mind.
When price expectations are held with certainty a measure for expectat­
ions can be found by subtracting the rate of interest on the indexed linked 
bond from that on the other, and then adjusting for the proportion of index 
linkage, this being the straightforward Fisherian approach. However when 
investors are not risk neutral and expectations are not held with complete 
certainty, the calculations are not so simple. Paunio and Suvanto 
overcome the problems involved by assuming, as did Carlson and Parkin within 
a different context, that the expected rate of change of prices is equal 
to the actual rate of change in the long run. It should also be noted that 
in order to make these calculations they divide the period into two,
1963(1) - 1968(3) and 1968(4) - 1974(12), as around 1968 "there occured 
several institutional changes which may have affected the formation of 
expectations". The difficulties with this approach centre on the manner 
in which the uncertainty problem is circumvented. They assume a linear 
risk aversion function, where risk is measured by the standard deviation 
of the expected value of the total return, and that this is constant during 
times of high and low inflation.
Having obtained this data they then test a first order adaptive 
expectations mechanism, they also tested a second order mechanism but 
this did not improve the results, the results were
1963(1) - 1968(3)
Pe = 0.305 P. . + 0.720 P®t L 1 LX
(3.7) (9.1)
R2 = 0.777
DW = 1.61 (4.43)
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1968(4) - 1974(12)
P® = 0.120Pt_1 + 0.885
(2.3) (15.17)
R2 = 0.889
DW = 1.93 (4.44)
(Note, uniquely lagged actual price inflation appears to have been used 
in these regressions, although no comment upon this is made). These results, 
they ajudge to be reasonably satisfactory.
Less satisfactory is a simple extrapolative model of the form shown in 
-2(4.1), the R is low as is the Durbin Watson statistic. They also test a 
regressive-extrapolative model, but the results are not good. Finally they 
found that the devaluation of October 1967, by 31%, had an impact effect 
which served to increase expectations of inflation by nearly 4%.
The results of these various studies are summarised in Table 4.3 and 
though at first glance there appears to be a great deal of difference 
between them, a deeper inspection reveals some consistency between the 
findings. Firstly several of the studies note a difference in expectation 
formation in times when inflation is high compared to times when it is low, 
when expectations seem to be formed by a simpler mechanism. Secondly 
several of the authors find a rational element in expectation formation 
which augments the basic extrapolative/adaptive mechanism. That is they 
provide support for a rational-extrapolative or a rational-adaptive 
hypothesis. However there seems no general concensus as to which of the 
models of expectation formation is the "best" one. This lack of agreement 
may be because of the inadequacies of the data, and this possibility should 
not be underestimated. However it may also reflect the fact that the 
expectations in the various studies are formed by different sets of people 
about different subjects.Thus it should not really surprise us that 
American business economists seem to form some of their expectations in
accordance with economic theory, the relevant question is, can this result
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be generalised to other expectations held by different sectors of the 
community.
There are also other differences between the studies. Important is 
the different frequencies at which the data becomes available, this ranges 
from every six months for the Livingstone data, to every month for the 
Carlson and Parkin series. This is important as all the researchers have 
nearly always assumed a revision period equal to the frequency at which 
the data becomes available. Hence Carlson and Parkin assume expectations 
to be revised every month, wheras Turnovsky and Wachter have a minimum 
revision period of six months.
Which, if any, of these is correct will, of course, depend upon how 
frequently actual expectations are revised. At the individual level it might 
be supposed that the shortest possible revision period corresponds to 
the frequency with which the individual comes into contact with the 
relevant stimulus. When, for example, the expectations concern the rate of 
inflation of the general price level, the stimulus occurs every time the 
individual buys a commodity, or hears of a coming price rise via the media. 
In actual fact the revision period may well be longer than this and may, 
like the actual method of expectation formation, be the outcome of an 
optimising process by the individual. Thus it may be that when the actual 
rate of inflation is subject to severe fluctuations, the revision period 
is much shorter than when it is relatively stable.
In the aggregate,expectations are likely to be a much smoother 
function of time than for the individual, and it may be that the revision 
period in the aggregate becomes so small as to be almost continuous.
Although there are difficulties with this if individuals follow a similar 
behaviour pattern and are subject to similar stimuli. If, for example, most 
individuals do the bulk of their shopping on any particular day then 
expectations will not be such smooth functions of time.
The consequences of assuming a too-long revision period will be to
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increase the error term in the equation, thus biasing the results against 
acceptance of the adaptive expectations hypothesis. One could imagine, for 
instance, situations where the expectations are revised weekly in an adaptive 
manner, but if a six month revision period is assumed the explanatory power 
of the adaptive expectations mechanism becomes quite low. To some, though 
perhaps a lesser extent, these comments also apply to tests of the other 
methods of expectation formation. It must be stressed therefore, that what 
Turnovsky and Wachter are in fact testing is not simply the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis, but the adaptive expectations hypothesis with a 
six month revision period. Bearing this in mind it is perhaps significant 
that the adaptive expectations hypothesis seems to work best in those 
studies which assume a relatively short revision period.
From this we can see that the empirical work on expectations has been 
far from satisfactory. Basically this is because good relevant data about 
expectations is just not available. Either the data itself is good, but the 
expectations are not held by representative sections of the population about 
price inflation in general, but by a particular set of individuals about 
one particular price. Or alternatively the characteristics of the 
expectations are relevant for inflation theory, that is they are held by 
the general public about prices in general, but the quality is dubious.
This is not to criticise the economists who have worked in this field. 
Information about expectation formation is vitally important in many areas 
of economics. These economists have made valiant attempts to provide that 
information, and because of the importance of the subject their work is 
important too. But it is also important to realise the limitations of their 
work and the very serious qualifications that must be placed against their 
conclusions. Above all it is important to realise the need for good, 
relevant data about expectations, and the only place this can really come 
from is the government statistical service. It is highly desirable that they 
conduct a regular sample survey of the public about their expectations not
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just about inflation, but also several other matters of ignorance which 
are proving serious stumbling blocks in economic research.
4.6 Incorporating Expectations into the Wage Equation
In this final section we are going to examine, briefly, those 
empirical studies which have attempted to allow for expectations in the 
inflationary process (For a further discussion see the introductory 
chapter). There have been three principal approaches to this problem, using 
directly observed data, such as the Livingstone data, generating a series 
using some formula, or attempting to incorporate the expectation formation 
process into the specification of the basic model to be estimated. To some 
extent the results of introducing expectations into the wage equation in 
these ways have already been dealt with in chapter 1, and we are at the 
moment more concerned with the general validity of these three methods of 
incorporating expectations into the wage equation.
The appropriateness of using directly observed data, as for example 
Parkin, Sumner and Ward (1975) and Riddel (1979) have done, with the 
Carlson-Parkin and Livingstone data respectively, depends upon the accuracy 
of that data. In the previous sections serious question marks were raised 
on this point, and we feel that the value of such empirical work is somewh­
at limited.
The second method too depends upon the underlying validity of both 
the model and the parameters used to generate the series. In particular 
we have grave reservations about the use of one mechanism to generate data 
on expectations over any length of time. For, as was emphasised earlier, it 
seems likely that different methods of expectation formation are used at 
different times. With more complex methods being used when inflation is 
either changing or at a high level. Thus studies which have used either 
of these two methods must be examined extremely carefully, with respect
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either to the mechanism used to generate the data, or the accuracy of the 
directly observed data. This should particularly be borne in mind when 
considering evidence about the value of the coefficient on expectations in 
the wage equation.
The third method consists of including the formation process within 
the general empirical structure to be estimated. When expectations are 
formed according to a first order adaptive mechanism such as
We can estimate this and estimates for X, the first order adaptive 
coefficient, obtained, as well as for the coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables. The only difficulty in this estimation process 
being the liklihood of induced negative serial correlation, as indicated 
by the composite error term in (4.48).
When expectations are formed rationally, this too can be incorporated
(4.45)
and the wage equation is
\  = f(v  + K + ut (4.46)
where represents the explanatory variables, other than expectations, and
ut is a white noise error term. Then lagging (4.46) one period and rearran-
ging we get
(4.47)
Combining this with equations (4.45) and (4.46) we get
fiXf!» + Cl - X ) P t + u t ut-1
(4.48)
into the empirical specification of the model. Thus suppose that the wage 
equation is again as in (4.46), but that price expectations are now a
lagged function of changes in the money supply, i.e.
K  = PJ(L)Mt (4.49)
We can incorporate (4.49) directly into (4.46) and get
W® = f(Xt) + 6(L)Mt (4.50)
Both of these approaches are open to the same criticisms made previously 
that, in general, they imply the same method of expectation formation 
regardless of the economic conditions. In addition the latter approach 
suffers from all the criticisms which we have levied at rational models in 
general, as does an approach adopted by McCallum (1975) amongst others.
He makes use of the property that rational expectations should differ
from the actual event by a random forecast error, with mean zero, only. Thus 
■ 6as a proxy for he uses P . A similar approach has been adopted by 
Wallis (1977), in the case where the expectations are about the dependent 
variable, and in this case we have
Assuming expectations are formed rationally we get
Although there are certain difficulties here when a  is equal to one. (Wallis' 
analysis is slightly more complex than this would indicate, as it is 
carried out within the context of a set of simultaneous equations).
Thus economists attempting to proxy expectations are faced with a 
difficult choice. They can make use of the random forecast error of rational 
expectations. Alternatively they can use directly observed data, which is 
often of dubious quality. Finally they can incorporate, directly or indire­
ctly, within the economic model some mechanistic form of expectation
(4.51)
formation, which is insensitive to changing economic conditions and is
in any case, often of only dubious validity in itself.
The choice that we make in choosing a method to proxy expectations 
for use in the empirical work is thus unlikely to be ideal. In making this 
choice we shall, in the next chapter, make use of some original sample 
survey data on expectations of wage inflation. In particular we will be 
interested in determining what appears, on empirical grounds, to be the 
most acceptable method of expectation formation.
Chapter 5
An Empirical Analysis of the Formation of Expectations
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we reviewed the theoretical and empirical 
work which has been done on the formation of expectations. We concluded 
that much of the empirical work, although often ingenious, was less than 
satisfactory. The basic problem being the lack of good, relevant data about 
expectations of inflation.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold, firstly to test the various 
models of expectation formation which we analysed in the previous chapter, 
and secondly to obtain either direct data upon wage inflation expectations, 
or alternatively, with the model of expectation formation which appears most 
appropriate, generate a series which we can use in its place. The purpose 
being that we can use this data in a direct test of the search theoretic 
model of inflation developed in chapter 2.
In order to achieve these tasks we make use of sample survey data 
which had not previously been developed within this context. This data, 
though not perfect, would appear to suffer less from the objections made 
against other studies. Thus it is hoped that the use of this data will 
provide usefull and original insights into the expectation formation 
process.
5.2 The Data
The data upon which this analysis is based is derived from the 
Financial Times Survey of Business Opinion. It is carried out monthly for 
the Financial Times by the Taylor Nelson Group who collect the data by 
means of personal interviews with the chairmen, managing directors or
other executive directors of public companies. The sample is based upon the
400 companies that constitute the F.T. actuaries index. To provide a 
workable sampling framework the thirty industrial groupings of that index 
have been reduced to eleven major categories, the first two, for example, 
being, electrical engineering and construction and building materials. Each 
month three groups are surveyed, this means that the whole index is 
covered every four months, non-electrical engineering, a particularly large 
and important group being surveyed every two months. About a dozen interviews 
are obtained in each of the three groups, making an average of thirty to 
fourty interviews a month.
The data for wage expectations comes in the form of a frequency 
distribution, the figures being in the form of four monthly moving totals 
representing the expectations of all eleven industrial groupings. The figures 
under the heading September - December are assumed to represent expectations 
in the middle of that period, i.e. on November 1. Since the survey began 
this distribution has had several structures. In answer to the question "Do 
you expect hourly wages in the next year to rise by" these were
(a)
0 - 3 %
3 - 5% 
more than 5% 
stay the same 
decrease 
no answer
(b)
0 - 4 %
5 - 9 %
10 - 14%
15 - 19% 
more than 20% 
stay the same 
decrease 
no answer
(c)
0 - 4 %
5 - 9 %
10 - 14%
15 - 19%
20 - 24%
25 - 29% 
more than 30% 
stay the same 
decrease 
no answer
For the purpose of calculating the mean of the frequency distribution they 
were amended in the following manner:
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(a) (b) (c)
0 - 3% 0 - 5 % 0 - 5 %
3 - 5 % 5 - 10% 5 - 10%
5 - 10% 10 - 15% 10 - 15%
0 15 - 20% 15 - 20%
0 - -3% 20 - 25% 20 - 25%
0 25 - 30%
0 - -5% 30 - 35%
0 -5%
The assumption was also made that the proportion who did not answer 
had expectations distributed in similar proportions to those who did, and 
the percentage of answers falling in each interval was adjusted accordingly. 
Although the survey has been published continuously since it began, not all 
the data is suitable. Because during the periods December 1969 - October 
1971 and February 1975 - June 1975, more than fifty percent of the replies 
fell in an open ended category. Consequently the empirical work has been 
done by combining together all those observations which fell outside these 
two periods. This has one unfortunate consequence, as we omit periods where 
expectations reached unprecedented heights. This, being omission on the 
basis of the dependent variable, may induce sample-selection bias in the 
results in this section.
The measure of wage inflation which was adopted was the percentage 
increase in any one month, adjusted to represent an annual rate of inflation,
Wt =
W - W , t t-1 + 1
t-1
,12
- 1 . 100 (5. 1)
In making this assumption we are making a fundamental departure from 
previous studies, which typically assume that the period people consider 
when revising their expectations is the same length as that for which
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they are held. Thus if expectations are about the coming twelve months, 
then it is usually assumed that the relevant stimulii are the events of 
the previous twelve months.
The reason for making this break with accepted practice is partly 
theoretical and partly empirical. On the theoretical side we take the 
position that the relevant period to consider when revising expectations 
is equal to the frequency with which expectations are revised. Thus if 
expectations are revised at monthly intervals, as we are assuming here, 
then people will consider the events of the previous month when adapting 
their expectations from those which were held in the previous month. The 
alternative view implies that people change or adapt their expectations 
every month, on the basis of what has hapenned in the previous twelve 
months. Yet surely the spirit of the adaptive expectations hypothesis 
implies that they will adapt their expectations to take account of 
information which was not available in the previous period.
The empirical evidence comes from an examination of figure 4.1.
This shows the expectations of inflation derived by Carlson and
Parkin (1975), together with their measure of actual inflation, which is 
the actual rate of inflation in the preceding twelve months. From this it 
can be observed that the actual series seems to lag behind the expectations 
series. Thus, there are, for example, four fairly clear peaks in the inflation 
rate series, these occur in 1962, 1965, 1969 and 1971. Each of these seem 
to occur after the corresponding peak in the expectations series, with the 
lead time appearing to be about four months. But theoretically this, in this 
particular case (in general terms this could happen given second and third 
order time derivatives taking certain values, in a higher order adaptive 
expectations mechanism, but this is not the case here), is nonesense.
I f we take an adaptive expectations mechanism, then expectations adapt 
to the present rate of inflation, they cannot lead the rate of inflation.
However, if we assume that the annual rate of inflation is a proxy for 
the inflation rate in the central month, we could by shifting the 
series six months to the left convert it into a proxy for the monthly 
inflation rate (as we shall demonstrate later in this chapter). This would 
then lead to a situation when at least two of the peaks in the actual 
inflation rate preceded those in the expected rate. The two series would 
then be more in line with theoretical expectations. Similar comments 
apply if we examine expectations derived in other empirical work, see for 
example figure 2 in Paunio and Suvanto’s (1977) paper, which we referred to 
in the previous chapter.
5.3 The problem of Perceptions
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It can be seen from figure 5.1 that expectations were, apart from 
three observations near the end of the series, always below the actual 
rate of inflation. There are several possible explanations for this which 
we shall consider. Firstly there is the possibility that the expectations 
could contain a regressive element. This is superficially at least, 
attractive, as it explains why, in the last three months of the sample, 
October, November and December 1976, expectations of inflation exceeded the 
actual rate of inflation, this being at its lowest level for several years. 
According to this view, expectations were regressing up to some 'normal' 
level, where the concept of normality is based on experience extending over 
a several year period. In addition, this hypothesis is also capable of 
explaining why expectations of inflation were less than the actual 
rate of inflation between February 1971 and September 1976. But it cannot 
explain the similar phenomenon which occurred throughout the period prior 
to June 1969. In this period expectations consistently underestimated the 
actual rate of inflation, varying between 3.57% to a maximum of 4.69%,
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with an average value of 4.12%. Yet as can be seen from Table 5.1, the actual 
inflation rate in the previous five years was always in excess of 4.12%, 
and in general above 4.69%. It would therefore appear that an explanation of 
this phenomenon cannot be given in terms of expectations containing some 
regressive element, as defined above.
Table 5,1 The Annual Rate of Wage Inflation: 1960 - 1966
Year Rate of Inflation
1960 6.60%
1961 5.16%
1962 4.83%
1963 4.54%
1964 4.89%
1965 6.83%
1966 4.49%
An alternative explanation might be found within the various hypotheses 
of expectation formation that we have already discussed, for example it 
might be that an extremely small first order adjustment coefficent in the 
adaptive expectations model together with a larger second order coefficent, 
which is operative in certain periods only, might be capable of generating 
an expectations series similar to the actual one. Although one would not 
expect expectations to decrease in this case if the actual rate still 
exceeds the expected rate, something which we observe happening several times 
over a sustained period of time in this series. Yet, here again, a 
rational-adaptive explanation might suffice, whereby account is taken of 
the likely effects of incomes policies.
However there is an alternative explanation which must also be 
considered. This is that people do not always correctly perceive the rate 
of inflation. This concept of perception has been largely ignored within 
the literature. But upon consideration it becomes clear that the correct 
specification of the simple adaptive expectations hypothesis, for example,
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should be conceived in terras of the perceived rate of inflation rather than 
the actual rate of inflation. It is therefore an explicit assumption in most 
of the empirical work that the inflation rate is fully perceived.
Carlson and Parkin's approach to this question is a little inconsistent, 
for even though they assume that expectations are based upon the actual 
rate of inflation. They do not fully accept that people always perceive the 
actual rate of inflation, rather they adopt an intermediate position. They 
assume that below a certain critical level inflation will not be perceived, 
yet above this level it will be fully perceived. This is shown in figure 5.2
Figure 5.2 Perceived and Actual Inflation
P P' Actual inflation
where P denotes this critical value.
Whilst this hypothesis is plausible enough it is not the only one
that could be made, or even perhaps the most likely one. An obvious
alternative retains the concept of a critical value below which inflation
is too small to be perceived, but supposes that even above this value
inflation rates will not be fully perceived until they are greater than
a second critical value, P'. The perception curve, in this case will lie
along the horizontal axis until the initial perception point, P, is reached,
oafter which it will lie between the horizontal axis and the 45 line until
' othe full perception point P , from then on it coincides with the 45 line.
This concept of a perception curve is entirely general, in that it
\can be adapted to include, not only the Carlson-Parkin special case, but 
also the situation where the rate of inflation is fully perceived. The 
difficulties lie on the empirical side, in attempting to estimate a 
perception curve to find out which, if any of the special cases we have 
mentioned so far best fits the data. The reason being that there is no data 
on perceptions.
We did try to derive such data from the information we have on 
expectations and actual inflation, this was done using the following 
formula, derived from a first order adaptive expectations mechansim
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WP = (1 - X) W e . + 1W* 
1 X t_1 X 1
An estimated value for X being used in these calculations, but the conclusi­
ons which followed from an analysis of this data were inconclusive. We 
could neither establish that people fully perceive the actual rate of 
inflation, nor that they do not. Thus the most suggestive evidence for 
the hypothesis that people do not fully perceive the rate of inflation 
still comes from figure 5.1. It seems very unlikely to us that if people 
do correctly perceive the true rate of inflation then, with the exception 
of four observations right at the end of the series, their expectations 
would continually lie below the actual rate of inflation. However there the 
debate must rest, and in the remainder of the empirical work we will use 
the actual inflation rate series as a proxy for the perceived inflation 
rate. (Although in the empirical work on the wage equation itself, we will 
experiment with alternative specifications).
5.4 The Results 1
We first tested a first order adaptive expectations hypothesis, for 
the period as a whole, the results are shown below
1. The sample period was from February 1967 to December 1976 excluding those 
periods noted on page 150, the data was monthly, thus there were 100 
observations.
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W{ = 0.98 Wt_1 + 0.013 Wt
(104.24) (2.89)
R = 0.979 
DW = 1.01 (5.2)
The explanatory power of the equation is quite high and the t statistics 
are both significant at the 95% level. But the Durbin Watson statistic1 is 
low which might point to the possibility of specification error. In 
addition the sum of the two coefficients is not all that different from
their theoretical value of one. However the coefficient on W is very small, 
implying an extremely low rate of adaption. One reason for this, and the 
specification error, may be the extreme amount of noise present in W This 
is a possibility we shall return to later, when faced with the task of 
filtering the signal element from the noise more efficiently. A further 
reason may be the introduction of numerous incomes policies throughout the 
period, and a seperate dummy variable was introduced into the regression 
for each of them. Each dummy variable took a value of one in the month 
immediately after it was introduced, and zero otherwise. These incomes 
policies and the corresponding dummy variables are listed below, in Table 5.2.
The results are shown in equation (5.3). It can be seen that of the 
eight dummy variables, six have a negative sign, which is what we should
we = 0.992We , + 0.0104 W. - 0.0116 YPD1 -0.403 YPD2t t-1 t
(103.27) (2.37) (0.02) (0.73)
- 1.255 YPD3 - 0.667 YPD4 + 0.272 YPD5 + 0. 162 YPD6
(2.26) (1.20) (0.49) (0.29)
- 1.657 YPD7 - 0.852 YPD8
(2.94) (1.54)
R2 = 0.982
DW = 1.297 (5.3)
expect if incomes policies had a negative impact upon expectations.
TI The Durbin Watson statistic in this and several other equation which iollow
is biased towards two by the presence of a lagged dependent variable. If
serial correlation were present this would bias the t statistics.
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Table 5.2 Incomes Policies Introduced in the Sample Period
Dummy
Variable
YPD1
YPD2
YPD6
YPD7
YPD8
Incomes Policy Details
3j% ceiling on pay increases, except those 
associated with productivity
CBI asks industry to avoid price increases over 
following twelve months, or to limit them to 5% 
in unavoidable cases
90 day statutory freeze 
Freeze extended by 60 days
Phase II, pay increases restricted to £1 + 4% of 
average wage bill
Phase III, pay increases restricted to £2.25 or 
7% of average wage bill + threshold agreements
Government adopts £6 a week policy
Chancellor suggests a pay limit of 3%, finally 
agrees a limit of 4j% with the TUC.
Date
Introduced 
March 20, 1968
July 15, 1971
Nov. 6, 1972 
Jan. 17, 1973 
April 1, 1973
Nov. 1, 1973
July 9, 1975 
April 6, 1976
We shall for the present leave this rational-adaptive approach to 
expectation formation, and test some of the other hypotheses that have 
been put forward, using the above results for purposes of comparison.
We began by testing the simple extrapolative hypothesis. However, the 
results were not very good, and as a consequence we have not reported them 
here. When we looked at the more general form of the extrapolative 
hypothesis, as specified in equation (4.2), the results were considerably 
better. For the purposes of this estimation we used an Almon lag, with a 
third order polynomial fitted over twelve periods. The coefficients and 
calculated t statistics are shown below in Table 5.3.
The overall explanatory power of this regression is impressive. It is 1
1. The dummy variable was operative only in the month immediately after 
the incomes policy was introduced.
Table 5.3 The Almon Lag Estimates of an Extrapolative Model
Variable Coefficient t statistic Adaptive Expectations 
Lag Structure
wt 0.082 7.76 0.082
\-l 0.074 12.19 0.075
■ 
== 
rt
 1 ro 0.067 12.92 0.069
\-3 0.062 11.30 0.063
\-4 0.057 11.03 0.058
W Ct-5 0.053 12.27 0.053
w „.t-6 0.048 13.93 0.049
wt-7 0.044 12. 13 0.045
%-8 0.038 8.41 0.041
\-9 0.032 5.92 0.038
V l O 0.023 4.47 0. 035
V i i 0.013 3.58 0.032
V l 2 constrained to be zero.
R2 = 0.740 DW = 0.289
not as high as that of the adaptive regression model, though it must be 
remembered that as that contained a lagged dependent variable, with the lag 
relatively short, the fit is almost bound to be good. In addition the size 
of the parameters is more satisfactory than in that model. However, the 
Durbin Watson statistic is very small, and again this might indicate 
specification bias. (The Durbin Watson statistic is now a valid indicator 
of the existence of serial correlation, unlike equations (5.2), (5.3) and
(5.4), which contained lagged dependent variables}) We might also note that, 
the resulting lag structure, up to t-6, is very similar to what we would 
get from an adaptive expectations mechanism, with an adjustment coefficient 
of 0.082.
We repeated the regression, but this time allowing for the effects of
incomes policies, as before. The results were not good and have not been
reported here. This, again might indicate that the model has been mis-
specified. However this might be it would appear that there are serious 
1. The existence of serial correlation would have biased the t statistics
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doubts as to the validity of the extrapolative hypothesis, in the spirit 
of Exekial's proposal. In as much as expectations do seem to be related to 
past actual rates of inflation, it would seem that this relationship is 
approximately that which would result from an adaptive expectations 
mechanism.
Turning now to the rational expectations hypothesis, the first task 
is to specify the'relevant economic theory!. The one chosen was a variant 
of the price expectations augmented Phillips curve. The variable chosen 
to represent demand conditions within the labour market was also derived 
from the F.T. business survey. All of the respondents were asked which of 
a number of factors were currently affecting production, one of the factors 
being manual labour. We took the percentage of respondents referring to 
this as our measure of excess demand. The price expectations variable was 
defined as
= Pt+12 ~ Pt . 100 (5.5)
Pt
which is the rate of inflation in the coming twelve months. The justific­
ation for this is that if expectations are formed rationally, then they 
will equal the actual rate of inflation in the future period, plus a 
random error term. The results from including this in the regression were
W* = 3.057 - 0.126 M L t + 0.591 P® 
,(6.60) (5.12) (13.55)
R2 = 0.68 
DW = 0.15 (5.6)
These results are clearly very poor. The coefficient on the labour demand 
variable, M , is the wrong sign, whilst that on price inflation 
expectations is too low. In addition the Durbin Watson statistic is very 
low indeed. Nor did these results change significantly when we allowed 
for the effects of incomes policies.
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It might be argued that equation (5.6) bears little relation to the 
rational expectations hypothesis as interpreted by the monetarists. Where 
the relevant economic theory centres on changes in the money supply.
However this is only true for the price equation. Equation (5.6) is quite 
consistent with the monetarist model of wage inflation, and therefore with 
a monetarist based rational expectations mechanism.
Returning to the adaptive expectations hypothesis, we have so far 
tested a simple first order rational-adaptive process, by which expectations 
are basically formed by a first order mechanism, but external factors 
such as incomes policies are taken account of. We now wish to examine 
some of the more sophisticated forms of the adaptive expectations mechanism. 
Taking first the simple "second order adaptive expectations hypothesis" 
tested by Carlson and Parkin, but including in the regressions the incomes 
policy dummy variables (which have been omitted from the results for the 
sake of brevity), we get
W® = 1.603 W®^ + 0.0019 Wt - 0.595 W®_2 - 0.0051 
(15.84) (0.46) (6.08) (1.29)
+ Incomes Policy Dummy Variables
R2 = 0.987
DW = 2.23 (5.7)
These results are clearly not very good, with the coefficients being very 
different from what one would expect on theoretical grounds. One possible 
reason may be that the second order mechanism only becomes relevant when 
the underlying parameters of the actual inflation rate series appear to 
have changed, as a result of which a first order mechanism no longer 
produces optimal forecasts, as the expected mean square error of the first 
order mechanism has increased. If therefore we could isolate those periods 
when such a change in the underlying parameters occurred we could redo 
the regressions restricting the second order variables to those periods.
The criteria adopted for structural change is if the actual rate of
inflation has been increasing or decreasing for four or more
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successive months by more than 0.1%. If in succeeding months the rate of 
inflation falls and then rises, the second order variables will not be 
operative in the month inflation falls, but will be so in the succeeding 
month when it continues its upward trend (and vice versa when there is a 
sustained downward trend).
There are two possible justifications for supposing that such periods 
are ones of perceived structural change. Firstly, in such periods peoples 
perceptions of the underlying time series might change from ARIMA(p,1,q) 
to ARIMA(p,2 ,q). In other words people might, in the changed situation 
be forming expectations not simply about the rate of inflation, but about 
its rate of change. Although as we argued earlier, a second order 
mechanism is not the most accurate description of this particular 
hypothesis.
The second possible justification is that if the proposed structural 
change takes the form shown in figure 5.3, where the underlying time 
series fluctuates about a mean of W^, but at time t changes and the new 
equilibrium level about which it fluctuates is , where the adjustment 
to this new equilibrium is not instantaneous, but takes place between t^  
and t . Then the continual increase in the inflation rate between t^  and
Figure 5.3 Structural Changes in the Inflationary Process
t will be a signal that the underlying process is undergoing structural
change. Thus an expectations mechanism which yields optimal results in
normal times, will not necessarily do so during the extended transition
period during which individuals learn the new parameters of the system.
Thus in the following regressions a ’ denotes that that variable was
operative during a period of perceived structural change, where this is
defined as when W has been increasing (or decreasing) for four or more
1successive periods by more than 0.1%. This being a signal to the individual
othat the series is changing in this fundamental manner. The results were, 
where the basic time period is again a month.
W ® = 0.992W®_1 + 0.0085Wt + 0.850«!®^ 0.838Wt-2
(102.48) (1.87)
- 0.0084VT - 0.0015«^^ 
(0.94) (0.16)
(5.48) (5.52)
■ 0.0085YPD1 - 0.388YPD2 
(0.02) (0.80)
- 1.246YPD3 - 0.671YPD4 + 0.281YPD5 + 0.060YPD6
(2.56) (1.38) (0.58) (0.12)
- 1.635YPD7 + 0.849YPD8
(3.30) (144)
R = 0.987 
DW = 1.885 (5.8)
The R and the Durbin Watson statistic are both satisfactory, although 
the latter will again be biased towards two by the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable. However this result provides relatively little 
support for the amended second order error learning hypothesis. For 
neither the coefficient on W', the actual rate of inflation during 
periods of perceived structural change, nor that on WJ._^  are significant. 
However, the coefficients on W®’  ^ and W®'^  are both significant and 
very similar in their absolute values. This seems to imply that in
normal times, ignoring any external effects, expectations are formed 12
1. If in succeeding months inflation falls and then rises* the second order 
variables will not be operative in the month inflation falls, but will be 
so in the following month, once it continues its upwards trend (a similar 
rule applies when there are deviations from a sustained downward trend).
2. That is that the series is perceived to be between t and t w h e r e  the 
length of this transition period will vary with circumstances.
according to a simple first order mechanism. But in periods of 
perceived structural change, in addition to this basic mechanism the 
change in expectations lagged one period, (W^ ' - W®’ ), is an imPort;ant
factor in the formation of expectations.
Such a mechanism would appear to coincide with none of those which we 
have examined in the theoretical literature. However an alternative 
interpretation of this is that it merely changes the lag structure in an 
extrapolative model. This alternative scheme would have the same weight 
on W^ but, apart from this, more weight is given to more recent 
observations, viewed in this light the mechanism appears not unreasonable.
The second order scheme we have just been considering was originally 
suggested by Carlson and Parkin on the grounds that a slightly more 
sophisticated error learning mechanism would take account both of the 
recent rate of inflation and its rate of change. However we argued earlier 
that a second order mechanism was not valid as an interpretation of the 
hypothesis that people take account of both the rate of inflation and its 
rate of change. We then argued that if people are forming expectations 
about the rate of change of inflation according to formula (4.39), then 
expectations of the rate of inflation will be equal to
W® = (l - X)W®_L + (i + 2A)wt - (l + X)Wt_1 (5.9)
When this was estimated with the incomes policy dummy variables added the 
results were not good, as can be seen from (5.10) where they are reported 
without the incomes policy variables. However it might be that
W* = 0.992 Wt l + 0.0105 W^ - 0.00039 W ^  
(82.53) (2.36) (0.085)
R2 = 0.982 
DW = 1.299 (5.10)
expectations of the rate of change are only formed when inflation
is seen to be changing in a systematic manner, either consistently upwards
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or downwards. That is in times of accelerating or deaccelerating inflation, 
expectations are formed according to (5.9), amended for external factors, 
but in more normal times expectations are formed by a simple rational first 
order adaptive process. Hence again we need to define times of accelerating 
or deaccelerating inflation. For this we used the same criteria as that 
upon which we defined the structural change periods before, i.e. the actual 
rate of inflation has been increasing for four or more successive periods 
by more than 0.1%. If in succeeding months the rate of inflation falls and 
then rises, the dummy variable will not be operative in the month inflation 
falls, but will be so in the succeeding month. The results were again 
clearly unsatisfactory, and have not been reported here. All the coefficients 
on the specially defined variables were not only insignificant, but very 
much smaller in absolute terms than their theoretical values. Hence we must 
reject the underlying hypothesis behind these equations, namely that in 
periods of accelerating or deaccelerating inflation expectations are formed 
about the rate of change of inflation according to (5.9).
5.5 Conclusion
From these results we can make several conclusions with varying 
degrees of confidence. Firstly expectations do seem to have been influenced 
on several occasions by the introduction of incomes policies. The extent 
of this effect varies from incomes policy to incomes policy, but that 
there was an effect seems indisputable.
Secondly of the various hypotheses which we have tested, rational-
adaptive expectations seem to work particularly well. We could find little 
evidence that expectations were formed in a pure rational, in Muth's sense 
of the term, manner. Neither did an extrapolative based hypothesis seem 
acceptable, except that it could be regarded as a different form of an 
adaptive hypothesis. In addition a variant of the rational adaptive 
hypothesis, which contains autoregressive elements during periods of
■j
perceived structural change, seems to provide the most acceptable explanation 
of expectation formation,on statistical criteria, as well as being 
acceptable on theoretical grounds.
However, the implied coefficient of adaption is, in 'normal' times, 
implausibly low. One possible reason for this, as we have already mentioned, 
is that the signal element in the actual inflation variable is small when 
compared to the noise component. This arises because the inflation rate is 
the monthly one as defined in equation (5.1). This will fluctuate not only 
with the underlying rate of inflation, which constitutes the signal element, 
but also with the number of wage settlements, which is a major constituent 
of the noise component. A large number of wage settlements, or a few very 
important ones (e.g. the coalminers, the engineers, etc.) will cause the 
wage index to rise by an unusualy large amount, and vice versa. We shall 
now turn to other possible ways of filtering this noise element.
One obvious possibility is to use the annual rate of inflation in the 
previous twelve months, i.e.
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Wt ' V l 2 (5.11)
t-12
This is after all the inflation rate which most other researchers have used 
as we saw in the previous chapter. Lipsey (1960) has agued that this is 
equivalent to the monthly rate of inflation in the middle of the period, i.e. 
at t-6. Wheras we have already argued that we require the rate of inflation 
since expectations were last formed, which in this case means the inflation 
rate in the previous month. Following Lipsey's argument the best indicator 
of this would be the annual rate of inflation centred on the month in 
question, i.e.
(5.12)Wt+6 " Wt-6
Wt-6
rv
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This is in fact the variable we shall use, although there are some 
problems with it, strictly interpreted it could be regarded as implying 
that the individual has prior information at period t of the exact 
inflation rate in t+6. However that is not the interpretation being placed 
upon it here. To repeat the point, it is merely being used as a proxy for 
the rate of inflation in the central month, in a similar manner to which, 
not only Lipsey, but also Phillips (1958).used a similarly defined inflation 
rate.
Using this then as a proxy for the monthly inflation rate, we re- 
estimated all the equations in this chapter. The general conclusions 
were much the same, of all the models tested the adaptive expectations model 
seems to give the best results, although this time with more acceptable 
coefficients as we shall see later. The incomes policy dummies were 
generally negative, several significantly so. In many respects the most 
interesting regression was again that which contained the "occasional 
second order mechanism" as in equation (5.8):
= 0.936W®  ^+ 0.044 Wt + 0.690W6', - 0.683 wf ’
(26.82) ( 2 .0 1 )
t-1 "t-2
(3.91) (4.37)
+ 0.066 VT - 0.075 - 0.00035 YPD1 - 0.265 YPD2
(0.95) (0.96) (0.001) (0.55)
- 1.298 YPD3 - 0.891 YPD4 + 0.211 YPD5 + 0.281 YPD6
(2.76) (1.89) (0.45) (0.58)
- 1.714 YPD7 + 0.613 YPD8
(3.58) (1.06)
R2 = 0.988
DVV = 1.740 (5.13)
Again the most interesting feature of this equation is the similarity in
• 0  . e
the absolute values of the coefficients relating to W ^  and . Once
more this carries the interpretation that, in 'normal' times, ignoring any
external effects, expectations are formed according to a simple first order
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mechanism. But in periods of perceived structural change, in addition to 
this basic mechanism, the change in expectations lagged one period,
("t'l ” * t V '  3n :*-mPortant factor in the formation of expectations. The 
coefficient of adaption lies somewhere between 0.044 and 0.064, the upper 
value being quite similar to the implied value from the Almon equation in 
Table 5.3. The two coefficients do not now sum to one, but this may be because 
people do not fully perceive the rate of inflation.
This is in fact the mechanism (with actual inflation defined as in (5.12)) 
which we shall be using when we come to generate an expectations series to be 
used later in the thesis when testing various wage equations. (We could not 
use the survey data as it does not go back far enough). This does not represent 
a hard and fast conclusion that this was the particular method used by 
individuals throughout the entire period under study, but merely that this 
provides us with a data series which in our opinion is likely to be as 
acceptable as we can obtain at the moment.
To use this mechanism we need to obtain estimates of the parameters.
For this purpose we estimated the following equation on a reduced sample 
basis, omitting those periods which marked the introduction of incomes 
policies. We used the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure within TSP to estimate the 
equation, as when we used OLS the existence of serial correlation was indicated.
W® = 0.920W® , + 0.060 W + 0.780W®' - 0.796 W® ’t t — l t t 1 z z
(33.51) (3.53) (4.96) (4.92)
R2 = 0.991
DW = 0.116 (5.14)
The exact details on how the expectations were generated will be given in 
chapter 7 when we test the search theory of inflation developed in chapter2. 
Meanwhile we will, in the next chapter, temporarily depart from the main line 
of development of the thesis to consider the degree of certainty with which
expectations are held.
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Chapter 6
Expectations and Uncertainty
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we tested various hypotheses of expectation 
formation, concluding that a variant of the rational-adaptive hypothesis 
seemed best to explain the data on wage inflation expectations derived 
from the F.T. survey of business opinion. In the next chapter we will use 
a series on expectations, generated from the estimated coefficients of 
this model, in testing the search theoretic model of inflation developed in 
chapter 2.
The purpose of this present chapter is to analyse the degree of 
certainty with which expectations are held. As such it is somewhat at a 
tangent to the general line of development of the thesis. The justification 
for this being that we feel the subject matter to be important, a feeling 
that as we noted in chapter 1 is apparently shared by others, see, for 
example, Laidler and Parkin (1975), and in an area which has received only 
little attention elsewhere.
In that paper Laidler and Parkin, within the context of expectations, 
drew attention to two different concepts of uncertainty. The first which 
we will call cross section uncertainty may be defined as the extent to 
which individuals hold different expectations. The second we will call 
individual uncertainty and can be defined as the degree of certainty with 
which individuals hold their expectations.
6.2 Individual and Cross Section Uncertainty
To understand the determinants of uncertainty we must look as 
Katona (1951), Ozga (1965), Carlson and Parkin (1975) and others in this 
field have done for help from the realm of psychology. In this respect the
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concept of "reinforcement" seems important. In standard psychological 
theory this relates to the learning process. Adcock (1960) illustrates this 
concept by giving an example of a maze as shown in figure 6.1, where the 
subject has to work out a serial pattern of responses. Consider the case 
where there are four choice points A, B, C and D. The correct choice at D 
leads immediately to the exit and is therefore immediately rewarded. We 
tend to remember this choice whilst still very confused or uncertain about
Figure 6.1 The Maze Example
our wanderings in the earlier part of the maze. But now when we make the 
correct choice at C we immediately recognise that we know the rest of the 
way. The way is now open for reinforcement of the correct choice at B and 
so on.
When applied to expectations of inflation reinforcement will take 
place when those expectations prove correct or very nearly so. This will 
increase our confidence in the mechanism by which our expectations are 
formed, and in the following period expectations formed by that mechanism 
will be held with greater certainty.
This concept of reinforcement is also of use in understanding how an 
individual makes use of the extra information provided by the introduction 
of incomes policies and the occurrence of well publicised wage strikes etc. 
Because these occur relatively infrequently, and also because to a certain
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extent each event occurs in unique cirumstances different from what has 
gone before, it is difficult for the individual to interpret the evidence 
they provide. This may be done in ways which can be best illustrated for 
an incomes policy. We may suppose that the individual's initial distribut­
ion of expectations^to be normal.centred around a mean of 20%, we may also 
suppose that the inflation rate is 20%. If expectations are formed by a 
simple first order adaptive mechanism, then the fact that the expectations 
were correct will result in a reduction of the variance around an unchanged 
mean. The introduction of an incomes policy aimed at reducing inflation to 
5% will have three possible effects. The first possibility is that the 
incomes policy carries no credibility at all, in which case the distribution 
of expectations will be what it would have been in the absence of such a 
policy altogether. The second possibility is the polar opposite to the first 
for individuals might feel so confident that the incomes policy will work 
that not only does the mean fall, but the distribution becomes more 
concentrated around that mean, hence there will be a reduction in individual 
uncertainty as measured by the variance of the distribution. The third 
possibility lies between these two polar extremes, the individual does 
take account of the incomes policy but there is difficulty in judging how 
successful, if at all, it will be. In this case the distribution may be 
bimodal, and because, as we have stressed, the evaluation of the likely 
effectiveness of an incomes policy is difficult due to the scarcity of 
relevant precedents, this is the most likely one. Those individuals who 
believe that the incomes policy will probably be effective will hold expec­
tations with the majority of the distribution centred around the first 
mode. Others who place less faith in its effectiveness, will have the 
majority of the distribution centred around the second mode. In both cases 
the mean of the distribution will fall, but the variance,measuring 
individual uncertainty is likely to increase.
(1) Thus we make the assumption that individuals can be thought of as having 
a probability distribution for possible outcomes, the variance of which 
provides a measure of uncertainty.
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A similar analysis also applies when evaluating the effects of wage 
strikes on individual uncertainty, except that expectations would be shifted 
upwards, as opposed to the introduction of incomes policy which shifts them 
downwards.
There is a second manner in which reinforcement may take place which 
can best be illustrated by returning to our maze example. If at point B we 
meet another individual also seeking the exit and we both agree as to the 
correct direction, then our confidence that we have found the correct way 
will be increased. When carried over to the problem of expectations of 
inflation this implies that when an individual meets another and their 
expectations are similar, then their confidence in those expectations will 
be increased, the opposite happening if their expectations differ markedly. 
Thus individual uncertainty will also depend upon cross section uncertainty.
Cross section uncertainty has been defined as the extent to which 
individuals hold differing expectations. In analysing why this may occur 
we will assume that expectations are formed by a simple adaptive mechanism, 
and later examine more sophisticated possibilities. Within this context 
the first reason why expectations might diverge is that the stimuli, i.e. 
actual wage inflation itself, might be perceived in different ways. This 
will be so for several reasons, firstly individuals in different firms 
will be exposed to different stimuli, because different firms, even in the 
same industry, will have a different mix of workers, some for example 
having a higher percentage of skilled workers than others, in addition 
of course contracts will be renewed at different times. However not all 
of the stimuli will be internal to the firm. Wages and wage changes in 
neighbouring firms or of firms in the same industry will also provide part 
of the evidence upon which individuals base their expectations, as will 
wages in totally seperate parts of the economy. For example if several 
large wage increases are granted in the public sector, or any other sector
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of the economy, then they are likely to affect the expectations of both 
workers and employers in other sectors of the economy.
However, even if individuals were to be faced with exactly the same 
stimuli they might still perceive it in different ways. Katona (1951) 
showed that this could be explained by the hypothesis of Gestalt psychology 
the basic principle of which is that our perceptions of the world around 
us are not those of individual elements combined into a whole, but a whole 
which gives a meaning to the elements. If we look at a drawing we do not 
perceive evry line of it, we perceive the picture of a man into which the 
lines combine, and the lines only so far as they are relevant to the 
perception of the man. If some lines are withdrawn from the drawing they 
may have no effect upon our perception of the man. We may not even notice 
the lines have been removed.
Furthermore the same elements may be seen either as one whole or as 
some other according to our inner attitudes and dispositions. If the 
drawing of a man is not very clear we may need some time to perceive him, 
or we may also perceive something else if we looked at it in another way. 
Therefore what we perceive will to some extent depend upon what we 
expect to perceive. A more economic orientated example is provided by a 
firm with several groups of workers each of which get an increase in wages 
but by different amounts ranging from small to large increases. The way 
this evidence is seen as a whole may vary from person to person, and this 
perception may well be influenced by prior expectations. If a person 
expects high wage inflation he may well see the large wage increases of 
some groups as confirming those expectations, placing relatively little 
emphasis on the smaller wage increases, and vice versa. This raises the 
interesting possibility that, within the expectations mechanism, not only 
are expectations adapting towards the actual rate of inflation, but so 
are our perceptions of that rate.
The second reason expectations might diverge, when formed by a purely
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adaptive mechanism is differences in A, the adjustment coefficient. Those 
individuals who react strongly to changed stimuli will have a large 
adjustment coefficient, therefore when inflation is accelerating their 
expectations will lag behind perceived inflation less than those with 
a smaller adjustment coefficient. The time period over which expectations 
are revised will also differ from individual to individual. Some may 
revise their expectations several times a month others less frequently the 
revision period probably being related to the frequency they come into 
contact with fresh stimuli (see discussion in chapter 4).
The nett result of this is that expectations are likely to diverge, 
and hence cross section uncertainty increase in times of either accelerating 
or deaccelerating inflationary expectations. Moreover these conclusions 
are likely to remain valid even when we consider a more complex expectation 
formation mechanism, such as the adaptive autoregressive model, as in 
equation (5.8). As we discussed earlier the autoregressive element only 
becomes operative during times of perceived structural change, and it is 
at such times that expectations will be changing rapidly, partly due to 
the autoregressive element.Such times will also be characterised, not only 
by a high degree of individual uncertainty, but also by a high degree of 
cross section uncertainty. The reason for the latter being that people will 
differ in classifying periods of perceived structural change, and also in 
the parameters of the autoregressive element.
Cross section uncertainty will also be affected by the rational 
element in expectations formation, i.e. by how different individuals take 
account of the extra information about the economic system in the form of 
incomes policies, widely publicised wage strikes etc. But it is difficult 
to specify, a priori, just what these effects are likely to be. When an 
incomes policy is introduced we saw that individuals might react in one of 
three ways. They might ignore the incomes policy, believing it to be ineff­
ective, they might believe very strongly that it will be effective, or they
might adopt a position between these two extremes. If everybody reacted 
in the first way then their would be no effect upon either expectations 
or the certainty with which they are held. But if people reacted in 
either of the other two ways, then although the mean would fall, in both 
cases the standard deviation of the aggregate distribution might either 
increase or decrease.
But of course not everybody will react in the same way, and because 
of this one might expect cross section uncertainty to increase, with some 
taking no notice of the incomes policy and others adjusting their 
expectations by varying amounts. However it is not possible to be certain 
upon this, and one can envisage situations where after a period of rapid 
inflation resulting in considerable cross section uncertainty, the introdu­
ction of a credible incomes policy concentrates expectations around some 
lower rate of inflation, thus reducing uncertainty.
Therefore the provision of extra information might either increase 
or decrease cross section uncertainty. Moreover because the introduction 
of one incomes policy in a particular period results in an increase in 
cross section uncertainty, this is no guarantee that the introduction of 
similar incomes policies in different periods will also have the same 
effect. Much will depend upon the exact context in which they are introdu­
ced. Similar remarks also apply about the effects of major wage strikes 
with the additional complication that they provide two peices of information 
about the economic system. Firstly they give information about the rate 
of wage increases workers in other sectors of the economy, and perhaps 
by extension workers in general, are seeking. Secondly they give informat­
ion about the miltancy of workers and how strongly they will pursue a wage 
claim.
6.3 The Data
In testing these hypotheses we are going to use data derived from
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the same sample survey used in the previous chapter. However for reasons 
which will become apparent we will not be using the data relating to the 
whole sample, the all-industry data, but that relating to a particular 
group, namely non-electrical engineering.
Our first problem was to find a measure for individual uncertainty, 
this has been defined as the degree of certainty with which individuals 
hold their expectations, and suggested that it could be measured by the 
variance or standard deviation of their probability distribution 
of possible outcomes. Unfortunately this measure is not available, although 
there is no reason why some measure of it could not be derived by surveys 
asking respondents to give upper and lower estimates as well as a central 
one. We can however use a proxy measure of average individual uncertainty 
at a given time, which is the proportion of respondents declining to answer 
the question.
In providing a justification for this we should first remember that 
all the respondents to this particular survey have first agreed to 
participate and that they are in general answering a number of other 
questions to do with expectations of profit, output, costs etc. In addition 
there seems no reason why they may be particularly sensitive to questions 
about wage inflation and decline to answer for this reason, as they might 
be about future profits or their own personal prospects. Thus we can rule 
out, as perhaps we could not do with other surveys, the possibility that 
respondents decline to answer for reasons such as they don't take part in 
surveys, they have'nt the time or they are particularly sensitive to the 
question.
We now make an assumption which is critical to the analysis. This is 
that the respondents will decline to answer if the variance of their 
probability distribution of possible outcomes is greater than some critical 
value, which we assume to be constant throughout the sample period. This is 
equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level of individual uncertainty
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above which they will be reluctant to give specific answers to questions 
on expectations. If we also assume that changes in individual uncertainty 
affect all the population in much the same manner, that is if some 
peoples individual uncertainty is increased this will not be offset by a 
reduction in other peoples' uncertainty. Then an increase in the proportion 
who decline to answer the question will reflect an increase in individual 
uncertainty for some which is not offset by a reduction for others. In this 
case the percentage who decline to answer provides a valid measure of the 
degree of individual uncertainty and an increase in this percentage reflects 
an increase in individual uncertainty for the population as a whole.
However this is by no means an ideal measure of individual uncertainty. 
The first criticism that may be levied against it is that it is capable 
of measuring uncertainty only above some critical minimum value. Secondly, 
and related to this first point, it is a discrete measure of a continuous 
variable. One might also criticise the assumptions that were made in order 
tojustify the measure. Of these assumptions it seems to us that the first, 
that respondents decline to answer above some constant critical value, is 
the most debatable. Yet it seems to us that for the purpose of this chapter, 
namely to test the hypothesis laid out in the previous section, none of 
these objections are vital, and that the percentage who decline to answer 
is an acceptable proxy for individual uncertainty. This is especially so 
when one considers the difficulties faced by workers in this field, and 
perhaps the even more "heroic" assumptions made by those authors in 
deriving measures of expectations themselves.
We have defined cross section uncertainty as the extent to which people 
hold differing expectations. A measure of this type of uncertainty is 
provided by either the variance or the standard deviation of the distribution 
derived from the survey. Of the two the standard deviation is probably the
best measure as it is linearly related to cross section uncertainty, whereas
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the variance, being the sum of the squared deviations, is non-linearly 
related. This measure of uncertainty, unlike that for individual uncertainty, 
is not entirely original. Carlson (1977) in a brief appendix to the main 
paper used the standard deviation of the distribution of the responses 
derived from the Livingstone survey of inflationary expectations in America 
as a measure of the "divergence of opinion", as have Carlson and Parkin 
(1975).
It was not possible to use the all industry data to calculate the 
standard deviation as this is in the form of four month moving average 
totals. An example will serve to illustrate why this is not suitable.
Suppose that the period in question is September to December, which we 
may take as representing expectations upon November 1, and that the 
standard deviation remains constant in all four months. Assume also that 
from September to December expectations increase from 4% to 7%, at the 
rate of 1% per month. Using the all industry data for the calculations 
would result in a standard deviation relating to the distribution over the 
four months as a whole. This is much greater than that for any of the 
individual months, which reflects the fact that the standard deviation 
for the individual months stems solely from the differing views of 
different respondents at the same time. But the all industry standard 
deviation also reflects the differing views of the same respondents at 
differing times. Thus when expectations are in great flux the standard 
deviation of the all industry data will be biased upwards. Therefore 
instead of using the all industry data for the empirical work, the data 
relating to a single group was used. The group chosen was non-electrical 
engineering, this category being surveyed twice as frequently as the 
others, i.e. every two months. The percentage who decline to answer are 
shown in figure 6.2, and the standard deviation in figure 6.3.
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6.4 Empirical Representation and Results
It was argued earlier that individual uncertainty would be increasing 
if expectations were changing rapidly. This would be the case if, for 
instance, expectations were being formed by a simple adaptive mechanism, 
when a large increase in expectations would indicate that expectations 
held in the previous period were substantially in error. Hence via the 
reinforcement principle this would increase individual uncertainty. It 
would also be the case if expectations were formed by a more complex 
adaptive autoregressive process as described in the previous chapter. In 
this case rapidly changing expectations would indicate a period of 
perceived structural change, and again result in increased individual 
uncertainty.
We may test this hypothesis by regressing individual uncertainty, or 
rather its proxy, the percentage who decline to answer the question, NA^.on, 
lagged uncertainty and the percentage change in the mean of the distribut­
ion, ¿t.
The essence of the second part of the reinforcement hypothesis was 
that when an individual meets another and their expectations are similar, 
then each will have their confidence in those expectations increased. This 
kind of reinforcement is more likely to take place the smaller the degree 
of cross section uncertainty. Conversely the greater the degree of cross 
section uncertainty the less likely an individual is to come into contact 
with others of similar expectations, and the more likely to meet people 
with different opinions, in which case his own expectations will be held 
with less certainty.
It was also argued that events which provide extra information to 
the individual would, because of their novelty, be likely to increase 
individual uncertainty. The obvious examples of such events were, as we 
have already said the introduction of incomes policies, and widely
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publicised strikes. Turning first to incomes policies, we basically used
one overall dummy variable to capture the impact of the introduction of the
policies listed in Table 5.2. The reason being to economise on degrees of
freedom, as for this analysis we had less than half the number of observat-
1ions available to us when analysing the formation of expectations. However 
this is not entirely satisfactory, for by using dummy variables we implici­
tly assume that all of the incomes policies had the same initial impact 
upon uncertainty. Partially because of this we introduced a second dummy 
variable D2 (the first being Dl), to capture any possible additional 
effects caused by the introduction of the incomes policy in Novemeber 
1972. We argued earlier that uncertainty occured in these cases because of 
the unfamiliarity of the evidence. To a degree this unfamiliarity will 
always be present, as each incomes policy will be introduced in circumst­
ances unique to it. But it seems possible that the introduction of this 
particular incomes policy would pose unusually large problems in 
interpretation, as there was very little it could be compared with. It was 
introduced some four years after the previous official incomes policy, more 
than twice as great as the gap which seperated any other two incomes 
policies. Moreover it was introduced by a conservative government, which 
had hitherto argued consistently against the use of incomes policies. There 
was also the problem of how the trade unions would react to this curb on 
their members incomes by a government with which it was already in 
violent conflict with over the industrial relations act. For all these 
reasons it seems likely that, as we have already said, the introduction 
of this particular incomes policy would pose more problems and generate 
more uncertainty than the others.
Turning now to major strikes over wages, the ones that had the 
greatest impact on the general public were undoubtedly the two coal
mining strikes which resulted in large scale electricity cuts throughout
1. Because, as explained on page 180, the basic time period is now two months.
The total number of observations is now 43, as shown in Appendix Table A3.
the country to both domestic and industrial users. (An initial attempt was 
made to discover whether these had any effect upon the formation of 
expectations themselves. But this met with little success, and the results 
were not reported). The first took place in 1972 and lasted from January 
10 to February 25, electricity supplies being restricted upon a rota basis 
from February 10 to March 1. The second disturbance began with an overtime 
ban by the miners which led to the introduction of the three day week for 
industry and commerce beginning on January 1 1974. The actual strike 
itself began on February 10 and ended on March 9, with the calling of a 
general election. Thus to test the hypothesis that these strikes had an 
effect on uncertainty a third dummy variable, D3, was constructed, 
operative for February 1972 and February 1974.
When these three dummy variables are added to the others the equation 
we are going to estimate becomes
N A = 6 N A , + g0 E. + g„0 . + 6 . D1 + g, D2 + ec D3 (6.1) t 1 t-1 2 t o t 4 o b
where all the coefficients are expected to be positive. The equation was 
estimated by O.L.S., and the results were (t statistics again in brackets)
N A = 0.056NA + 15.17Et - O.OIC^ + 5.79 D1
(0.55) (3.02) (0.02) (2.09)
+ 33.78 D2 + 15.03 D3 
(4.87) (3.27)
R2 = 0.58
DW = 1.81 (6.2)
The Durbin Watson statistic is included in the above equation even though, 
because of the existence of a lagged dependent variable it is not strictly 
valid. However as Johnston(1972) has pointed out, the Durbin Watson statis­
tic is still a good, if not ideal, indicator of the presence of serial 
correlation even with the presence of a lagged dependent variable. It
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is for this reason that we have included it. It lies between the upper 
and lower critical bounds, therefore even taking the statistic at its face 
value, it is inconclusive. If we re-estimate the equation without the 
lagged dependent variable we obtain the following results
N A t = 15.24 ¿t + 0.11Ot + 6.08 D1 + 34.34 D2 + 14.87 D3 
(3.07) (0.20) (2.26) (5.06) (3.28)
R2 = 0.57
DW = 1.75 (6.3)
The Durbin Watsom statistic is now valid, however it again lies in the 
inconclusive zone.
All ofnthe coefficients have the expected signs. The insignificance 
of the lagged dependent variable indicates that individual uncertainty is 
relatively quickly resolved. The standard deviation, included as a measure 
of cross section uncertainty, is also insignificant. This might reflect 
the possibility that in order for reinforcement of expectations to take 
place, individuals must not only meet others with similar expectations, 
but this similarity must be communicated. Now whilst it seems possible that 
such communication takes place on a general plane, for example whether an 
incomes policy will work, or whether a large wage claim awarded to one 
group of workers will be transmitted to other workers. It is perhaps less 
likely that communication takes place in a more specific manner about 
exactly how much they expect wages to rise in the future. Therefore this 
hypothesis, although theoretically an attractive one cannot be accepted on 
the basis of the evidence presented here.
All of the other coefficients are significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level of significance. We can therefore accept the hypotheses 
that individual uncertainty will be greater in times of accelerating or 
deaccelerating inflation, and that events such as the introduction of inco­
mes policies and widely publicised wage strikes also affect individual 
uncertainty.
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Turning now to cross section uncertainty, we argued earlier that 
expectations would diverge, and hence cross section uncertainty increase, 
when expectations themselves were changing rapidly. Basically this is 
because some adapt their expectations more rapidly in response to changed 
stimuli than others. Similarly when expectations are relatively stable we 
would expect expectations to converge, as the more cautious catch up those 
who respond more rapidly. Therefore we can relate the level of dispersion 
to the level in the previous period and the absolute change in the previous 
period. It is the absolute change in this case, not the percentage change, 
as the mechanism which generates cross section uncertainty is the adaptive 
expectations method, and the same amount of cross section uncertainty will 
be generated if expectations are being adapted from 1% to 5%, as would be 
if they were being adapted from 21% to 25%.
However if, after a prolonged period of generally rising expectations, 
they begin falling, then initially expectations will converge, with those 
holding the highest expectations adapting them rapidly downwards. The same 
phenomenon happening when after a prolonged period of falling expectations 
they begin rising. Hence when the general trend in expectations is either 
upwards or downwards and their are deviations from this we should also 
observe a reduction in cross sectiion uncertainty as expectations converge. 
To test this hypothesis we constructed a shift dummy variable on lagged 
uncertainty which was operative in such periods (and which is referred to
as o;_x).
A constant term and the mean of the distribution, Et, should also be 
included in the regression as it was argued that there would always be some 
differences in the stimuli facing entrepeneurs and that these differences 
would result in some minimal level of cross section uncertainty. Moreover 
the variation in the stimuli which the employers receive is likely to be 
related to the rate of inflation itself, at least until the economy has 
fully adjusted to that rate of inflation, a period which may take several
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years . Even then there may still be considerable scope for variations in 
stimuli, as workers fall behind one year to catch up another. There will 
also be more scope for interpretation of this stimuli.
As with individual uncertainty events which provide extra information 
about the economic system might also affect cross section uncertainty. We 
therefore included the same two dummy variables, D1 and D3, as before, in 
the regressions. The dummy variable D2, which was constructed to take 
account of the possible special effects on individual uncertainty of the 
incomes policy introduced in November 1972, was not however included. For 
although it again appears unlikely that all incomes policies will have 
equal effects on cross section uncertainty, this differentiation will not 
be related in any simple manner to the novelty of the incomes policy, but 
to factors such as the difference between the actual rate of inflation and 
the target rate of inflation.
Consequently the equation now becomes
where aQ, 0^, a 2 and are all expected to be positive, a 3 is expected 
to be negative and the other two coefficients may be either positive or 
negative. The estimated regression, which was again estimated by O.L.S., 
is shown below
The same comments apply to the Durbin Watson statistic as before, and
(6.4)
a = 0.26 + 0.19Et + 0.170t_1 + 0.038a^_1 + 0.25AE 
(0.61) (3.94) (0.01) (0.32) (2.28)
t-1 t
+ 0.95 D1 + 0.72 D2
(2.56) (1.05)
R2 = 0.55
DW = 1.33 (6.5)
again it lies between the upper and lower bounds, therefore even at its
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face value it is inconclusive. Of those variables whose signs we were able 
to specify,and have the expected signs and are significant at the 5% 
level of significance, cl^, C*.g and a^, the two coefficients on lagged 
uncertainty and the constant term were insignificant. This would seem to 
indicate that cross section uncertainty is quickly resolved. Within the 
context of the adaptive expectations model this would occur if, within the 
two month period which is our basic unit of time in this analysis, expecta­
tions were frequently revised by individuals.
The regression was then redone, but omitting the lagged dependent 
variable and the shift dummy variable
O = 0.27 + 0.19Et + 0.25AEt + 0.97 D1 - 0.71 D3 
(0.67) (5.32) (2.39) (2.74) (1.06)
R2 = 0.55
DW = 1.28 (6.6)
The Durbin Watson statistic is now valid, but still lies in the intermediate 
zone. The constant remains insignificant at the 5% level of significance.
The coefficient of the incomes policy dummy variable, a is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that during this period the 
introduction of incomes policies tended on average to increase cross section 
uncertainty. Conversely a is negative, although not significant at the 5% 
level. However in interpreting this result it should be borne in mind 
that widely publicised wage strikes tended to increase individual uncerta­
inty. Thus sixteen percent of those questioned declined to answer during 
the first strike and seventeen percent during the second. It may well be 
that, contrary to what we have assumed, their expectations were not 
distributed in a similar manner to those who did answer. In which case 
had their expectations been recorded the level of cross section uncertainty
would have been higher than the measure we have taken.
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6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the degree of certainty with 
which expectations are held. Two types of uncertainty have been identified, 
individual uncertainty or the degree of uncertainty with which individuals 
hold their expectations, and cross section uncertainty, or the extent to 
which expectations differ between individuals. In determining individual 
uncertainty the concept of reinforcement seems important, in an economic 
context this will take place when the expectations prove correct or nearly 
so. The greater the error in recent expectations the more uncertain the 
individual will be about present expectations. In addition external factors 
which provide additional information to the individual about the economic 
system may also affect expectations. Their impact upon individual 
uncertainty will be related to the "novelty" or "uniqueness" of the 
information. When there is little with which it can be compared with, 
individuals will be uncertain as to how to intepret the information, and 
the more novel it is the more uncertain they will be.
In analysing cross section uncertainty we started from the basic 
assumption that expectations are formed according to the simple adaptive 
expectations hypothesis. Differences then arise due to differences in the 
adaptive coefficients, the stimuli individuals receive and the way they 
perceive them. These differences will then increase cross section uncerta­
inty most noticeably when inflation is either accelerating or deaccelerating.
It was also argued that external events which provide information about 
the economic system were also capable of affecting cross section uncertainty 
although whether they would increase it or decrease it would depend upon 
the circumstances. In the period we were studying, incomes policies 
tended to increase cross section uncertainty whilst strikes appeared to 
decrease it, although this latter conclusion is less firm.
Throughout the chapter we have pointed to shortcomings both in the 
data and the assumptions made in the empirical work. However these do not 
seem to us either unusual or serious within an empirical economic context, 
particularly with respect to work done on expectations. In particular they 
do not appear to be serious enough to invalidate the empirical work, which 
in the main supports the theories advanced. Perhaps one of the most 
important implications of this work is that the individuals who particip­
ated in these surveys did take account of external factors which provided 
extra information about the economic system. They did not form their 
expectations in a purely mechanical way, either by the adaptive expectations 
mechanism or some other. This then, taken as a whole, provides further 
support for the rational-adaptive hypothesis we have been advocating in 
previous chapters. They are also consistent with the more complex mechanism 
of equation (5.8), where an autoregressive element is present during 
periods of perceived structural change.
Therefore this diversion, from the principal line of development within 
the thesis, has been usefull in providing this indirect confirmation. It is 
also hoped that it has been of interest as an attempt to develop an 
analysis of uncertainty along the lines suggested by Laidler and Parkin. 
Moreover we shall later be using some of the conclusions from this 
chapter when attempting to integrate uncertainty about expectations within 
our model of wage inflation. Meanwhile in the next chapter we return to 
the central theme of the thesis, and in particular attempt to test 
directly the search theoretic model of inflation developed in chapter 2.
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Chapter 7
An Empirical Analysis of the Wage Inflation Equation
7.1 Introduction
We have so far formulated a search theoretic model of wage inflation. 
The theory has already been tested, but with respect to its implications 
in a different area to inflation, namely the labour market flow variables, 
quits, fires and hires. We have also devoted considerable attention to an 
analysis, both theoretical and empirical, of expectations of inflation.
In this present chapter we will be concerned with testing directly 
the search theoretic model of wage inflation already referred to. In the 
course of doing this we shall also make use of much of the work done in the 
three chapters on expectations, in particular using an expectations series 
generated from the parameters of a regression estimated in chapter 5 
(equation (5.12)).
Initially the analysis will cover the period 1951(1) - 1969(2), the 
first date was set largely by the inavailability of data prior to that.
Whilst the second by the assertion, made by many authors (e.g. Williamson 
and Wood (1976)), that this was about the time when excess demand based 
theories of inflation finally seemed to break down. Clearly before 
attempting to see whether this is also so for the particular theory develo­
ped here, we should see whether it can satisfactorily explain inflation 
prior to that date. After doing this, we can then examine events after 1969.
7.2 The Data
An appendix at the end of the chapter will contain a detailed set of 
definitions of the variables used in this part of the study. This particu­
lar section is therefore devoted to points of particular interest or
importance, although it should be noted that many of the variables used
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in this chapter have already been discussed in chapter 3.
The first problem we were faced with, then, was how to divide the 
year into quarters. The division that was decided upon was
Quarter 1 End December - End March
Quarter 2 End March - End June
Quarter 3 End June - End September
Quarter 4 End September - End December
Having done this we then turned our attention to the specification of the 
dependent variable. There are several possible"wages" which may be 
used in empirical work, e.g. wage rates, weekly or hourly, or earnings, 
again weekly or hourly. We have chosen basic rates rather than earnings 
primarily because earnings will be correlated with labour demand variables 
merely because overtime working will increase when the market is "tight".
In addition quarterly data on earnings was not available during the 1950's. 
We also chose hourly wage rates in preference to weekly wage rates, as this 
more closely reflects the cost to the employer of labour as well as the 
reward to the employee. Although to some extent it is perhaps not critical 
which of these variables we choose, to quote Lipsey (1960)
"...although a priori reasoning can suggest many reasons 
why rates and earnings may not move together, they do in 
fact stay, over a very long period of time, remarkably 
close together, so that any theory that explains one will 
go a long way to explaining the other"
Even so a lot of effort has been expended in discussing the relative merits 
of these, and others, as appropriate bases upon which we can measure wage 
inflation. As always, an excellent summary of these points can be found in 
Trevithick and Mulvey (1975).
A second question, of considerable importance, concerns the best way 
to proxy the quarterly rate of change of the wage rate. There are two 
chief candidates, firstly the annual rate of change,centred on the quarter 
in question, which we shall denote by W^, algebraically
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~ W - WW = t+2 t-2 . 100 (7.1)
Wt
Secondly several economists have used the simple quarterly rate of change, 
denoted by W^, where
W. = Wt Wt-1 . 100 (7.2)
V i
The chief advantage of the first of these two measures over the second 
is that it is much less volatile, in the terminology of Parkin, Sumner and
A
Ward (1975), usage of reduces the noise to signal ratio.'The chief 
disadvantage is that the signal tends to get muted in the process. Thus if 
the underlying trend has distinct peaks and troughs, these will be trunca­
ted by an annual measure of inflation. In other words, the amplitude of
A
W^ will be less than the amplitude of the true underlying series we are 
trying to proxy. We shall be returning to these points later, when discuss­
ing the nature of the disturbance terms.
Turning now to the independent variables, we shall first look at 
unemployment. The measure we use relates to the wholly unemployed in Great 
Britain, both males and females, excluding adult school leavers and 
students, and not seasonally adjusted. This contrasts to the analysis in 
chapter 3, where we used adult male vacancy and unemployment data. There are 
two reasons for this change, firstly data on adult male vacancies alone 
is not available after the early 1970's, and as we will be examining the 
period until 1975 this would have presented serious difficulties. Secondly 
the wage rate data relates to all workers, both men and women, therefore 
data relating to both also had to be used when proxying the number of job 
searchers and available vacancies.
The figures for adult students have only been collected since July 
1971, prior to this date they have been estimated by the Department of 
Employment. As our basic period is one quarter we take the three monthly
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figures in each quarter and obtain an average. In some months two estimates 
are available, relating to the beginning and the end of the month, and in 
this case we include both estimates when calculating the average. In the 
empirical work we use unemployment as a percentage of the working population 
(This contrasts with the practice adopted in chapter 3, and for a discussion 
of these differences see the appendix at the end of this chapter).
The vacancy figures were also expressed as a percentage of the 
working population. They relate to seasonally unadjusted vacancies 
notified to the employment exchanges, and remaining unfilled. Prior to 
April 1962 nurses were excluded from the general vacancy register, having 
had their own. Seperate nursing statistics are available for this period, 
but it is not a simple matter of adding these to the general vacancy 
figures as it appears that not all of those who used the nurses register 
transferred to the general register. For example, in December 1961, the 
last date on which figures are available, there were 25453 nurses on the 
nurses register. Yet it was reported that the actual merger added only 
some 19200 to the register. Consequently all the figures on the register, 
prior to April 1962, have been multiplied by 192/255 before being added to 
the general vacancy figures.
The most difficult data of all to obtain, and in some respects the 
most crucial, was that relating to expectations of wage inflation. The 
difficulties arise because the survey data we had only extended back to 
1967. Consequently, having rejected the rational expectations hypothesis, 
we had no alternative to constructing a series on expectations, based 
upon the empirical work in chapter 5. At the end of that chapter we 
concluded that, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the rational- 
adaptive hypothesis, of all the alternatives considered, appeared to 
provide the most acceptable explanation of the manner in which expectations
are formed. In particular we concluded that a rational-adaptive mechanism,
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with autoregressive elements operative during periods of "perceived struct­
ural change", would be capable of generating a data series on expectations 
which is likely to be as valid as any we can obtain at the present moment. 
We also estimated the parameters of such a mechanism, and these are given 
in equation (5.14).
Using this equation, we then constructed four series to represent 
expectations. The first of these was a simple first order adaptive 
expectations scheme, whereby expectations are revised according to the 
following formula
W® = 0.920W®_X + 0.060 (7.3)
We assume that inflation is fully perceived, but it should be noted that 
the coefficients sum to less than unity, and a possible explanation of 
this might be that in fact expectations are not fully perceived. Thus this 
mechanism will result, even in equilibrium, in expectations being equal 
to only three quarters of the actual rate of inflation. Thus if the actual 
rate of inflation is 4%, then the long run equilibrium value for expectat­
ions is only 3%.
We began constructing the series in March 1949, and assumed that in 
the previous month expectations of inflation were in fact zero. Any bias 
this might cause will lessen with time, and it is hoped that by the first 
quarter of 1951, when the empirical work began, the bias would be very 
small. We then constructed a second series of expectations, also based 
on (7.2), but allowing explicitly for the possibility that expectations 
were not fully perceived. Specifically we adopted the Carlson and Parkin 
(1975) assumption that inflation rates below 2.5% will not be perceived at 
all, whilst those above 2.5% are fully perceived.
We then turned to the full, part autoregressive, part rational- 
adaptive process, as defined in (5.14), which is reproduced below
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W® = 0.920W® + 0.060 W + 0.780W®' - 0.796W®' (7.4)L l 1 X X” 1
where the dash denotes that the variable is operative only in periods of 
perceived structural change, as defined in chapter 5. In addition we 
constructed a fourth series of expectations, also based upon (7.4), but 
with the actual rate of inflation not being perceived below 2.5%. For all 
four series we took the average of the three monthly figures in any one 
quarter.
We should emphasise that none of these variables can be regarded as 
perfect proxies for expectations. In particular it seems unlikely that the 
parameters within any expectation formation mechanism would remain unchanged 
throughout a twenty year period. However we believe, as we have said before, 
that this is the best that can be achieved at the present.
Finally, before we leave this section on the data, we should note 
that the underlying cyclical change variables, included in chapter 5, such 
as INYUL etc, did not appear to improve the explanatory power of the wage 
inflation equation, and have been omitted from the regressions. In addition 
the profit and unemployment benefits data was defined as before. However, 
as the sample period is now a lengthy one, we have to make some allowance 
for productivity growth increasing the net revenue contribution of the 
average worker. This was done, not simply by including a time trend, but by 
linking that time trend to the profits variable itself in a multiplicative 
manner.
7.3 The Specification of the Disturbance Term
Surpisingly enough there are not many papers which contain an explicit 
discussion of the nature of the residuals. However such a discussion can 
be found in Wallis (1971), who argues that the type of differencing proced­
ure employed in (7.1) results in negative fourth order serial correlation.
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Because a high value for lead to a high value for , but in
four periods time a low value for W . Thus implicit to this argument is 
the assumption that the residuals properly relate to the wage level itself. 
Rowley and Wilton (1973 and 1974) argue however that the disturbance term 
relates to the "underlying quarterly rate of inflation", and that the
A
residuals, in a wage equation where the dependent variable is W^, can be 
regarded as following a fourth order moving average process. Explicit in 
their approach is the assumption that the same group of workers receive 
an increase in their wages once a year in any given quarter, less explicit 
is the assumption that this operates so that one quarter of all workers 
receive an increase in each quarter.
We believe that neither of these approaches, nor the conclusions which 
stem from them are entirely valid. We shall expand upon this criticism 
within the context of Wallis's approach. Basically we question the assumpt­
ion that the residuals, which relate to the wage equation, are serially 
independent. The existence of this disturbance term can be justified on 
several grounds, one of the most important being the variation in the 
number of people who receive increases in a given time period. Thus, in 
times of inflation, if a large number of workers receive wage increases in 
a quarter we might expect the wage rate to be higher than one would 
expect, given the state of the independent variables, i.e. we would expect 
there to be a positive residual. Similarly if relatively few workers 
receive wage increases in a quarter, then we would expect a negative 
residual. However given that there are only a finite number of workers, and 
that there is in practice a limit to the frequency with which their wage 
rates are revised, there will be a finite number of workers receiving 
wage increases in, for example, a twelve month period. In which case if a 
large number of workers receive wage increases in one period, there will 
be relatively fewer wage increases in the succeeding three periods. However 
the effect of a large number of wage increases in period t, besides
tending to result in a positive residual in that period, will also have 
some effect on the residual in t+1, probably resulting in that residual 
also being positive despite the relatively few workers receiving wage 
increases in that period. Hence one would expect there to be positive 
first order serial correlation present. However by period t+2, and even 
more so by period t+3, we might expect this to be reduced, and it is even 
possible that the fact that relatively few workers are receiving wage 
increases will result in negative second and third order serial correlation. 
If this were the only reason for the disturbance term, we would expect for 
the U.K., the wage level to exhibit regular fluctuations, with a four 
period cycle, around an underlying trend as in figure 7.1. In which case 
we would expect there to be positive first and negative second and third 
order serial correlation. This is in fact what we do tend to observe, in
t t+4 time
figure 7.2, for example, we can see the course of the wage rate between 
1951(1) and 1955(1). The trend line in this diagram was found by linking 
together observations from the first quarter of each year, and it is quite 
clear that the residuals do indeed follow this pattern.
However there will be other disturbances causing the actual wage rate 
to deviate from its trend value. Individual workers in any one period may
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receive wage rates in excess of, or less than, that which one would 
expect given the underlying economic conditions. Now, because published 
wage rate statistics represent an average of all workers wages, an above 
average wage award for a large number of workers in one period will not 
only cause the wage rate to be above the trend level in that period, but 
also in the succeeding periods, until those workers wages are renegotiated, 
which we may assume to be at approximately yearly intervals. This is 
similar to the effect noted by Rowley and Wilton and because of it we 
would expect there to be positive first, second and third order serial 
correlation.
A
What are the implications of this for W^, the annual measure of 
inflation? A higher than 'normal' wage settlement to a group of workers 
in period t will lead to the wage rate being higher, not only in period 
t, but until those same workers' wages are revised again. Assuming that 
wages are revised annualy, the wage rate will then be higher than normal - 
i.e. have a positive disturbance term, in periods t, t+1, t+2 and t+3. 
Providing we assume independence of the error term relating to annual 
wage rates for the same group of workers over time, we would expect the 
next settlement to be less than normal, and wage levels to return to 
their expected values. (This last argument is implicitly the same as Wallis's.) 
This process will lead to positive first, second and third order serial 
correlation, in addition to negative fourth order serial correlation. If we 
couch the arguements in terms of a higher number,than normal, of wage 
settlements, then the same conclusion emerges. Although it should be noted 
that the first order serial correlation is likely to be stronger than the 
other orders, as the original disturbance term gets muted over time.
Thus in comparing these conclusions with Wallis's it can be seen that
they differ in as much as we suggest the existence of a more complex
autoregressive scheme than he thought likely. Whilst regarding the work of
Rowley and Wilton, we believe that their assumption that the same workers 
receive an increase at the same time every year to be much too rigid, and
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indeed omits an important factor when considering the correct specifica­
tion of the error term. To repeat what has already been said, the fact 
that there will be only a finite number of wage increases in a given twelve 
month period, implies that a large number of increases in any one period 
will be followed by a relatively low number of increases in the succeeding 
three periods. This has important implications for the correct specification 
of the error term which cannot be captured in the rigid manner attempted 
by Rowley and Wilton. Indeed we believe that their attempt to do so in 
this way invalidates much of their empirical analysis.
This interest in the residuals of W^ has not been extended to the 
purely quarterly measure of the inflation rate, W^, as defined in equation 
(7.2), that is apart from Parkin, Sumner and Ward's comment that this app­
ears to be a very noisy series. However it seems likely that this noise is 
not pure white noise, as seems to have been assumed hitherto. Specifically 
we argue that the residuals are subject to negative, first,second and third 
order serial correlation. The argument is thus, over a given period of say 
a year, we can, as we have already said, expect there to be some upper 
limit on the number of workers receiving increases, which is determined 
by the size of the workforce, if we assume that each worker recieves only 
one increase in that period. If then in the first quarter of the period a 
large number of workers receive wage increases, this will leave fewer 
to receive increases in the succeeding three quarters. This effect will be 
muted by two other factors, firstly not all workers will receive an increase 
once every twelve months, and secondly not all workers will receive the 
same wage increase. Note should also be made that this is also consistent 
with a positive fourth order serial correlation specification, but that 
allowing for negative first second and third order serial correlation will 
probably lead to better results, as these disturbances are nearer in time 
to the period in question.As for the size of the three serial correlation 
coefficients, being as a positive disturbance is likely, ceteris paribus,
to produce equal effects in the following three quarters, we would expect 
the three serial correlation coefficients to be approximately -0.33.
We regard these observations regarding the disturbance term to be very 
important. For not only does the existence of serial correlation tend to 
invalidate, somewhat, the statistical validity of the empirical work.
Taking account of it can lead to an increase in the significance of the 
explanatory variables.
Before finishing this discussion on the disturbance term, we should 
note that there has, in recent years, grown up an awareness of the fact 
that changes in the wage rate index can result either from changes in the 
size of settlements, or the number of settlements. Economists have in 
general been interested in the size of settlements, which they feel can 
be regarded as being more representative of the "underlying rate of 
inflation". One approach to this filtering problem has been to adjust the 
official index to take account of the frequency of settlements (Johnston 
and Timbrell (1973) and Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1975)), but as Elliott 
and Dean (1978) have argued this has not been satisfactorily accomplished 
to date. A second approach has been to construct seperate indices detailing 
the size and frequency of settlements, and to seek the determinants of each 
(Elliott and Shelton (1978). Or alternatively to use the individual, raw 
settlement data as the independent variable (Riddell (1979)). Both of these 
approaches are relatively new and it is still too soon to have formed any 
definite conclusions as to their degree of success. However to the extent 
that the problem has been to allow for the differring number of settlements 
within the specification of the wage equation, we suggest that the method 
adopted here, i.e. incorporating the effects of these factors within the 
specification of the disturbance term, can be considered as an alternative 
to the above two approaches. Moreover it is an alternative which is consid­
erably more general in its potential use, as data on wage settlements is
by no means easily available.
7.4 The Results: 1951(1) - 1969(2)
The first set of regressions were concerned with W , the annual rate 
of change of the wage rate, centred on the t'th quarter. The set of 
independent variables were in general the basic ones indicated by the 
search theory. The expectations series which worked best, and which was 
used in the regressions throughout this chapter, was that based upon the 
more complex semi autoregressive mechanism defined in equation (7.4), and 
where the rate of inflation was fully perceived. Initially we used O.L.S. 
to estimate the equations and the results were, omitting the seasonal 
dummy coefficients
W = -10.79 + 63.5211 + 2.93 Vt + 0.11 til t - 0.054Ut 
(3.97) (3.78) (1.59) (1.62) (0.05)
+ 6.03 Bt + 0.45 W®
(2.29) (3.12)
R2 =0.67
DW = 1.20 (7.6)
(Again it should be noted that, as throughout the thesis, the figures in 
brackets are t statistics). These results are reasonably good, all the 
coefficients have the expected sign and with the exception of unemployment
all are significant, at least at the 10% level. In addition the value for 
2R is reasonably high. However the Durbin Watson statistic is significant 
at the 5% level and indicates the presence of positive first order serial 
correlation.
We argued earlier in this chapter that under certain conditions we 
would expect the residuals to be characterised by first, second, third 
and fourth order serial correlation, therefore the significance of the 
Durbin Watson statistic should not be too surpising. There are several 
standard techniques for estimating equations with serially correlated 
residuals, however they tend to get somewhat complex when there are more

The t'th row of F gives the derivatives of f^ with respect to b^, b^,...,^.
Now let Fq be the value of F evaluated at the initial value b^ =
(b , b20’’’'’ bm0^' The Gauss-Newton method then consists of taking a 
linear^expansion of f(b) around bQ , the vector of initial starting values, 
and then using ordinary least squares. We therefore minimize with respect 
to the sum of squared residuals, i.e. with respect to
(Y - f(b0) - F0(e - b0)}’{Y - f(b0) - F0(f? - b0)} (7.13)
This gives
F(j{Y - f(bQ) - F0(B - b0)} = 0 
^ ( Y  - f(b0>) = FqFq(B - bQ)
and the change from the initial to the new estimate is given by
d = 8 - bQ = - f(b0>) (7.14)
A new estimate of ft , bx, is obtained as bx = bQ + d. The process is then 
repeated until convergence is achieved.
The modification suggested by Hartley, and used here, involves 
setting the new estimate of bA equal to b ^  + Xd, where X lies between 0 
and 1. The convergence criterion is that if | d^^/b^^¿ — i)l <  ^ (i is in 
fact set equal to 0.01), for j = l,....,m, then the procedure has converged. 
If not X is searched over, starting atX = 1, i, ¿, ..... until
< S^i-1\  bA is then set equal to b ^  + Xd, and the process is repea­
ted .
If we assume that the errors, et , are independently and identically
2distributed with mean 0 and variance 0  , and if b is the final estimate of 
P , then
0 2 = 1 SSE(b) (7.15)
n
(1) Specifically a first order Taylor series expansion, where Y is approxi­
mated by: Y e f(bQ) + FQ(ft - bQ)
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and the nonlinear least squares estimator b is approximately normally
2 — idistributed with mean 6 and covariance matrix 0 {F(b)'F(b)}
Using this method to estimate equation (7.6), with a first order 
serial correlation term, we get (again omitting the seasonal dummy coeffic­
ients, which we shall continue to do).
A
Wt = -6.23 + 39.0011 + 3.16 Vt + 0.033 til t - 0.079 Ut
(1.39) (2.00) (1.53) (0.27) (0.06)
+ 5.76 Bt + 0.40 W®
(1.71) (1.55)
R2 = 0.73 Pl = 0.48 (3.16)
DW = 1.82 (7.16)
The initial starting values for the coefficients were set equal to the 
O.L.S. estimates, the serial correlation coefficient, p , being set at 
zero. Again the results are reasonably good, there is some reduction in the 
significance of the coefficients, and indeed the time trend/profits variable 
now becomes insignificant. But taken as a whole the results still provide 
some measure of support for the hypothesis being tested. Detailed discuss­
ion of the size of these coefficients will be delayed until the end of the 
chapter. For the moment it is perhaps usefull to compare these results 
with those obtained from a more standard method of allowing for serially 
correlated residuals, namely the Cochrane Orcutt iterative technique.
Wt = -5.34 + 35.1911^ + 2.76 Vt + 0.049 til t - 0.26Ut 
(1.33) (1.85) (1.33) (0.47) (0.21)
+ 5.58 Bt + 0.40 W®
(1.77) (1.94)
R2 = 0.71 p » 0.47 (4.61)
DW = 1.83 (7.17)
As can be seen this provides very similar results to the previous equation 
estimated by nonlinear least squares.
However we have previously indicated, that we would not only expect
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positive first order serial correlation, but probably second and third 
order positive correlation in addition to negative fourth order serial 
correlation. Consequently we re-estimated the equation allowing for this,
Wt = -8.77 + 43.64 JT t + 3.94 Vt + 0.12 til +0.25Ut 
(2.85) (2.68) (2.26) (1.67) (0.25)
+ 4.21 Bt + 0.47 W®
(1.65) (2.38)
= 0.46 (3.35) 
p_ = -0.21 (1.49)
2R = 0.76 p3 = -0.017 (0.12)
DW = 1.97 P4 = -0.23 (1.84) (7.18)
These results have improved somewhat in as much as there has been a 
general increase in the t statistics, although there is some reservation 
as to the coefficient on expectations, which is significantly less than 
one. As for the serial correlation coefficients, the first order one remains 
positive and significant at the 5% level. The fourth order one is also 
significant at this level, with the sign expected. The second and third 
order coefficients are both negative, but insignificant at the 5% 
level.
Turning our attention now to Wt> the quarterly rate of change in 
wages, we first estimated the basic equation using O.L.S.
wt = -2.21 + 25.47 JIt - 0.82 Vt + 0.062 tn ■- 0.66U 1
(1.08) (2.00) (0.59) (1.18) (0.84)
+ 1.81 Bt + 0.25W®
(0.91) (2.26)
R2 = 0.31
DW = 2.34
These results are clearly not very good, the R is much lower than before, 
although this is only to be expected as the quarterly rate of inflation is 
considerably more volatile than the annual rate. However, of the
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coefficients, only two, profits and expectations are significant. The Durbin 
Watson statistic is in the indeterminate range, and consequently no firm 
conclusion can be drawn as to the possible existence of first order negat­
ive serial correlation.
However we argued earlier that there were very strong theoretical 
reasons for believing that the residuals would be characterised by 
negative first, second and third order serial correlation. Consequently 
equation (7.19) was re-estimated using the nonlinear method described 
earlier, the results were
W t = -3.27 + 18.90ITt + 0.49 + 0.050 tITt - 0.076Ut
(3.60) (2.54) (0.59) (2.23) (0.16)
+ 1.30 Bt + 0.21W®
(1.15) (4.39)
Px = -0.38 (3.13)
R2 = 0.49 P2 = -0.50 (4.17)
DW = 2.06 P3 = -0.34 (2.76) (7.20)
These results suggest a considerable improvement upon those obtained by 
using O.L.S., four of the coefficients are now significant at the 5% level. 
In addition all the serial correlation coefficients are significant, 
providing impressive support for the theoretical arguments advanced earlier, 
especially as none of the coefficients are significantly different from 
their theoretical value of -0.33.
However neither vacancies, unemployment or the unemployment benefits 
variable are significant in this equation. This may be due to problems of 
multicollinearity making it difficult to isolate the significance of 
individual coefficients, even though the three variables as a whole 
might be significant. Because of this possibility the equation was re- 
estimated with unemployment, the least significant of the three variables,
omitted. The results were
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Wt = -3.32 + 18.04 üt + 0.62 Vt + 0.049 til + 1.14 Bt 
(3.96) (3.40) (1.91) (2.24) (2.05)
+ 0.22 W® 
(4.48)
R2 = 0.49
DW = 2.06
p = -0.38 (3.16) 
P2 = -0.50 (4.30) 
P3 = -0.34 (2.80) (7.21)
All the coefficients are now significant at the 5% level, and we shall 
now turn to examine these.
The coefficient on the profits variable is 18.04, whilst the profit 
ratio itself varied between 0.1 and 0.2. This implies a difference in the 
inflation rate, between these two extreme values, of about 1.8% a quarter, 
or 7.3% a year, which represents a considerable effect The coefficient on 
the combined time trend/profits variable is 0.049, which implies that over 
a twenty year period, with a profit share ratio of, for example, 0.15, the 
effect of increasing worker productivity on wage inflation would be to 
increase it by 0.74% a quarter. The coefficient on the benefit ratio is 
1.14, a measure of the impact of this on inflation can be found by calcul­
ating the effect of the introduction of the earnings related supplement in 
the fourth quarter of 1966. In effect this increased the unemployment 
benefit ratio from about 0 26 to 0.51, i.e. almost doubling it. This would 
have tended to increase inflation by about 0.29% a quarter, or 1.1% in a 
full year. Turning now to the coefficient on wage expectations, we can see 
that the coefficient is 0.22, however the wage expectations variable is 
in annual terms so we must also convert this coefficient to an annual one, 
which gives a value of 1.21. This is greater than unity, its theoretical 
value, but not significantly so. Finally we turn to the coefficient on 
vacancies which is 0.62. Vacancies themselves varied from about 0.4% of the
working population to about 1.4%, thus making a difference to inflation of 
0.62% a quarter or about 2.5% a year.
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The residuals from this last equation are shown in figure 7.4. There 
are several points to note. Firstly, if these are compared with the actual 
rate of inflation in figure 7.5, we see that, although the equation does 
reasonably well in predicting the timing of the peaks, it does not do so 
well in capturing the heights of those peaks, in fact it underpredicts 
everyone. One possible reason for this might be that the disturbance term 
is nonlinear. The reason being that, although there is an obvious lower 
bound to negative residuals in this present sample period, due to the 
fact that in general wages were never falling. There is no such compelling 
reason to believe in the existence of an upper bound on positive residuals. 
Consequently we might expect the relationship between u^ and ut_., i = 1,
2, 3, to look something like that shown in figure (7.3). The angle is 18.4 
Figure 7,3 An Example of Nonlinear Serial Correlation
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This implies that there would be a limit to the effect a very high 
positive disturbance term in one period would have on the disturbance 
terms in future periods. But this would not effectively be the case for 
very large negative disturbance terms. The results were not very encouraging 
and they have not been reported here. With respect to the serial correlation 
terms, none of the linear terms were significant at the 5% level. Only one 
was significant at the 10% level, and that had the wrong sign. The squared 
terms remained significant in general, and there was no marked change in their 
size.
Consequently the possibility of nonlinear disturbance terms has not 
been pursued here. Yet the exercise has perhaps been of some interest due 
to the innovatory nature of the work. Be that as it may it has not provided 
us with an answer as to why these peaks have been consistently underestima­
ted. A further possibility is that there might be some link with the 
politico-economic cycle. As the following table shows nearly all the peaks 
coincided with some major event in that cycle.
Table 7.1 Politico-Economic Events which Coincide with Peaks in the 
Wage Inflation Series
Peaks Politico-Economic Events
1951(4) General Election, October 1951
1955(1) General Election, May 1955
1956(1) 1956 was classified as an incomes policy year by
Lipsey and Parkin
1957(2) Council on Prices and Incomes estabilshed, August 1957
1960(1) General Election, October 1959
1963(4)
1966(2) General Election, March 1966
(Peaks after 1966 were omitted, as the series became considerably more 
volatile at this time, with several "peaks” within a very short space of 
time). The peaks themselves are probably correlated with a large number of
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settlements, and in this case it is not difficult to guess why they should 
precede the introduction of incomes policies. But it is not so obvious as 
to why they should be correlated with general elections. None the less the 
similarity between the two events is striking, with four of the five 
general elections in this period occurring near a peak. This is obviously 
a matter of some interest, but for the moment we shall have to leave it 
there with the matter somewhat undecided.
In addition to the basic equations various alternative specifications 
were estimated. Firstly, we argued earlier that we would not expect the 
coefficient on expectations to be a constant with a value of unity. Rather 
we would expect it to be a variable, with a value equal to the employer's 
desired differential. This hypothesis was tested, but the results 
provided no significant improvement over the basic equation and they have 
not been reported here. We also experimented with a nonlinear mechanism by 
which expectations below a certain level did not affect the rate of inflat­
ion, but above this critical value they entered with a unit coefficient. 
Such a mechanism has been suggested by Eckstein and Brinner (1972), and 
also found favour with Askin and Kraft (1974). However initial results 
indicated that allowing for such a nonlinear effect produced no significant 
improvement in our wage equation, and this line of research was not pursued 
with either.
7.5 The Effects of Incomes Policies
We noted in chapter 1 that there was no general consensus amongst 
economists as to the effects that incomes policies had had. Thus for the 
U.K.,Parkin, Sumner and Ward (1976) and Tarling and Wilkinson (1977), 
amongst others, find no effects at all. Others, for example, Burrows and 
Hitiris (1972) and Sargan (1977) do find a significant role for incomes 
policies. Whilst Henry and Ormerod (1978) find that they have a temporary
effect.
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There is even disagreement as to the correct way in which to allow 
for incomes policies within a wage equation. Many researchers have used a 
shift dummy variable to capture the effects of incomes policies (e.g.
Lipsey and Parkin (1970)). However Oi (1976) has argued that this is 
invalid as it requires that the slope coefficients on the independent 
variables be equal during policy off and policy on periods, an assumption 
he thinks unlikely.
Indeed the use of shift dummy variables seems a particularly 
inappropriate method of allowing for incomes policies for a number of reas­
ons. In addition to Oi's comments their use supposes that their application 
will cause a constant "shift" downwards in the inflation rate from what it 
would have been in the absence of an incomes policy, regardless of what 
level that inflation rate would have been. Even the use of seperate dummy 
variables to represent seperate incomes policies only partially overcomes 
this objection. For although this allows for a seperate effect for each 
incomes policy, which will presumably depend upon both the nature of the 
incomes policy and what the inflation rate would have been in the absence 
of the incomes policy (the greater the inflation rate the greater the 
potential shift effect). It will not distinguish between the differing 
effects of each individual incomes policy during different stages of its 
implementation.
As an alternative to the use of shift dummy variables we could, using 
nonlinear techniques, quite easily estimate a slope dummy variable 
operative to the same degree on all the coefficients. This would be the 
empirical equivalent to the view that the incomes policy operates to 
reduce inflation by the same proportionate, rather than absolute, amount 
in each period. It is therefore superior to the use of a single shift 
dummy variable, but it would still be open to the criticism that it 
presupposes that an incomes policy will be operated with the same degree 
of rigour at all stages of its operation.
As a further alternative we could attempt to find some proxy for
the effectiveness of incomes policies throughout the entire period of 
their operation. One such possibility is the use of data on strikes over 
wages. We shall argue later that if the incomes policy causes wage increases 
to be below the level the employer wishes to give, then strikes which 
attempt to force the employer to increase his offer are irrelevant. For 
in this case the employer is prevented from even implementing the offer 
which he wishes to make. If we make the assumption that employers' desired 
wage offers have some distribution with a non-zero variance. Then the grea­
ter the distance between the wage increase allowable under the incomes 
policy and the average employer's desired wage offer, the greater will be 
the number of employers prevented from implementing the offer they would 
like to make, and the fewer wage strikes there will be.
But the specification of this proxy and the ensuing empirical work 
would enlarge the thesis to an undue degree. Therefore this approach has 
not been pursued. However if one rejects the use of dummy variables, then 
in practice we are not left with many alternatives with which to isolate 
the effects of incomes policies. We could,as Lipsey and Parkin also did, 
estimate the equation for policy off periods, and then compare the 
predictions made using this equation with actual inflation during policy 
on periods. Unfortunately, using the criteria adopted by Lipsey and Parkin 
and Tarling and Wilkinson, out of the 73 observations which form our sample 
base, 36 can be classified as being policy on periods. This leaves us with 
much too small a sample base on which to estimate the equations, particul­
arly taking into account the serial correlation structure which would 
reduce even further the available number of observations.
Thus the only alternative is to estimate the basic equation, 
whilst not allowing for incomes policies, and then examine the residuals 
to see if we can detect any evidence of their effects. In doing this we are
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implicitly making a number of assumptions about the effectiveness of 
incomes policies. The most important of these is that in the majority of 
the periods in which they were operating, they had either no effect on 
the rate of inflation, or alternatively that such effects were relatively 
small and can be legitimately included as one of the many factors which 
affect, without dominating, the disturbance term.
In justifying this assumption we should first note that only one 
of the incomes policies introduced in this period (1951(1) - 1969(2)), can 
be classified as being "compulsory", all the rest being "voluntary". This 
was stage 2 of the Labour governments policy, (1966(3) - 1967(2)).
In general (a noteable exception would appear to be the second and third 
stages of the Social Contract), it seems reasonable to suppose that a 
compulsory policy will be more effective than a voluntary one.
Secondly some justification for the assumption might be found from 
an examination of the data on wage strikes, as we suggested earlier that 
the effectiveness of incomes policies might be evaluated by their effects 
on strikes over wages. This data is shown in figure 8.3, and we can see 
that since the mid fifties, and prior to 1970, there have only been two 
brief periods when the number of wage strikes fell below 200. The first 
such period was from 1962(4) - 1963(1), and the second from 1966(3) - 
1967(1). This would seem to confirm the view that throughout the period 
1951(1) - 1969(2) incomes policies had a marked dampenning effect on wage 
inflation in only a few brief periods.
Finally when we come to examine the residuals themselves, neither 
those from figure 7.4 or figure 7.6 seem to indicate that the equations 
were consistently overestimating the rate of inflation in the period 
after 1961, which would have been the case had the almost continuous 
operation of an incomes policy after this date exerted a consistant 
dampenning effect on the inflation rate. We can therefore conclude that
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it seems probable that until 1969 incomes policies were not in general 
causing the rate of inflation to deviate significantly from what was also 
compatible with the underlying labour market conditions. However this does 
not preclude the possibility that some of these incomes policies, during 
part of their period of implementation, had such effects. An examination 
of the residuals reveals that there were perhaps two clear periods when 
the inflation rate was being consistently overestimated by a substantial 
amount. Using figure 7.4 to date these, as the quarterly rate of inflation 
is more sensitive to "outliers” than the annual rate, they were, 1959(1) - 
1959(4) and 1966(2) - 1967(2). The first of these two periods does not 
coincide with any suggested period of incomes policy operation, but it may 
possibly be explained by a reduction in the number of settlements in advance 
of a general election. The second period does however coincide almost 
exactly with the implementation of the compulsory incomes policy already 
noted. That this should have such an effect on the residuals is hardly sur­
prising, in the five month period July - December, 1967, the index moved 
only one point, from 169.8 to 169.9. Presumably this is explained by an 
almost total lack of settlements being implemented during this period, and 
we might expect at the termination of the incomes policy, an above "average" 
increase in the index caused by their delayed implementation. Whether this 
is in fact the case or not, we can see that once the period of "severe 
restraint" ends, there are a number of very large positive residuals.
We can therefore conclude that,during the period under study, incomes 
policies did not have a significant effect on the inflation rate. But it 
seems probable that in individual cases there was such an effect. However 
it also seems likely that, in at least one instance, this was followed by 
an acceleration in the inflation rate, possibly due to the delayed impleme­
ntation of a large number of settlements.
But we cannot go on from this to conclude that incomes policies in
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general cannot have a permanent effect on the inflation rate, merely that 
in the period under consideration they did not appear to. In order to 
answer this wider question we also need to consider the forces which may 
lead to the termination of an incomes policy, and to do this we need to 
bring trade unions more explicitly into the inflationary process. Both 
these are tasks which we shall attempt in the following chapter.
7.6 The Period after 1969
We have seen that the basic model is capable of explaining wage 
inflation until 1969(2). This date was initially chosen as it has been 
widely argued that it was about then that excess demand based models of 
inflation begin to break down (Williamson and Wood (1976) and Henry, Sawyer 
and Smith (1976)). We can illustrate that this is also the case for this 
model in a number of ways. Firstly we simply extended the sample basis 
to cover the whole of the period 1951(1) - 1975(4), the results are shown 
below
Wt = -2.68 + 11.2011 + 0.57 Vt + 0.049 tII t + 0.77 Bt 
(2.00) (1.27) (1.22) (1.27) (0.78)
+ 0.35W®
(12.89)
px = -0.20 (1.91)
R2 = 0.66 P2 = -0.39 (3.63)
DW = 2.01 P = -0.04 (0.56) (7.24)
Compared with (7.21) this equation is clearly less satisfactory in several 
respects. Firstly only two of the coefficients are now significant at 
the 10% level, the constant term and expectations. Secondly the coefficient 
on expectations is much too high, it implies an annual coefficient of about 
2.32, as opposed to the theoretical value of unity, and finally the serial 
correlation coefficients have also been reduced in significance.
Another way of demonstrating the inadequacy of our search theoretic
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general cannot have a permanent effect on the inflation rate, merely that 
in the period under consideration they did not appear to. In order to 
answer this wider question we also need to consider the forces which may 
lead to the termination of an incomes policy, and to do this we need to 
bring trade unions more explicitly into the inflationary process. Both 
these are tasks which we shall attempt in the following chapter.
7.6 The Period after 1969
We have seen that the basic model is capable of explaining wage 
inflation until 1969(2). This date was initially chosen as it has been 
widely argued that it was about then that excess demand based models of 
inflation begin to break down (Williamson and Wood (1976) and Henry, Sawyer 
and Smith (1976)). We can illustrate that this is also the case for this 
model in a number of ways. Firstly we simply extended the sample basis 
to cover the whole of the period 1951(1) - 1975(4), the results are shown 
below
Wt = -2.68 + 11.20IT + 0.57Vt + 0.O49tI!t + 0.77Bt 
(2.00) (1.27) (1.22) (1.27) (0.78)
+ 0.35W®
(12.89)
Pl = -0.20 (1.91)
R2 = 0.66 P2 = -0.39 (3.63)
DW = 2.01 P3 = -0.04 (0.56) (7.24)
Compared with (7.21) this equation is clearly less satisfactory in several 
respects. Firstly only two of the coefficients are now significant at 
the 10% level, the constant term and expectations. Secondly the coefficient 
on expectations is much too high, it implies an annual coefficient of about 
2.32, as opposed to the theoretical value of unity, and finally the serial 
correlation coefficients have also been reduced in significance.
Another way of demonstrating the inadequacy of our search theoretic
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model of inflation in the 1970's is to use the coefficients from equation 
(7.24), estimated over the earlier period, to predict inflation in the 
1970's. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 7.2. The first 
column shows the predicted inflation rate and the second the actual rate, 
with the annual figures in brackets. From this we can see that there are 
two periods in particular, 1969(3) - 1970(4) and 1974(2) - 1975(2), when 
the predicted series underpredicts the true series. This point is reinfor­
ced by an examination of figure 7.7 which shows the predicted and the 
actual wage rates. As can be seen the two series gradually diverge by an 
increasing amount, especially in the two periods already referred to.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have tested the basic search theoretic model of 
inflation. For the period 1951(1) - 1969(2), it was found to work quite 
well, with profits, a combined time trend/profits variable, vacancies, the 
benefit earnings ratio and expectations of wage inflation all proving 
significant in determining the rate of wage inflation. In addition we 
suggested, both for annual and quarterly data, the existence of a more 
complex error structure than has hitherto been used.
However this same model fails to explain wage inflation after 1969, 
and it is to this problem that we now turn.
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Table 7.2 Comparison of Predicted and Actual Inflation Rates
Time Period Actual Inflation Rate Predicted Inflation Rate
1969(3)
(4)
1970(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1971(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1972(1)
(2 )
(3)
(4)
1973(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1974(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1975(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1.43
3.07
2.97
2.23
2.55 
5.42
2.06
2.94
2.00
5.04
1.64
3.37
7.34
1.50
1. 01
5.66 
3.72
1.67
3.69
8.22
6.94 
7.92
6.96
8.05
1 . 86
6.56
(13.17)
(12.04)
(13.85)
(12.06)
(26.77)
(23.43)
1.92
1.90
2.00
2 . 21
2.58
2.66
2.60
2.73
2.55
2.55
2.37
2.85
3.07
3.15
3.27
3.51
3.73 
3.61
3.63
3.88
4.23 
4.60
4.42
4.24 
3.93 
3.98
(9.45)
(10.43)
( 11 . 88 )
(14.12)
(16.35)
(16.57)
Note: The figures in brackets represent the sum of the quarterly figures 
in the corresponding year.
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Data Appendix to Chapter 71
Vacancies: These are adult male and female vacancies reported to the 
employment exchanges. The quarterly figures are obtained by averaging the 
monthly figures. Prior to 1962 the figures were amended as described in the 
text, due to the existence of a seperate register for nurses. Figures in 
1000's . Source: British Labour Statistics Yearbook (various issues) and 
Historical Abstract.
Nurses; Prior to 1962 a seperate register existed for nurses. This was 
merged at the beginning of 1962, and this is estimated to have added some 
19200 to the general register. Source Ministry of Labour Gazette (various 
issues) .
2Unemployment: These are adult male and female unemployed workers as 
reported to the employment exchanges, excluding school leavers and adult 
students. The quarterly figures are obtained by averaging the monthly 
figures. Source: British Labour Statistics Yearbook (various issues) and 
Historical Abstract.
Working Population: The data relates to the end of the quarter. To get a 
figure nearer to the average in the quarter as a whole, a two period 
moving average was used. Source- British Labour Statistics Yearbook ( 
various issues) and Historical Abstract.
Profits: Gross trading profits of companies seasonally adjusted. Prior to 
1955 the quarterly figures had to be linearly interpolated from the 
annual figures. Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1977.
G.D.P.: Gross domestic product measured at factor cost. Prior to 1955 
the quarterly figures had to be linearly interpolated from the annual 
figures. Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement, 1977.
Unemployment Benefits: These are for a single person. The amount of
2
earnings reiated supplement has been calculated on the assumption that
the average weekly earnings for October in the relevant tax year represent
the average for that year. Source: Department of Health and Social Security.
Earnings■ Net average weekly earnings of adult male manual workers. From 
1963 onwards the estimates were made by the Department of Health and Social 
Security (and are the same as those used in chapter 3).Prior to this date 
the data was estimated from biannual gross earnings data, and tax and nati­
onal insurance rates. Sources- Department of Health and Social Security, 
British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract and the Annual Abstract of 
Statistics (various issues).
Wage Rate:The wage rate upon which the measures of inflation are based 
is the index of basic hourly wage rates for all manual workers in all 
industries and services. The data relates to the end of the quarter in 
question. Source: British Labour Statistics Yearbook (various issues) and 
Historical Abstract.
Wage Inflation Expectations: These were based on the formula 
W® = 0.920 W® + 0.060 W + 0.780 W®' - 0.796W®L t”i l t“l t ^
where W ' and w^'2 are as defined in the text- The wage rate is that used 
above. The quarterly figures are an average of the three monthly figures.
Notes (1) All data are seasonally adjusted unless otherwise stated.
(2) Both unemployment and vacancies were expressed as a proportion of the 
working population. This contrasts with the analysis in chapter 3, where 
unemployment and vacancies were in absolute terms. The reason for this 
change reflects the length of the different sample periods. In chapter 3 the 
potential labour force can properly be assumed constant, with fluctuatio­
ns in the measured figures being due to cyclical factors, as secondary 
workers who become unemployed tend not to register. We felt that such fluc­
tuations would bias the proprtionate measures of unemployment. However the 
present sample period is almost twenty years long, and we feel a more
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Chapter 8
A Switching Regimes Model 
8.1 Introduction
We have so far developed a search theoretic model of the inflationary 
process. We have also tested that model and found that although it provides 
a satisfactory explanation of wage inflation in the post-war period, until 
1969(2), it would appear to break down after that date. Moreover this 
result is not unique to the theory developed here, but seems symptomatic 
of most excess demand based theories.
We are therefore faced with a number of problems. Why did it break 
down? Is it that the inflationary mechanism changed for some reason at 
this point in time? Or is it that the theory was never valid, merely for a 
period of time appearing to be so, but when more evidence became available 
the apparent consistency disappeared. Amongst economists this latter view 
seems to be growing in popularity. Thus, for example, Henry, Sawyer and 
Smith (1976) conclude that there is no evidence for any relationship 
between unemployment and inflation in the post-war period.
The difficulty one has in accepting this conclusion is, as we saw in 
the introduction to the thesis, that for a long time many, probably a 
majority, of economists ascribed to the view that there was such a relati­
onship. We believe that before we can conclude that they were in error, we 
should re-examine the theory,including the assumptions made, particularly 
if those assumptions are common to all excess demand theories.
With respect to the theory put forward in chapter 2, there were several 
assumptions made in order to simplify the analysis. However the one, which 
for present purposes, appears most relevant was that trade unions do not 
influence the inflationary process, except perhaps to the extent of acting 
in some manner as a catalyst. This assumption is not unique to the analysis
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but can be found, explicitly or implicitly, in nearly all excess demand 
based theories. A good example of this can be found in Friedman (1975)
"Trade unions play a very important role in determining 
the position of the natural level of unemployment. They 
play a more important role in denying opportunities to 
some classes in the community that are open to others.
They play a very important role in the structure of the 
labour force and in the structure of relative wages. But 
despite appearences to the contrary, a given amount of 
trade union power does not play any role in exacerbating 
inflation. It is true that if relatively weak unions 
become strong, in the process of going from weak to strong 
they may exert an interim inflationary influence. They will, 
in the process drive up the real wages of their members.
This will reduce the level of employment in their sector.
In so far as the government has a full employment policy 
and is sensitive to the total level of unemployment, it 
will adopt expansionary policies and drive up the level of 
money demand. This is capable of producing a temporary 
rise in the level of prices. But it does not produce contin­
uing inflation. The strong union will then get its new real 
wage rate, and there will be a re-alignment of employment 
in the various industries."
Thus what Friedman appears to be saying here is that the object of union 
policy is merely to establish some union/non-union differential. If 
unions become stronger they may attempt to increase this differential.
But once this has been established there will be no further effects on 
the inflationary process, except of course that the natural rate may have 
increased.
Friedman's view is therefore similar to that of Phelps (1968), 
Ashenfelter, Johnson and Pencavel (1972) and others who have argued that 
the establishing of a union/non-union wage differential is a prime 
objective of union policy. Except that Phelps also has this differential 
varying with labour market conditions (Phelps argues that this will vary 
directly with excess demand in the labour market, however the evidence 
points towards an inverse relationship (Mulvey and Trevithick (1975)).
However, as we stated in the introduction to the thesis we do not 
feel that this view regarding the unions' role is correct. Instead we 
believe, for reasons that will be expanded upon later, that the primary
aim of unions is to maintain their members' standards of living. It may 
well be that because workers acting collectively are better able to do 
this than workers acting alone, there will be some differential between 
organised and unorganised workers. But this is an outcome of unions actions, 
not the determining factor.
Therefore it seems to us that excess demand based theories have not 
adequately incorporated trade unions into the inflationary process, and it 
seems possible that this might provide a partial explanation of why such 
theories broke down in the 1970's. Moreover it is also our view that 
bargaining theories have also, somewhat paradoxically, failed in this 
respect. Most of them have failed to encompass the view that a union is 
not a single entity with a common aim, or even a combination of individuals 
with a common aim. It is rather a collection of individuals with common 
and specific interests, who feel that those interests can best be 
furthered by joining together. But in joining together they do not lose 
those individual interests and supplant them with other collective ones.
Any analysis of trade unions and the bargaining process should 
therefore be phrased in terms of a coalition and examine how coalitions 
reach decisions and function. It should also encompass the fact that this 
structured, formalised type of coalition develops both formal and informal 
leaders. The latter may be shop stewards or simply workers with some 
influence over their colleagues. The formal leaders consist basically of 
full time union officials, including some shop stewards. These formal 
leaders, although they may begin with the same aims and interests as the 
other members of the coalition, may well, applying Michel's (1962) "Iron 
Law of Oligarchy", develop interests of their own, seperate to those of 
the ordinary membership.
The kernel of such an analysis can be found in an extraordinarily 
perceptive paper by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), who recognise that
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there are indeed three parties involved in labour-management relationships:
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therefore be phrased in terms of a coalition and examine how coalitions 
reach decisions and function. It should also encompass the fact that this 
structured, formalised type of coalition develops both formal and informal 
leaders. The latter may be shop stewards or simply workers with some 
influence over their colleagues. The formal leaders consist basically of 
full time union officials, including some shop stewards. These formal 
leaders, although they may begin with the same aims and interests as the 
other members of the coalition, may well, applying Michel's (1962) "Iron 
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the management, the union leadership and the union membership. Moreover 
they specify the objectives of the leadership as; (1) the survival and 
growth of the union as an institution and (2) the personal political 
survival of the leaders. They then argue that these objectives are accomp­
lished, in most part, by satisfying the aspirations of the membership as 
well as possible.
With respect to the membership, they argue that there is some 
minimum wage which is acceptable to them, denoted by y , which will depend 
upon the levels of unemployment and company profits. In addition it will de 
pend directly on the extent to which a moving average of recent wage 
increases deviates, or falls short of some expected long run increase.
They also argue that this minimum acceptable wage will fall with a strike 
as shown in figure 8.1.
Figure 8,1 The Effect of a Strike on the Worker's Minimum Acceptable 
Wage
yo
Minimum 
acceptable 
wa ge
Duration of strike
They present the employers problem as one of maximising profits. He 
then has the choice of agreeing to y and avoiding a strike, or of reject­
ing y^ and incurring a strike which will result in a lower wage increase. 
In effect the firm must weigh the effect on profits of strike costs 
against the possibly lower wage costs which can be expected to accompany a 
strike.
We believe that the recognition that there are three parties involved
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in the wage negotiations is a most important insight. But that not enough 
attention is given to the determinants of either unions' or employers' 
actions. Consequently we will present a more detailed analysis than 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, paying particular attention, on the union side, 
to the determination of this minimum acceptable wage and the effect on this 
of the relationship between union leaders and their membership. We will 
also be looking at the employers' side of the problem, and in particular 
attempting to make that more compatible with the search theoretic approach 
presented in the previous chapters. We feel this to be important and would 
emphasise that we do not regard the employers position, as apparently 
Ashenfelter and Johnson do, as one of attempting to negotiate as low a wage 
as possible. Rather he will also be considering the effects of this wage 
on the ease with which he will be able to attract and retain labour in the 
contract period, i.e. the period over which the wage is effective.
In the event this turns out to be one of the crucial differences 
between the analysis presented here and most bargaining theories. Its 
development will provide the key which will open the way for a synthesis 
of the wage bargaining and excess demand theories of inflation into what 
can be regarded as a switching regimes model. A model which will be consis­
tent with both approaches to inflation, and which is capable of explaining 
the breakdown of excess demand theories after 1969 and their apparent 
acceptability prior to that.
Thus in the following sections we shall analyse,in turn, the bargain­
ing problem from the unions' and the employers’ sides. The analysis 
concerning the unions will itself be divided into two sections, firstly 
the problem of what determines the minimum acceptable wage, and secondly 
the nature of the relationship between union leaders and their membership. 
Finally in the latter sections of the chapter we shall be concerned with 
empirically formulating and testing the theory.
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8.2 The Individual Worker's Aspiration Wage
By the term "individual worker's aspiration wage" we mean the minimum 
wage which the worker will accept rather than vote for a strike'!' Ashenfelter 
and Johnson argue that this will depend positively upon the difference 
between the expected long run increase in wages and the currently anticip­
ated increase in wages. (Although this seems a little inconsistent, as if 
these two terms are equal then the minimum acceptable wage increase is 
zero). The implication of this in their model is that yQ is a moving 
average of previous changes in real wages
M
v =  a  +  ct I u A r 
y0t 1 2 ito i t-i ( 8 . 1)
where > 0 and < 0
Thus implicit in their formulation is the concept of some long run constant 
increase in real wages, which they justify on the grounds that "workers 
always want more".
This hypothesis of a long run desired increase in wages can also be 
found elsewhere. For example Johnston and Timbrell (1973) postulate the 
existence of a"catch-up" variable, which represents the extent to which 
annual changes in real net wages fall short of some postulated constant.
More recently Henry, Sawyer and Smith take a hypothesis originally develo­
ped by Sargan (1964) and conclude that pressure for money wage increases 
from workers in order to reach some target for growth in take home pay has 
been a decisive influence in the current inflation. The results of their 
empirical work tend to provide some support for this hypothesis, and they 
estimate the desired increase in real earnings to vary between 2 to 2j%, 
it tending to be higher when more recent observations are used.
However in all this work there is no real justification for why
workers should desire an increase in wages (apart from Ashenfelter and
(1) In this chapter we use several different income and wage concepts, to 
clarify the analysis these are summarised in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 respectively.
d  ’
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Johnson’s comment that workers always want more). Still less is there any 
explanation as to why this desired increase should be constant and the 
determinants of this constant. This is, after all, a significant departure 
from previous theories. Keynes claimed that workers attempted to maintain 
the level of their money wages, later theorists modified this to read 
real wages. But it is still quite a jump to go from this proposition to 
one that says workers attempt to increase their real wage by 2 every 
year. Have workers always tried to do this, if so why did it elude so many 
economists for so long? If, on the other hand, such behaviour has recent 
origins what were they?
We believe that before we can answer these questions we must first 
ask why workers want wages in the first place. The answer is of course an 
obvious one, but it leads to conclusions which are not so obvious. Workers 
want wages in order to be able to purchase the goods they consume. This 
then suggests the alternative interpretation that workers are not primarily 
concerned with the wages they receive, but the standard of living this 
entitles them to. This then further suggests that a workers aspiration wage 
is such that it will enable him to maintain the standard of living, or 
consumption pattern, he and his familly currently enjoy. This we suggest 
will be the minimum wage which will prove acceptable to workers and their 
famillies.
We can now see how Keynes reached the conclusion he did. In his world 
people both suffered from some degree of money illusion and related their 
consumption to present income, in order to mainatin their standard of 
living therefore they would have to maintain their money wage. If we take 
away the money illusion assumption then individuals will have to maintain 
the level of their real wage, which is the conclusion later theorists 
arrived at. However a great deal of work, both theoretical and empirical, 
has been done which suggests that people do not base their consumption 
solely upon income in the present period, whether real or money.
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One of the best known alternatives was put forward by Friedman (1957), 
who suggested that people base their consumption upon a concept he called 
permanent income. If this is correct, and if it is also correct that 
individuals attempt to maintain their standard of living, then it follows 
that the income concept individuals will be concerned with is their 
permanent income, and it is this which they will attempt to maintain.
Friedman in constructing a variable to measure permanent income 
suggested the following formula
Y*(T) = P / T e(p-a) (t_T) Y*(t) dt (8.2)P — CO
where 3 is the adjustment coefficient by which permanent income adjusts to 
measured income.
d Yp = 3 ÍY*(T) - Y*(T)} (8.3)
d T P
and a is the estimated rate of growth of real income. Friedman added this 
as he thought it more reasonable to estimate permanent income in two parts, 
firstly a trend value which is taken to grow at a constant percentage rate 
and secondly a weighted average of adjusted deviations of past values.
However it would seem that this formulation does not really capture 
the spirit of the permanent income hypothesis, which is that in making 
consumption decisions people take into account the future. True there is 
a growth factor present, but it is purely retrospective, it does not extend 
into the future. The growth factor in (8.2) merely adjusts previous 
periods incomes to put them on a comparable basis with present income. It 
in no manner allows for expected income growth in the future. Thus in 
making their permanent income calculations people perceive that income has 
been growing in the past, allow for this when calculating permanent income, 
but apparently believe that all such growth ends in the present period.
If we turn to the text to see if this is consistent with Friedman's
view, or if it is that he made an error in presenting this formula, then 
we are in difficulties. For, apart from the mathematical interpretation 
of permanent income, an exact economic definition is surprisingly difficult 
to find. He does not seem to favour the view (page 25) that permanent income 
is equal to the present value of the individuals present and future earni­
ngs plus his non-human capital. Which he rejects on the grounds that it 
implies an extremely long time horizon and also doubts if units can borrow 
on the basis of anticipated returns from both human and non-human wealth, 
at the same rate of interest at which they can lend accumulated non-human 
wealth. On the other hand, he also rejects the possibility that individuals 
take no account of future income, on the grounds that this is too short 
sighted. Instead he seems to favour an intermediate view.
Alternative theories of the consumption function have favoured the 
first view, although the growth factor has also been misinterpreted in the 
corresponding empirical work. Thus Ando and Modigliani's (1963) life cycle 
hypothesis, for example, seems very similar to the hypothesis that people 
plan their expenditure plans on the discounted present value of their 
present and future earnings. Indeed if we were to incorporate within this 
latter approach the restriction that people can only borrow limited 
amounts on their future income, and also adjust interest rates to reflect 
myopic time preference tendancies, any differences between the two approa­
ches largely disappear.
However this may be, it is clear that unless one takes the extreme 
view, which Friedman himself rejects, that no account at all is taken of 
the future, then (8.2) is not a valid proxy for permanent income. For, 
although it allows for a retrospective growth factor, it fails to extend 
this into the future. The growth element in (8.2) merely adjusts previous 
periods income to comparable terms with present income. An example may 
make this clearer. Take two different economies A and B. In country A
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the level of real disposable income per capita is a constant £1000 per 
annum. In B it is not constant but growing at an annual rate of 5% and in 
period T it too has reached a level of £1000 per annum. Calculating 
permanent income with Friedman's formula, and assuming past growth rates 
have been correctly perceived, would yield values for permanent income of 
£1000 for both countries, because the role of a is merely to adjust previous 
periods income to a comparable basis with present income.
Yet does it seem reasonable that the populace of country B, having 
perceived income growing in the past will not extend this growth into the 
future? Is it not more realistic to assume that they will expect their 
income to continue growing into the future, that they will take account of 
this in formulating their expenditure plans, and that a correct measure of 
permanent income should reflect this. If one accepts this argument then 
it becomes obvious that Friedman's empirical measure of permanent income 
is not the correct measure to use in studies of consumption. For it takes 
no account of the future, his measurement is merely a filter for extracting 
temporary deviations from permanent components.
We may, however, build upon the assumption, basic to modern theories 
of consumption, that individuals in making their consumption plans take 
account of expected lifetime income. In an undiscounted form this would be
Y*(T) = /T+K Y*(T) e &(t_T) dt (8.4)
where K is the time horizon over which the individual discounts, and might 
be equal to the expected lifetime of the individual. Y* is Friedman's 
permanent income measure, upon which we put a slightly different interpret­
ation, namely that it represents the income the individual would expect to 
receive in period T with all temporary fluctuations filtered out. 6 is the 
expected growth rate of income which may or may not be equal to a, the 
rate at which it has been perceived to have been growing at in the past.
One could, for example, imagine a situation where a major event such as
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the outbreak of war, or in more recent times the oil crisis, can have 
an independent and direct effect upon expectctaions of future income 
growth.
In this case, for consumers' spending plans to remain unchanged,and 
therefore their standard of living to remain constant, the level of income 
at the end of the following period must be at least equal to
d 6Y (T+l) = Y*(T) e P (8.5)
,.d.where Y (T+l) is desired income at period T+l, and desired income growth 
will be given by
Yd(T+i) = Y;(T)e ~ Y(T)
Y(T)
( 8 .6)
We have now developed several different concepts of income and several more 
of income growth. In order to help clarify the analysis these are summari­
sed in Table 8.1.
In this expression for desired income growth, (8.6), the two growth 
rates, a  and 6, play a crucial role, and it is to an examination of these 
that we now turn. In this Friedman's work is again of little help, he gives 
scant attention to a , the perceived rate of growth in the past, or its 
derivation. This was perhaps understandable, the principal burden of the 
work was to provide an alternative to the simple Keynesian consumption 
function. However it would seem unlikely that a is in fact constant 
throughout long periods of time. Friedman's own empirical work is related 
to the period 1897 - 1949. Thus it implicitly assumes that the expected 
long term rate of growth in the 1930's, when income in fact grew very little, 
was the same as in the 1920's when it did grow rapidly. Similar comments 
apply to the U.K., is it reasonable to assume that a had the same value 
in the inter-war years, when over a fourteen year period, 1923 - 1937, the 
average weekly wage rose by less than 7% in real terms, as it had in the
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Table 8,1 Summary of Different "Income" Terms
Term Definition
Y(T) Actual income at the end of period T 
Friedman’s permanent income 
Undiscounted expected lifetime income
Y* (T)P
Y* (T)
Yd(T+l) Desired income at the end of period T+l
The rate at which income has been perceived to have been 
growing in the past
The rate at which income is expected to grow in the future, 
which may or may not be equal to a
The desired income growth over the next period
a
5
Yd(T+l)
Note: all terms referred to here relate to real income, nett of tax.
post-war years when, until recently, personal income growth has been much 
more marked. Or does it not make more sense to argue that the perceived 
growth rate will bear some relationship to the actual growth rate in the 
period in question?
With these comments in mind, we are going to put forward the alterna­
tive hypothesis that a is not in fact constant, but is a variable related 
to present and past actual growth rates in a geometrically declining 
manner. We shall also assume, initially at least, that in general 6, the 
rate at which income is expected to grow in the future, is equal to a, the 
rate at which it has been perceived to have been growing in the past. 
Inserting this value for 6 into (8.5) gives us the desired level of 
real income, but before this can be translated into a money wage rate 
allowance must be made for taxes and other deductions, and also any 
expected inflation.
When this is done the gross desired money wage increase is
Yd(T+l) Y*(T) e P (T+J) - Y(T) P(T) (1 - atr) 
(1 - mtr)
(8.7)
g Y(T) P(T)
The first term on the right hand side in brackets gives the desired
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proportionate increase in net money wages. The price expectations term 
refers to the mid point of the contract period. If the expected price level 
at the end of the period was used to multiply the desired wage this would 
ensure that at the end of the period wages were at their desired level, but 
in the intervening period they would have been consistently above that level. 
The appropriate time horizon on expectations is therefore that which 
ensures that on average throughout the period desired wages equal actual 
wages. Thus, if this period is a year, this will imply the expected price 
level in approximately six months time.
The term in the second set of brackets reflects the possibility that 
any desired increase in net wages will necessitate a greater increase in 
gross wages because of the difference between average and marginal tax rat­
es. As noted by Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson (1972) any increase in income 
will be charged at marginal tax rates, which are in general greater than 
average tax rates. Hence for desired disposable money income to increase 
by a given amount, gross income must increase by a greater amount still.
For example, in October 1969 net earnings for manual workers were £18.17 
per week. An increase of 10% would, in money terms, entail an increase of 
£1.817. The marginal tax rate, including national insurance, was 0.432, 
hence gross wages would need to increase by
£1.87 1 = £3.20
(1 - 0.432)
Gross wages in October 1969 were £24.83 (giving an average tax rate of 
0.268), therefore the desired increase in gross wages was 12.88%.
The effect of this difference in the two tax rates is, as in (8.7), 
proportional to the ratio of the two tax retention ratios. We can see that 
the greater the difference between average and marginal tax rates, the 
greater this effect will be. Thus to some extent the inflationary impact 
of taxation is not so much related to levels, as to the progressivity of 
the system. Although it should also be noted that upward changes in
taxation rates exert a disequilibrium effect on wages independent of any 
effect on the progressivity of the system. These are points which we shall 
be returning to later, in the concluding chapter.
We have, in this section, examined how individual workers form their 
aspiration wage. However this will not in general be the same for all 
workers. Therefore we must now turn to examine how the trade union leader 
translates the varying aspiration wages of his membership into one "target 
wage" which he seeks to negotiate with the employer.
8.3 The Trade Union Leader's Target Wage
It has already been suggested that one of the trade union leader's 
principal concerns is to retain his job. To do this he will have to attempt 
to satisfy some minimum proportion, probably in excess of a half, of his 
membership, or the section of the membership with which he is concerned. 
Within the context of a desired money wage increase this means that his 
target wage needs to be in excess of this minimum proportion, which we 
denote by y , of his membership.
Their aspiration wages will differ due to differences in the way 
individuals derive their permanent income, due to different adjustment 
coefficients. There will also be differences in expected inflation rates. 
Hence trade union leaders will be faced with a membership which has a 
distribution of desired wages which is illustrated in figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2 Distribution of Union Members' Aspiration Wages
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This has a mean value of W, is the wage which satisfies the aspir­
ations of the proportion Y of his workforce. The greater is Y, the greater 
is the proportion of the membership he attempts to satisfy, the greater 
will be the union leader's target wage. In addition, providing Y is greater 
than 50%, the target wage will also increase with the variance of the 
distribution in figure 8.2. However at the same time opposition to this 
target wage will increase from those with aspiration wages in excess of 
the target wage.
The variance itself will be a function of the component elements 
which make up the desired money wage, i.e. the desired real wage and 
expectations of inflation. In chapter 6 we tested and accepted the hypoth­
esis that cross section uncertainty, with respect to expectations of 
inflation, would be greater when the inflation rate itself was changing 
rapidly. A similar result might be supposed to apply to the aspiration 
wage, i.e. when the recent pattern of real wages has been volatile, then 
permanent income will vary widely from individual to individual. This again 
being due to the parameters which underlie the formation of permanent 
income varying across individuals.
Differences in individual uncertainty have no effect on the 
individual's aspiration wage as we have built the theory around income 
maximising individuals. If, however, we were to replace this with utility 
maximising individuals, where the utility function, defined on the real 
wage, is strictly concave, that is it exhibits diminishing marginal utility 
with respect to the real wage. Then the standard Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(1947) expected utility framework can be employed, with the result that 
the existence of individual uncertainty about the real wage reduces the 
utility of the real wage. Therefore in order to maintain his level of 
utility the individual must increase his desired money wage. Individual 
uncertainty in this context will again be related to the rate of inflation, 
uncertainty over this will lead to uncertainty about the real wage over the
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contract period. We also saw in chapter 6 that individual uncertainty too 
would increase when the inflation rate was changing rapidly.
If we now place this discussion within the context of the early 
1970's in the U.K., and recall that at this time the inflation rate was 
accelerating to unprecedented levels. Then we can reasonably class this 
period as a time of high individual and cross section uncertainty. We would 
then expect to see individual workers aspiring to real wage increases 
which will overcompensate for any expected price increase. We would also 
expect to witness trade union leaders attempting to negotiate settlements 
which will increasingly excede the average aspiration wage of their member­
ship. Yet at the same time, we would expect to observe increased opposition 
to such settlements by some of the membership whose aspiration wage lies 
to the right of W^, . This might lead trade union leaders into attempting 
to reduce this opposition by securing settlements which will satisfy a 
greater proportion of their membership. It might also provide a platform 
upon which aspirants to the leadership, official and unofficial, can build 
their case, or breakaway movements can be formed.
Such events could easily be interpreted as increasing trade union 
militancy both by members of trade unions and their leaders, and that this 
is a direct cause of inflation. Wheras in actual fact this increased 
"militancy" is a symptom, not a cause of inflation.
$.4 The Employer's Competitive Wage
We have now examined the determinants of the wage the trade union 
leader attempts to negotiate with the employer. We must now turn to 
examine the bargaining problem from the employer's side. It was argued 
earlier that it was not in the employer's interest to attempt to negotiate 
as small a wage as possible. Instead he will have in mind the effects of 
this wage on the ease with which he will be able to attract and retain
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labour in the contract period, i.e. the period during which the negotiated 
wage is operative. More specifically he will have in mind a wage, which we 
will call the "competitive wage", which is optimal in relation to these 
considerations, and this is the wage he will attempt to negotiate with 
the unions.
As its name implies the competitive wage will be related to the wages 
he would wish to pay in a competitive labour market, in the absence of a 
union's presence, the determination of which we have already examined in 
previous chapters. However, we may expect the analysis which emerges from 
including trade unions to differ from that made previously for several 
reasons. Firstly we would expect a tendancy to move towards regular 
collective bargaining, and out of this arising a concept of a wage rate 
applicable in some way to all workers, and set for some, probably fixed, 
time into the future. This differs from the previous analysis in several 
important respects. Firstly there was previously no limit on the frequency 
with which wages could be changed. Thus faced with changing labour market 
conditions the employer could take immediate action, in the form of 
changing his hiring and quit wages, to retain or increase his labour force. 
To some extent this flexibility has gone, although it may still be possible 
for him to pay wage rates above the negotiated rate to certain workers. 
However it is unlikely that he will be allowed to do the reverse, namely 
pay lower rates to less productive workers. Hence we get the result that 
in a downswing, in a firm with a trade union presence, an employee faced 
with dismissal no longer has the opportunity of offering his services at a 
lower wage rate.
In the case where no deviation from the negotiated wage is possible, 
the employer, in deciding his competitive wage, will take into account 
that the negotiated wage will determine the ease with which he can attract 
and retain labour in the coming period. We assume, as always, that he 
will determine the competitive wage by setting it at such a level that the
marginal benefit of changing it equals the marginal cost.
The marginal cost is, of course, the increase in the wage rate 
being contemplated, multiplied by the number of workers it applies to. The 
marginal benefits relate to the decrease in net revenue foregone as a 
result of the increased ease of hiring and retaining labour. The reduction 
in quits the employer could expect will have several effects. Firstly less 
revenue will be lost whilst searching for replacement workers. In addition 
however, workers who quit are likely to have higher productivity levels 
than the average worker, hence there will also be a reduction in the 
permanent losses due to the retention of these efficient workers. The 
reduction in search time, whilst looking for replacement workers or to fill 
new jobs caused by an expansion in the desired labour force, will also 
cause a reduction in net revenue foregone as a result of unfilled vacancies.
Thus in this case the competitive wage will be a function of the same 
labour market variables which determined the rate of inflation in the 
absence of unions .
In the case where the employer is allowed to pay wages above the 
negotiated rates to certain individual workers there will be no gains to 
an employer from an increase in the negotiated wage rate. Because if a 
worker threatens to quit,his wage can be increased immediately and indepen­
dently of the wages of the rest of the labour force. Similarly if the 
employer is having difficulties in hiring new workers, then he can offer 
them more than the negotiated rate. In this case it would appear that the 
impact of the unions is much less than in the previous case, at least as 
regards the employer's competitive wage.
However we shall assume that the labour market is divided up into 
either perfectly competitive sectors, or where there are trade unions they 
impose a uniform wage rate for all workers. In this case the competitive 
wage, i.e. the wage the employer wishes to negotiate with the union, will 
be a function of the same labour market demand variables which determined
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the rate of inflation in the absence of unions.
8.5 An Analysis of the Wage Bargaining Process
We now have all the elements of the problem and can illustrate how 
they interact in the actual wage bargaining process. We have suggested that 
the employer will have in mind an optimal wage he wishes to pay based on 
the difficulties of attracting and retaining labour, this is the competit­
ive wage. If this is in excess of the trade union leaders target wage then 
there is no problem, this is the wage that will be "negotiated". If, 
however, this is not the case then the employer does have a problem. He can 
incur a strike and hope to reduce the union leader's target wage. However 
there are costs involved in such action, and if the present discounted 
value of such costs outweigh the benefits then he will not incur the strike, 
but agree to pay the union leader's target wage.
The principal expected benefits or gains of incurring a strike relate 
to the reduction in the negotiated wage which the employer can expect to 
agree with the union. Ashenfelter and Johnson argue that the outbreak of a 
strike has the effect of lowering the workers aspirations, as shown in 
figure 8.1, due to the shock effect of the firm's resistance and the 
resultant loss of normal income.
Within the context of the model we have developed a reduction in the 
union leaders target wage might take place for several reasons. Firstly 
there might be a reduction in the workers' concept of their permanent 
income. We have suggested that this is formed with reference to past 
changes in real income, by the permanent income mechanism, but that there 
may be impact effects from such events as the recent, middle east oil 
crises. In a similar manner strikes might also have such impact effects 
upon the permanent income calculations. Leading to both a reduction in 
the workers aspiration wage prior to the strike, and further reductions
r w
-245-
during the strike, resulting in a decline in the union leader's target 
wage as shown in figure 8.1. Alternatively it may be that although the 
permanent income calculations will be unaffected by the strike, workers 
will be persuaded to settle, in the short term, for a wage below their 
"permanent income" wage in the expectation that this will be made good 
in a future negotiation.
Finally it may be that the workers aspiration wage is unaffected, 
either in the short or long term, by the strike. But that it brings 
pressure upon the union leaders themselves to reduce y  in figure 8.1, 
which represents the proportion of their membership whose aspirations 
regarding wages they attempt to satisfy. Such pressures might be, for 
example, a reduction in strike funds or increasing pressure from those 
workers whose wage aspirations are met by the employer's offer, to accept 
that offer. All of these pressures might be expected to increase with time, 
but there may be some minimum proportion of the membership below which 
the trade union leader will be very unwilling to let support for himself 
fall. Although it should be noted that this may be accompanied by increas­
ing opposition from those whose wages already exceed W . Thus we see that 
a strike is likely to increase tension within the union, possibly leading 
to splinter groups forming.
This potential gain to the employer will be more important the greater 
is the share of wages in total costs. Thus in a highly capital intensive 
industry, where labour costs are a relatively small component of total 
costs, the gains from incurring a strike will tend to be less than in a 
labour intensive industry.
When however, the strikers are only a small proportion of the total 
workforce, but the wage award they get will influence the wage aspirations 
of the rest of the workforce, then the gains to the employer will be 
increased. Another case when the costs to the employer may be disproportio­
nate to the strikers numbers, is where they have the potential to halt all
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production, as for example a small number of skilled men might have. A 
similar case occurs when the employer has several different firms and 
plants, and the wage award in any one will set the pattern for the 
remainder.
The expected losses to the employer of incurring a strike will be the 
expected difference in profits due to the strike. These will be reduced 
for several reasons. First there will be the loss in profits due to the 
fall in sales due to the cessation of supplies. These will, of course, 
be greater the greater are profits in general, but there are other factors 
to consider. If stocks are low these losses will be more severe than if 
stocks are high. We might expect stocks to be highest at sometime in the 
downswing of the cycle, when employers have produced more goods than they 
can sell. In such cases the reduction in profits from lost sales may be 
negligable. Indeed it may even be that this presents the employer with a 
conveniant way to cut back production and reduce those stocks. Hence both 
the general profit level and the level of stocks will be important in 
determining short run costs to the employer of lost sales.
In addition to these short run costs there may be losses even once 
the strike has ended. These may occur if buyers, either consumers or other 
firms, are able to find alternative suppliers of the product. The easier 
this can occur, i.e. the greater is the elasticity of substitution of one 
supplier for another, then the greater the risk of sales being lost and 
profits being affected even once the strike has ended. Similarly if the 
employer has a monopoly of this particular product, but close substitutes 
are available, then again there might be a more permanent reduction in 
sales. The Post Office, for example, enjoys a monopoly for which there are 
no close substitutes, and hence is not likely to suffer a significant 
lasting reduction in demand as a result of the strike. The car industry, on 
the other hand, presents almost the exact opposite example. If supplies of
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one car are not available then competitors models will be bought, and for 
those who do this, it might set a pattern for furure car purchases.
On a slightly different plane there will be the potential reduction in 
workers' productivity following a strike. This might serve to introduce a 
bad industrial relations atmosphere into the firm which may continue 
after the strike has ended and cause a lasting reduction in profits. In 
addition there is a possibility that strikers will find alternative full­
time employment, in which case when the strike ends the employer will have 
a reduced labour force and may have to hire more workers than he had 
previously contemplated.
A further factor is that although the union leader's target wage is 
in excess of the wage the employer wishes to pay, there are none the less 
advantages to him in paying this, although these advantages will be outwe­
ighed by the losses. These consist of the greater ease with which he can 
attract and retain labour to his firm. Incurring a strike to reduce the 
negotiated wage will reduce this benefit.
The time horizon for these costs varies from the length of the strike, 
for lost output, to an indefinite period for some of the other costs. Of 
equal interest is the relevant time horizon for the benefits. Ashenfelter 
and Johnson use an indefinitely long one, implying that the gains last 
indefinitely. More realistically we recognise that this particular negoti­
ated wage will only last over the contract period, after which a new 
negotiated wage will be agreed. It therefore seems possible that the expec­
ted benefits will last only over the contract period. On the other hand, 
an employer might feel that a strike will not only reduce the trade union 
leaders target wage in this period, but in future negotiations as well.
This will occur if the parameters of the permanent income calculation are 
affected by the strike, one possibility is that 6, the expected growth 
rate of real income in the future, might be reduced. In addition the actual 
reduction in the real wage secured by a strike in this period, will act
V
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on future permanent income calculations to reduce workers aspirations.
Thus the employer can quite legitimately expect that the benefits will be 
spread over more than one contract period, but these benefits will not be 
the same for all periods, as in the Ashenfelter and Johnson case.
Hence it can be seen that we have a rather unique example of a 
switching regimes model. The negotiated wage will equal the competitive 
wage when this exceeds the union leaders target wage. When this is the 
case in the majority of wage negotiations, inflation will be determined 
by an excess demand based search theory similar to the one developed 
earlier. When this is not the case however, when in the majority of wage 
negotiations the union leaders target wage exceeds the employer's compet­
itive wage, then we are in a more genuine bargaining situation. In this 
case, provided there is no strike the negotiated wage will equal the 
union leaders target wage. This will be a function of the proportion of 
his members he attempts to satisfy, and the distribution of their indivi­
dual aspiration wages. These in turn will be determined by reference to 
previous income levels and the expected rate of inflation. If there is a 
strike the union leaders target wage will tend to exceed the negotiated 
wage, which will lie somewhere between this and the employer's competitive 
wage. In this case the negotiated wage will depend upon both the union 
leaders target wage and the duration of the strike. This, in turn, will 
depend on profits, stocks, the difference between the union leaders 
target wage and the employer's competitive wage, and possibly other labour 
market variables such as unemployment and vacancies.
Thus, when the competitive wage exceeds the union leader's target 
wage inflation will be determined by an excess demand mechanism. When this 
is not the case however, when in the majority of negotiations the competi­
tive wage does not exceed the union leaders target wage, then inflation 
will be determined by the difference between present wages and the union's
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target wage, and the probability of a strike reducing this difference. In 
Table 8.2 Summary of Different Wage Concepts used
Term
Negotiated
wage
Competitive
wage
Bargained
Wage
Union leader's 
target wage
Individual ' s
aspiration
wage
Definition
The actual wage negotiated between the employer and the 
union leader. This will equal, either the competitive 
wage or the bargained wage, whichever is the greater
The wage the employer wishes to pay, and is based on 
the ease with which he can retain and attract labour
The wage negotiated in a genuine bargaining situation 
when the union leaders target wage exceeds the compet­
itive wage
The wage the union leader attempts to negotiate with 
the employer. It is based on the aspiration wages of 
his membership and the proportion of that membership 
he attempts to satisfy
The minimum wage the worker will accept, and is such 
that it will enable him to maintain his planned cons­
umption pattern
this case we shall call the wage which gets negotiated the bargained wage.
A definition of this and all the different wage concepts used in this 
chapter can be found in Table 8.2.
Thus we now have a plausible explanation for the apparent breakdown 
of excess demand based theories of inflation since 1970, when prior to 
that they had almost been universally accepted. If one accepts the switching 
regimes model presented here, then it can be argued that prior to 1970, 
the competitive wage exceeded the union leaders target wage in the great 
majority of wage negotiations. However it seems possible that after this 
date this was no longer always the case and that at certain times wage 
inflation was being determined by a more genuine bargaining process. We are 
now left with the further problem, which we will turn to in the next 
section, of testing this hypothesis.
8.6 Empirical Formulation
We have suggested that there are two different inflationary mechanisms
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at work at different times. In effect, particularly after 1970, it would 
appear that we have a switching regimes model and some way has to be 
found of dividing the period into two, into those quarters when wage 
inflation was generated by a competitive mechanism and those when it was 
determined by a more genuine bargaining mechanism. Beginning with Quandt 
(1958) considerable effort has been directed at estimating similar models 
(Goldfeld and Quandt (1973), Fair and Jaffee (1972), Fair and Kelejian 
(1974), Maddala and Nelson (1974) and Laffontand Garcia (1977)). There have 
been two general approaches, the first is based upon maximizing some likli- 
hood function. The second attempts to find some extraneous criteria upon 
which to divide the sample.
We shall adopt the latter approach, and in doing this we shall ask 
whether there are likely to be any other ways in which periods when the 
competitive wage is less than the union leader's target wage can be distin­
guished from periods when this is not so. The answer is that we should 
probably witness an increase in strikes over wages.
In what we might call normal periods, i.e. when for the majority of 
wage negotiations the competitive wage exceeds the union leader's target 
wage, there will for several reasons still be some wage strikes. Firstly 
some industries will be in decline, and employers in those industries will 
have a lower competitive wage than the average employer. Similarly some 
industries may have been experiencing periods of very high prosperity which 
would lead workers to have higher than average expectations of income 
growth. When this prosperity declines to a more normal level the employer 
will be unwilling to meet these expectations. Also not all employers are 
rational, and some unions may be undergoing some internal leadership 
struggle which will increase in figure 8.2. We might also expect the 
number of wage strikes to vary with the business cycle due to either,
similar variations in the competitive wage or union strategy.
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However when the competitive wage is less than the union leader's 
target wage in the average industry, not just ones which have been declin­
ing for example, then wage bargaining will take on a much more genuine 
character. This will not always result in a strike for, as we argued 
earlier, in deciding whether or not to accede to the unions demands, the 
employer will balance the likely costs and benefits of a strike.But we 
would expect that, ceteris paribus, the greater the gap between the wage 
the unions are demanding and the wage the employer wants to pay, the less 
likely the average employer will be to accede to the unions demands and the 
greater the probability of a strike. Hence we can see that when strikes 
are above some critical value we can assume that period to be one where 
on average the union's target wage is greater than the competitive wage.
In addition the more strikes there are above this critical value, then the 
greater is the probable gap between the two sides.
Figure 8.3 shows the number of disputes over wages commencing in 
the relevant quarter, as published in the Department of Employment Gazette. 
These were published monthly, but do not represent all such strikes 
commencing in a given period as some were reported after publication. 
However these amended figures were not published. Fortunately this does 
not seem too serious for our purposes as it is unlikely to impart any bias 
to the analysis. The figures themselves represent the combination of two 
sets of strike categories, those relating to demands over wage advances, 
and those relating to other wage questions. Over the period there has been 
a shift in the relative importance of these two components, with strikes 
over wage advances becoming relatively more important. However this may 
represent the increasing frequency with which wage rates are revised 
collectively (see Elliot (1976)). The argument being that if wages are 
revised relatively infrequently, pressure for wage increases from workers 
will have to find outlets other than the obvious one of upward revision
of the wage rate.
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However it remains a fact that strikes over these two categories
combined showed no marked and sustained trend, either upwards or downwards, 
over the period as a whole. Instead, what seems to have happenned is some 
increase in the number of strikes in the early post-war years, reaching 
some form of plateau in 1955/6, from which the only deviations appear 
temporary. These deviations appear to be of two kinds, steep troughs, as 
in 1963, and very sharp peaks, as in 1969/70. It seems possible, as we 
suggested in the previous chapter, that we might identify the troughs with 
incomes policies. For such policies, although they do nothing to meet the 
workers' aspiration wages, reduce the immediate relevance of conflict 
between employers and trade union leaders. As for the relatively low 
level of strike activity in the early 1950's, this might be linked with 
the relative prosperity of that period, when relatively few industries were 
declining.
In order to identify those periods with excessive strike activity, 
and hence those periods which could be identified with genuine bargaining 
conflicts, a polynomial trend was fitted to strikes over the period as a 
whole. Observations which then fell significantly above the trend value were 
used to define the periods we are trying to identify. The alternative to 
this procedure would appear to be some lengthy analysis of strike activity 
which would be lengthy and out of place here.
We chose a fifth order polynomial which in general provided a relati­
vely good fit to the data (It should be noted that higher order polynomia­
ls would possibly have been significant, but these would pull the trend 
towards those extreme values which we are trying to identify). The polyno­
mial when fitted resulted in the following equation, (8.8). The residuals 
are shown in figure 8.4, and as can be seen in general they fall within one 
standard deviation of their actual values. There are however several periods 
when this was not so. For the purpose of this study we are only concerned
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St = 151.2 - 4.35 t + 0.91 t2 - 0.03 t3 + 0.00035 t4 
(2.95) (0.48) (1.79) (2.48) (2.89)
- 0.0000014 t3 + Seasonal Dummy Variables
(3.15)
R2 = 0.41 
DW = 0.74 ( 8 . 8 )
with those periods which showed significant positive deviations from their 
trend value, i.e. when strikes were significantly greater than we would 
expect them to be. There were two such periods, 1969(4) - 1970(3) when all 
four observations were more than one standard deviation in excess of their 
predicted values, and 1974(2) - 1975(2), when three of the five observati­
ons were more than one standard deviation above their predicted values.
To test whether these two periods really were significantly different 
from the rest of the sample, we repeated the regression with two dummy 
variables ,SD1 and SD2, operative for the respective two periods. The results
St = 159.8 - 6.15 t + 1.00 t2 - 0.030 t3 + 0.00036 t4
(4.78) (1.04) (3.00) (3.96) (4.47)
- 0.0000014 t + 283 39 SDÌ + 161.60SD2 + Seasonal Dummy
Variables(4.75) 
R2 = 0.75 
DW = 1.57
(10.23) (5.27)
(8.9)
As can be seen the dummy variables are both significant at the 5% level, 
and therefore we can accept the hypothesis that these two periods, as a 
whole, sufferred unusually large strike activity over wages.
In the work which follows we are going to identify these nine quarters 
as periods when inflation was determined, not by the competitive wage, 
but by a more genuine bargaining process. In particular, we constructed a 
dummy variable, operative for these nine periods, and which acted multipl­
icatively on the whole equation, i.e.
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W = f(Xt) (1 + £STDUM) + serial correlation terras + seasonal
dummy variables
where STDUM = Number of wage strikes in period t, for t = 1969(4) - 
1970(3) and 1974(2) - 1975(2)
= 0 for all other periods.
and = the basic explanatory variables, as for example specified in
equation (7.21).
We set STDUM equal to the number of strikes when operative, rather than 
simply equal to one, because the more strikes there are above the critical 
value, the greater will be the distance between the competitive wage and 
the union leader's target wage. Thus the equation may be interpreted as 
implying that in normal periods, when the dummy variable is not operative, 
wage inflation will be determined by the basic excess demand mechanism. But 
in abnormal periods, when the dummy variable is operative, inflation will 
be greater than the rate which would result from this mechanism, and the 
proportional difference will be proportional to the amount of strike activity. 
This is why (1 + fSTDUM) acts in a multiplicative, rather than an additive, 
manner, i.e. to maintain the proportional relationship between the two.
Finally we chose W , as the explanatory variable, in preference to for 
reasons described on page 192, the high noise to signal ratio having been 
resolved by correct specification of the error term.
In the regression £ was given an initial starting value of zero, the 
other coefficients had the same starting values as before. The regression 
itself was based upon the period 1951(1) - 1975(4), the results were
Wt = (-3.47 + 19.6int + 0.21 Vt + 0.061 til t + 0.36Bt
(3.76) (3.17) (0.66) (2.32) (0.57)
+ 0.29 W ) (1 + 0.00102 STDUM)
(15.13) (5.32)
R = 0.76 
DW = 2.00
p = -0.38 (3.55) 
P2 = -0.52 (5.08) 
p3 =-. -0.14 (1.27) (8 . 10)
This represents a considerable improvement over equation (7.24), which 
regressed the basic equation over the whole period. The strike dummy
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also very significant and clearly its inclusion greatly improves the 
equation. Of the three serial correlation coeficients, the third order 
one is still insignificant at the 10% level, though only marginally so.
It is possible that this might be due to an increasing tendancy to revise 
wage contracts at more frequent intervals, though for this to be a 
completely satisfactory explanation it would require that wages were being 
revised at least once a year.
As further tests of the validity of the strike dummy variable, we did 
two further regressions, one with a dummy variable, D69, taking a value 
of one after the third quarter of 1969 and zero before that. In other 
words testing the hypothesis that there was a simple multiplicative shift 
in the excess demand equation after 1969. The second regression replaced 
STDUM with S^, which is simply the number of strikes in period t. The 
results of these two regressions were
VV = ( -1.99 + 8 66 H + 0.69 V t t 1
(1.47) (1.07) (1.62)
t + O .024 tn + 0.68 B1 
(0.59) (0.71)
t
+ 0.29W®)( 
(4.26)
1 + 0.18 D69)
(0.90)
R2 = 0.67
DW = 2.00
Px = -0 .21 (2.00) 
P2 = -0.40 (3.64) 
P = -0.07 (0.55) ( 8 .11)
and
Wt= ( -1.49 + 8.41 H + 0.11 Vt + 0.011 tlT t + 0.30 Bi 
(2.30) (2.09) (0.50) (0.58) (0.67)
t
+ 0.19 W® ) ( 1 + 0.0028 St )
R2 = 0.72
DW = 1.99
P = -0.32 (3.00) 
P2 = -0.50 (4.63) 
P3 = -0.06 (0.52) ( 8 . 12)
Claerly neither of these results are as good as the previous ones, the R 's
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are not as high, neither in general, are the t statistics as significant. 
Therefore these results, together with those of equation (8.10), imply1 
that the use of a selective strikes dummy variable gives better results 
than the untransformed strikes variable, and again support the hypothesis 
that the periods we have identified as abnormal are in fact fundamentally 
different from the other periods.
A further implication of this hypothesis is that the basic search 
theoretic model should also work in those periods which we have not identified 
as abnormal, just as it did prior to 1969. Indeed it has already been noted 
in the previous chapter that the predictions from this model were not 
unreasonable outside the periods which we have since identified as being 
abnormal. We therefore re-estimated equation (7.21) over a sample base 
extended to include those periods after 1969(2) which we have not defined 
as being abnormal. The results were
W. -3.37 + 20.59 II + 0.06 V, + 0.039 til _ + l.lOB^t • • "t
(3.74) (3.54) (0.21)
+ 0.29
(11.09)
R =0.58 
DW = 1.94
(1.63) ( 1.68)
= -0.42 (3.70)
p = -0.60 (5.59) 2
P3 = -0.18 (1.55) (8.13)
These results are quite good, although they cannot be directly compared 
with (7.24) due to their being defined on different periods. However some 
of the coefficients, e.g. that on expectations, are more theoretically 
acceptable than before and what is equally important very similar to those 
obtained from the earlier sample period upon which (7.21) was defined.
Consequently we can conclude that their is substantial indirect 
evidence which supports the hypothesis, i.e. the switching regimes model, 
we have been advocating.
1. Although it should be noted that as we have not conducted a more rigorous 
statistical test, e.g. a nested 1' test, this cannot be regarded as firm proof.
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8.7 The Link Between the Worker’s Aspiration Wage and Permanent Income
The chief difficulty in testing the existence of a link between 
permanent income and the aspiration wage is the lack of data. According to 
our strikes criteria there are only nine periods which we can classify as 
being abnormal, and hence being periods when the negotiated wage can be 
linked with the union leaders target wage. Yet this itself is linked with 
individual's aspiration wages in a variable manner. And these in turn are 
formed by the rather complex interaction of real disposable income lagged 
over a number of periods, expectations of inflation, the degree of 
certainty with which these expectations are held, the difference between 
average and marginal tax rates, and the expected and perceived growth rates 
in real disposable income. Hence it does not seem a feasible task to 
formulate and test all of these interconnected relationships in full. But 
we can at least make a beginning and test for the existence of a relation­
ship between the aspirations wage and a lagged distribution of real 
wages, using a permanent income type formula, where in the aggregate the 
real aspiration wage is given by
A is the same type of adjustment parameter as appears in Friedman’s 
permanent income formula, the first two terms result from the expansion 
of the adaptive expectations machanism implicit in that formula. The term 
inside the brackets represents the wage rate lagged four periods and is 
there to represent the workers previous wage in a number of previous years. 
This term is divided by a price term, relating to the mid point of each 
of those years.a is a growth term, there to update previous observations 
onto a comparable basis with present observations. 6 is also a growth term, 
representing the rate at which income is expected to grow at in the future.
W
P
1 a (i-l) (8.14)
-260-
To convert the real aspiration wage into money terms we must multiply
(8.14) by the present price level plus some fraction \  of the expected 
price increase over the following twelve months. We might expect x to take 
a value of about 0.005, which would on average maintain the real wage at 
its desired level over the coming tweleve months (However we should bear in 
mind that both individual and cross section uncertainty about expectations, 
can cause union leaders to overcompensate for price expectations.). Hence 
the aspiration wage, in money terms can be expressed in the following 
functional form
In Friedman's original work n was set equal to 16, however this would 
use up too much data and comparisons of the aspiration wage with the 
competitive wage could only begin in the mid 1960's. Consequently we 
restricted n to equal 11, which means that we will be underestimating the 
effects of lagged income. This underestimation will be relatively small,
To the extent that this underestimation exists, it will bias X upwards, as 
the only other coefficient to be estimated. Finally to further simplify 
matters 6 , the rate at which income is expected to grow at in the future 
was set equal to the rate at which it had been perceived growing at in the 
past. This in turn was set equal to the actual growth rate over the previous 
ten year period, corrected to represent an annual growth rate, i.e.
Bearing in mind all the qualifications we proceeded to estimate (8.15), 
using nonlinear least squares, on the nine abnormal periods already defined.
n
a 6 <Pt + Pt (XP®)
i = l Pt-4(i-1)-2
(8.15)
n
for example with X = 0.25, £ X(1 -X) * ^  = 0.958 (It should equal 1.0).
i=l
+ 1.0 (8.16)
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Table 8.3 A Comparison of the Competitive and Aspiration Wages; 
1960(2) - 1975(4)
Date Competitive Aspiration Date Competitive Aspiration
Wage Wage Wage Wage
1960(2) 195.7 175.1 1971(1) 381.8 372.5
(3) 198.1 176.0 (2) 389.4 387.7
(4) 200.6 177.0 (3) 401.3 401.7*
1961(1) 203.7 181.9 (4) 408.7 406.8
(2) 208.1 194.6 1972(1) 429.3 405 7
(3) 211.3 197.3 (2) 435.5 416.2
(4) 211.9 202.4 (3) 452.3 427.4
1962(1) 213.7 208.2 (4) 486.5 446.3
(2) 216.2 213.5 1973(1) 494.2 454.5
(3) 219.0 217.5 (2) 499 8 474.1
(4) 221.8 215.9 (3) 529.3 502 1
1963(1) 223.5 217.8 (4) 550.2 531.2
(2) 223.9 225.3* 1974(1) 558.7 558.9*
(3) 227.2 223.5 (2) 579.4 602.0*
(4) 228.5 221.6 (3) 629.6 663.2*
1964(1) 234.5 225.5 (4) 674.5 689.0*
(2) 236.7 233.3 1975(1) 730.5 728.6
(3) 240.6 238.6 (2) 780.0 820.9*
(4) 242.7 240.6 (3) 841.3 925.2*
1965(1) 246.2 244.7 (4) 854.4 930.8*
(2) 250.5 251.2*
(3) 255.2 255.3*
(4) 260.0 259.2
1966(1) 263.8 259.3
(2) 271.4 263.8
(3) 273.2 269.8
(4) 274.4 271.2
1967(1) 274.1 270.0
(2) 276.5 272.3
(3) 279.5 277.8
(4) 287.0 278.8
1968(1) 292.2 282.5
(2) 300.3 290.4
(3) 301.6 299.3
(4) 305.6 303.1
1969(1) 313.9 310.7
(2) 316.2 318.1*
(3) 318.7 324.4*
(4) 323.1 326.4*
1970(1) 333.0 334.5*
(2) 343.2 342.9
(3) 351.6 351 9*
(4) 361.8 361 7
An * denotes a quarter when the aspiration wage exceeded the competitive 
wage.
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They provide remarkable support for our hypothesis, and also for 
the existence of a link between the aspiration wage and permanent income. 
For, apart from the nine quarters which we have designated as abnormal, the 
competitive wage is almost always in excess of the aspiration wage. Whilst 
in the nine periods we have designated as abnormal, the aspiration wage is 
greater than the competitive wage no less than seven times.
8.8 Conclusion
In many respects this is the most important chapter in the thesis. In 
it we have developed a switching regimes model which is consistent with 
both the breakdown of excess demand based theories after 1969, and their 
apparent success prior to that date. This theory has taken the form of a 
synthesis between wage bargaining and excess demand based theories, which 
we see as being complementary, rather than competitive.
Thus the theory suggests that the negotiated wage will be equal to 
the competitive wage, formed by an excess demand type mechanism, when this 
is greater than the union leader's target wage. However when this is not 
the case, wage inflation will be the outcome of a bargaining process. We 
have suggested that prior to 1969, the competitive wage was in general in 
excess of the union leader's target wage. Hence the success of excess 
demand based theories in explaining wage inflation prior to that date.
But after this it would appear that there were at least two periods, both 
lasting approximately a year, when this was not the case, hence the apparent 
breakdown of excess demand theories after that date.
In attempting to provide some empirical support for the theory we 
have pointed to several peices of evidence. Firstly we noted that there 
were only two periods of strike activity which could be identified as 
excessive, 1969(4) - 1970(3) and 1974(2) - 1975(2). Both of these occurred 
after 1969, and both seemed incompatible with the general trend in strikes 
prior to that. Which is exactly what we would expect if the above hypotheses
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were valid. Secondly when a regression with a strikes dummy variable, 
operative in these nine periods, and acting multiplicatively on the wage 
equation was estimated the results were superior to any alternative 
specification which was tried. Thirdly when the search theoretic model 
was estimated for the whole period until 1975(4), omitting only those 
periods which were designated abnormal, the results were reasonably satis­
factory. Finally when a model of the worker’s aspiration wage was used to 
formulate a series representing the union leader's target wage, this target 
wage was almost always less than the competitive wage, except in the nine 
periods mentioned above. We regard these four seperate pieces of evidence 
as providing, collectively, an impressive case in support of the theory.
In addition to the basic synthesis, several other points of interest 
have emerged from this chapter. We shall be turning to these, as well as 
to the policy implications of the theory and comparisons with other theories, 
in the following chapter. Which will conclude the thesis.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 A Restatement of the Central Theme
The central task with which this thesis has been concerned has been 
to reconcile the apparentsuccess of excess demand theories in explaining 
inflation prior to the 1970's with their apparent failure since then. In 
the event this reconciliation took the form of a synthesis between such 
theories and wage bargaining ones. It is this thesis which represents what 
we feel to be the most important contribution of the thesis.
Hitherto these two approaches to wage inflation have been regarded as 
being mutually exclusive. The acceptance of one precluding the acceptance 
of the other. However it seems to us that both contain essential elements 
of the truth which the other ignores. Therefore, by combining these two 
theories we get a more complete analysis of the inflationary process.
Excess demand theories of inflation emphasise the employer's role, 
whereby he reacts to demand conditions in the labour market by varying 
the wages he pays. However to a large extent they ignore, or at best give 
only a cursory analysis to, the role of trade unions. Thus, for example, 
both Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) make the assumption that the princi­
ple motivation of unions is to maintain some differential over non-union 
workers. Therefore all wages, union and non-union, are linked to demand 
conditions in the competitive sector of the economy. Thus they ignore, what 
is an important part of many wage bargaining theories, that trade unions 
are in part motivated by concern over their members living standards.
In comparison wage bargaining theories emphasise the trade unions role 
but largely ignore the employers'. Almost all, explicitly or implicitly, 
make the assumption that his principal motivation in the wage bargaining 
process is to attempt to negotiate as Iowa wage as possible. Thus
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ignoring the point, emphasised by excess demand theories, that employers 
will bear in mind the effect of the negotiated wage on the ease with which 
he can attract and retain labour during the contract period.
Combining these two theories together we arrive at the position that 
the employer will enter the wage negotiations with a wage that he wishes 
to pay, which we call the "competitive wage". Similarly the trade union 
leader enters with a minimum wage he wishes to see negotiated, his "target 
wage". If the competitive wage exceeds the union leader's target wage, then 
this will be the wage which is negotiated. If, however, this is not the 
case then we are in a more genuine bargaining situation. If there is a 
strike then the negotiated wage will probably be less than the union 
leaders target wage, and it will fall with the duration of the strike. If 
there is no strike then the employer will have to pay the union leader's 
target wage.
9.2 Subsidiary Themes and Conclusions
In developing this synthesis, several subsidiary conclusions emerged 
which we also feel to be of some interest. We began by developing an excess 
demand based theory of inflation along the lines of Phelps, Holt, Mortens- 
on and others. The theory developed however differed from others in 
several respects. In method it stressed the interactive roles of job searc­
her and employer in the hiring process to a degree which has not been done 
before. In conclusions reached, it emphasised the role of profits within an 
excess demand framework, and the possibility of a non-unit variable 
coefficient on expectations.
Hitherto profits have largely been ignored within an excess demand 
framework, although they have received some emphasis in bargaining models. 
This lack of interest may in part be due to the influence of an early 
paper by Lipsey and Steur (1961) who found only a weak association between 
wage changes and a profits variable. However it should be noted that they
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used the level of profits, corrected for price changes, but not for real 
secular growth in the economy. This is important, for we do not feel that 
an increase in profits due, e.g., to an increase in output resulting from 
an expansion of the labour force, is likely to have any effect on wage 
inflation.
The possibility of a non-unit coefficient on expectations arises 
because a unit coefficient will, using Phelps' terminology, only serve 
to maintain an absolute differential,in money terms, over the wages an 
employer expects other employers to be paying. To maintain a relative 
differential, the coefficient on expectations must vary with labour market 
conditions. Somewhat surpisingly, to us at least, this was one of the few 
implications which did not receive some support from the empirical work. 
However we do find the theoretical arguments persuasive, and would suggest 
that it continues to be perservered with in empirical work, until we have 
more evidence on which to judge it.
Another variable which was to prove insignificant, when testing the 
wage equation, was unemployment. This may well be because of multicollinea- 
rity problems, however the possibility also exists that it is not a signi­
ficant factor in the inflationary process. In the theory its importance 
stems from the assumption that only full time search is possible. More 
realistically we might recognise that workers can also engage in search 
whilst still in employment. If this was done it might well be that the 
role of unemployment in the inflationary process disappears. However it 
should also be borne in mind that unemployment was significant when testing 
the implications of the search theory for labour market flows.
Expectations of inflation play an important role in this, as in most 
other theories of inflation, and it is to these that we turned in chapters 
4 - 6 .  Chapter 4 contained a review of some of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on expectations. It seemed to us that, in general,
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these two strands of the literature had been developed seperately, which 
seemed unsatisfactory for the one should support the other. It was for 
this reason that we attempted to develop links between them. As for the 
optimal method of expectation formation, we argued that this would be likely 
to vary with the inflation rate itself. In particular, in times when the 
inflation rate was changing rapidly, individuals were likely to employ a 
more complex method of expectation formation than when the inflation rate 
was relatively stable. Important in this context is the concept of a cost 
function, hitherto the only costs which have been considered are those of 
being in error, which the individual would attempt to minimize. In addition 
to this however we suggested that the individual would also take into 
consideration the costs of the method itself.
This was one of the principal theoretical reasons for rejecting, 
within the context of inflation, a pure rational expectations hypothesis 
of expectation formation, in favour of some rational-adaptive hypothesis.
In combination with the empirical work of chapter 5, the conclusion that 
emerged was that expectations were probably formed in a mixed rational- 
adaptive manner, the exact structure of which would vary with the economic 
conditions. Thus when inflation was changing rapidly, in possible periods 
of perceived structural change, a more complex "adaptive" mechanism would 
be employed than when inflation was relatively stable. The rational element 
takes the form of cognisance of events, such as the introduction of an 
incomes policy, which provide information about the economic system.
Another interesting possibility which was to emerge from this chapter 
was that individuals might not fully perceive the rate of inflation. The 
most suggestive evidence in favour of such a hypothesis came from figure 
5.1, where expectations almost continually underestimate the rate of 
inflation. However no more substantial proof was to emerge and the possibi­
lity remains a matter of conjecture. But if it could be established it 
would, for example, have important implications, independent of the rest of 
the thesis, for the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis as expounded
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by others. The principal difficulty in testing this possibility lies in 
the absence of any data on perceptions, and we urge that the Central 
Statistical Office, or some other official body, should conduct a regular 
sample survey, to obtain reliable data on peoples expectations and 
perceptions, on this and other matters. However in the absence of more 
tangible evidence we were forced to assume, almost throughout the thesis, 
that inflation was fully perceived.
There was, however, one exception to this, that the specification of 
a mechansim to generate expectations would result, even in the long run, 
in expectations being equal to only 0.75 of the actual inflation rate. In 
the empirical work this seemed to be acceptable, with coefficients on 
expectations being in general insignificantly different from one, except 
in equation (8.13), which extended the sample base to include those periods 
after 1969(2) which were designated as "normal", i.e. when the competitive 
wage exceeded the union leaders' target wage. In this regression the 
coefficient on expectations was significantly greater than one, and this 
might indicate that inflation is more fully perceived at higher levels as, 
for example, after 1969(2), than at lower levels.
It was noted in the introduction that one might reasonably identify 
the common theme of the present economic era as being the more complete 
integration of expectations into economic theory. But we believe, in common 
with Laidler and Parkin (1975), that before such integration can proceed 
much further, considerations of uncertainty must be introduced into the 
analysis. In this thesis we have made a start, in chapter 6 we analyse the 
degree of certainty with which expectations are held. We identified two 
types of uncertainty, cross section uncertainty, or the extent to which 
individuals hold differing expectations, and individual uncertainty, which 
reflects the confidence with which individuals hold those expectations. We 
also suggested suitable proxies for both these concepts, and the empirical 
work tended to confirm the theoretical conclusion that both types of
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uncertainty would increase during times when the inflation rate was changing 
rapidly. We also noted that both kinds of uncertainty were sensitive to 
external events which provide information about the economic system, such 
as the introduction of incomes policies.
Turning from the determinants of uncertainty to their actual incorpo­
ration into the theory, we can see that this work was not developed so 
fully. The search theory was based on the assumptions of income maximizing 
individuals and profit maximizing employers. To introduce concepts of 
uncertainty, it would be necessary to rephrase the theory in terms of util­
ity maximizing individuals and, e.g., risk averse employers, which in 
principle at least does not seem too difficult a task. However elements of 
uncertainty were incorporated into the theory surrounding the determinati­
on of the union leader's target wage, and in this case an increase in 
either individual or cross section uncertainty would tend to increase the 
target wage. Thus in situations where this exceeds the competitive wage, 
this will tend to increase any inflationary pressures.
In chapter 7 we attempted to determine whether the search theory 
developed in chapter 2 was capable of explaining inflation. In the event it 
proved acceptable until 1969(2), but appeared to break down after that date. 
In doing this empirical work particular attention was paid to the specific­
ation of the error term. Thus it would appear that equations with either 
the annual or quarterly rates of inflation have a more complex error 
structure than has hitherto been supposed. This was particularly important 
with respect to quarterly rates of inflation where the correct specification 
of the error term significantly increased the signal to noise ratio.
As we have already noted the results of this chapter were, prior to 
1969, consistent with the search theoretic model of inflation developed 
in chapter 2. But, as was emphasised earlier, this cannot be taken as 
unambiguous proof for the validity of that theory. For nearly all of the 
variables which the search theory indicated as being significant, were also
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consistent with other, e.g. wage bargaining, theories of inflation.
Because of this it was highly desirable that we should carry out an alter­
native test of the theory in an area where these other theories had no 
relevance.
The area we chose was labour market flows, i.e. quits hires and fires, 
and such a testhad already been carried out in chapter 3, with again 
largely favourable results to the search theory. This then gives us more 
confidence in interpreting the empirical results in chapter 7 in the way 
we have. However this chapter had further implications, particularly with 
respect to the U-V curve. We devised a method of estimating the U-V curve, 
and established its existence, in the sense of there being a semi-equilib­
rium relationship between unemployment and vacancies. We also established 
that the position of this curve in the unemployment vacancy plane would 
depend upon the values of certain other variables, such as profits and 
unemployment benefits, in much the same way as inflation does. Other 
interesting concepts to emerge included the possibility of a backlog of 
quits as the economy moves out of a recession.
In chapter 8 we developed the switching regimes model of inflation, 
by combining together the excess demand and wage bargaining theories. Again 
the empirical work provided considerable support for this model. This 
empirical work involved dividing the sample into two, into those periods 
when the competitive wage exceeded the union's target wage, and into those 
periods when the reverse was the case. The criteria on which this division 
took place was based on identifying periods of excessive wage strike 
activity. This empirical work then provided some confirmation for our 
assumption that prior to 1969 the competitive wage was nearly always in 
excess of the union's target wage, but that after that date there were two 
periods, each about a year, when this was not so. This is then t.he reason 
we believe that excess demand theories worked well until 1969, but appeared
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to break down after that date.
In this chapter we also spent a considerable amount of time in 
analysing the trade union's role in the inflationary process. Building 
on a theoretical base originally developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969), we analysed the interactions between the union leader and his 
membership. We suggested that the principal aim of the union leader was 
to retain his job, and that he could best do this by satisfying some 
minimum proportion of his membership. They in turn base their "aspiration 
wage" on a desire to maintain their standard of living, or planned consump­
tion pattern. We then linked this to Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, 
with the result that the individuals aspiration wage is that which will 
leave his permanent income unchanged.
In pursuing this we found that it appears that Friedman mis-specified 
permanent income for two reasons. Firstly the growth element used in 
updating previous periods income to compare with the present was constant, 
when it seems more likely to be a lagged function of actual changes in 
income. Secondly this growth factor was purely retrospective, it did not 
extend into the future. Thus the permanent income hypothesis, which in part 
stems from the hypothesis that individuals in deciding on their consumption 
take into account expected future income, does not in its formulation 
take any explicit account of the future.
We believe that these criticisms, if accepted, have extremely import­
ant and obvious implications for the consumption function. In particular 
they may help explain why this also appeared to change in the 1970's (see, 
for example, Davidson et al (1978)).
9.3 Comparisons With Other Theories
In this section we shall not primarily be concerned with comparisons 
with other wage bargaining or excess demand theories, for in most cases
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these comparisons are obvious. To summarise, wage bargaining theories have 
omitted to take due consideration of both the employers' position and the 
inter-relationship between the trade union leader and his membership.
Whilst excess demand theories have omitted to take full account of the 
union ' s role .
Instead we shall be more concerned with "reinterpreting" some of these 
other theories in what we hope is a more plausible manner. We shall begin 
this with those studies which have attempted to explain recent inflation 
in terms of trade union militancy. The most obvious example of such a study 
is of course Hines'(1964) work, where he argued that increasing trade 
union militancy would be manifested in areas other than the actual wage 
bargain. In particular he argued that a necessary prerequisite for the 
success of a "militant wage demand" would be a recruiting drive to acquire 
more members. Hence the degree of militancy can be proxied by the increase 
in the percentage of the labour force which is unionised. We also examined 
in chapter 1 the arguments which have been registered against this 
hypothesis, as well as making clear our own objections to this interpretation 
of "militancy".
However it would appear that in the light of the theory developed 
here, Hines' militancy proxy was in a sense valid, though not for the 
reasons he argued. Thus when the aspirations wage exceeds the competitive 
wage we would expect excess demand based theories to break down. Yet, at 
the same time we would also expect unorganised workers to join or form 
unions, to be better able to achieve a wage which will maintain their 
standard of living, which their employer is reluctant to pay. But Hines 
mistook the direction of causality, unions do not go seeking members at such 
times, workers go seeking unions.
Similar explanations explain the apparent success of other militancy
variables, e.g. strikes in Taylor's (1970) paper. Again it is precisely
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when the aspirations wage exceeds the competitive wage that we would 
expect both excess demand theories to break down and strikes to increase. 
Hence the significance of strikes in the wage equation, particularly an 
excess demand based one.
In comparison with Hines, several theories have argued that unions are 
concerned with maintaining some constant rate of growth in their membershi­
ps net real incomes. Thus in spirit these theories are related to ours, 
although there are important differences. We shall examine these with 
reference to one of the most recent of these theories, that of Henry,
Sawyer and Smith (1976). They argue that unions desire to maintain a 
constant increase in their members net real income and that deviations 
from this target growth rate, for example due to incomes policies, will lead 
to pressure building up to secure the desired wage level. Thus, e.g., on 
the removal of an incomes policy we can expect very large wage demands.
Some justification for this hypothesis can be found in the thesis, 
which links, via the permanent income hypothesis, the desired increase in 
real wages to past increases. However there are important differences 
between the two theories. Most obviously they suggest that this is largely a 
complete explanation of inflation in the post-war years, whereas in the 
theory developed here it is only part of an explanation within a switching 
regimes model. Also their desired increase in real net earnings is a constant 
wheras in our theory it varies in accordance with recent experience.
We also mentioned in the introduction that several non-economic 
theories were gaining some degree of acceptance even amongst economists.
A typical example of this is the argument that unions in particular and 
society in general have become more aggressive in recent years, and that 
this is manifested by increasingly militent wage claims. Thus Williamson 
and Wood (1976) note that there has been in the 1970's an increased 
willingness on the part of trade unions to inflict harm on others in
pursuit of their own advantage.
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However we believe that this is not a cause of inflation, but a 
symptom. We have argued that during periods when the union leader's 
target wage exceeds the competitive wage we can expect to witness, as well 
as wage claims and settlements above the competitive wage, an increase 
in the number of strikes coupled with increased opposition to any settlement 
reached by those union members whose aspiration wages lie below the negoti- 
ted wage. Such events can easilly be interpreted in the way Williamson 
and Wood,and others have done. But the evidence in this case is misleading 
and we do not believe that any analysis on inflation based on what we see 
as a misinterpretation of the evidence can yield any usefull conclusions. 
This is why we rejected from the beginning these alternative non-economic 
approaches.
Finally we return to the point at which the thesis began, the paper 
by Phillips (1958). He argued that it is only when the cost of living 
rises more rapidly than money wages, that price increases become operative. 
Where money wages are rising more rapidly than the cost of living then 
"...employers will merely be giving under the name of cost of living 
adjustments part of the wage increases which they would in any case have 
given as a result of their competitive bidding for labour." As we saw 
in the introduction to the thesis this argument has been largely dismissed, 
but we believe that this quite clearly is hinting at the switching regimes 
model contained here. For it contains most of the essential elements, that 
workers are interested in a wage which will maintain their standard of 
living, that employers have in mind a wage they wish to pay in the light 
of demand conditions in the labour market. And that if this wage is not 
sufficient to maintain the workers standard of living then a different mec­
hanism comes into operation.
It is of course very easy to put too much emphasis on a few lines, 
written several years ago, when economic ideas and conditions were very 
different from those which prevail today. But if we are correct in this
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interpretation of Phillips' work, then it can only increase ones admiration 
for a paper which has already been hailed a classic.
9.4 Policy Implications
An examination of the policy implications is obviously an important 
part of any theory. Nonetheless we feel a little reticent in doing this 
for several reasons. Firstly the thesis has been primarily concerned with 
analysing and explaining inflation, rather then with setting out a set of 
policies to reduce inflation. In order to properly analyse the policy 
implications we would need to carry out a number of simulations with various 
policy prescriptions, based on the theoretical model developed. In addition 
one needs to consider how these policies would affect other areas of the 
economy, and any feedback from those areas to inflation itself. Such a task 
is a further thesis in itself.
Secondly it has become apparent as we reviewed the literature how 
quickly accepted theories become discarded and policy conclusions reversed. 
This is important for governments do base their policies on economic 
theories and on the advice of economists, even if the link is sometimes 
tenuous. The wrong policy advice can have very harmfull effects on an 
economy and cause a great deal of needless suffering. Thus, although it may 
seem a long way from the pages of an academic journal to social disorder 
and distress, the economist cannot differentiate himself from the implica­
tions which might follow from some government basing their policies on his 
theories.
Finally the theory itself is a first attempt to formulate this 
synthesis between excess demand and bargaining theories, and no doubt it 
is capable of considerable development, modification and indeed correction. 
Thus for all these reasons the following discussion is tentative.
The discussion itself will be placed within the context of the U.K. 
economy, where it seems likely to us that the problems associated with the
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union leaders' target wage exceeding the competitive wage are relatively new. 
They did not exist prior to 1945 because people had not perceived incomes 
growing in the past, as we have remarked before, the rate of income growth 
in the inter-war years was comparatively low, and thus expectations of 
future income growth had no foundation. There was thus no continuous 
pressure for increases in the real wage, in recession as well as the 
upswing of the cycle, as we argue there is today. After 1945 income growth 
became more apparent, but the problems with inflation that this was to lead 
to were not immediately obvious. For over twenty years the competitive wage, 
the wage the employer wished to pay was sufficient to satisfy workers' 
aspirations. This was due to several factors, the almost continual prosper­
ity of this period, coupled with the lag between income growing continuously 
over time and this being perceived and feeding through fully into expecta­
tions, and a slightly accelerating growth rate throughout much of the period.
These factors could not continue forever, the turning point would 
appear to be in 1966 when an almost continuous recession was enough to 
ensure that three years later the average worker's aspiration wage exceeded 
both his actual wage and the wage the employer wished to pay. This resulted 
in an increase in industrial unrest coupled with a rate of inflation which 
seemed incompatible with the underlying labour market conditions. Since 
then there has been a further period of expansion which, starting from 
already high levels of inflation and expectations of inflation, was to lead 
to a further expansion in the inflation rate. This was followed by a further 
and prolonged recession, which has again resulted in increased industrial 
unrest and a continuing high rate of inflation, broken only by the tempor­
ary success of the Social Contract. Therefore paradoxically it would appear 
that the very deflationary policies which were aimed at reducing inflation, 
only served to further aggravate the problem.
Thus the basic problem with which we are faced with now is that during
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a recession inflation is not falling, but at least remaining on a plateau 
from which it can increase to even higher levels during the next expansio­
nary phase of the cycle. However there is also the possibility that infla­
tion, during periods when the union's target wage exceeds the competitive 
wage, will not merely remain on a plateau, but will actually accelerate to 
even higher levels. In this case there is no obvious upper bound on the 
inflation rate. This latter possibility arises for two reasons. Firstly 
union leaders' will probably attempt to satisfy more than 50% of their 
membership. Secondly union members themselves, if uncertain about the expe­
cted rate of inflation, may seek to secure wage increases which will 
overcompensate for any expected price increase.
Thus one conclusion at least is clear, to minimize the risk of the 
problems we have described arising the government should attempt to 
maintain as constant a growth rate as possible. Unfortunately for the U.K. 
at present this policy prescription is of little relevance, the problem is 
not how do we prevent this problem from arising, but how do we solve it once 
it has arisen.
In examining this problem we shall first turn to the two policies 
which have been most widely advocated, that is the reduction of demand 
within the labour market and the use of incomes policies. Policies aimed 
at reducing the level of excess demand within the economy will reduce the 
competitive wage, i.e. the wage the employer wishes to pay, and if the 
competitive wage exceeds the union's target wage, this will then reduce 
wage inflation. However if this is not the case, if the union leader’s 
target wage exceeds the competitive wage, then the analysis is more complex. 
Firstly there seems no reason to suppose that, ordinarily, this will 
reduce the individual worker's aspiration wage. Nor does there seem any 
compelling reason why it should affect the manner in which the trade union 
leader responds to his memberships aspirations. Hence we would not, in 
general, expect the union’s target wage to be reduced by, e.g., increasing
-279-
unemployment. There may however be some impact on the bargaining process 
itself. The widening gap between the wage the employer wishes to pay and 
the union leader's target wage may well increase the liklihood of a strike 
which will reduce the union's target wage in the manner discussed in the 
previous chapter. This is especially likely as profits are also likely to 
be low, and thus the costs of a strike will also be low in relative terms. 
But it is problematical as to how much the strike will serve to reduce the 
union's target wage.
Against this possibility there are others which will tend to work in 
the opposite direction. Most obvious is that with the reduction in demand 
will go a reduction in overtime working which will reduce workers ' net inc­
omes. They may attempt to compensate for this by an increase in their wage 
rates, thus in effect their aspiration wage will vary with the amount of 
overtime worked. Related to this is a factor which stems from the possib­
ility that consumption plans will be based, not on individual income, but 
on household income. Increasing unemployment is liable to affect secondary 
workers in particular, thus, for example, if the wifes income is lost her 
husband may partially attempt to compensate for this by increasing his own 
income, via an increase in the wage rate.
There is one further possibility to consider and this is the existence 
of a level of unemployment so high as to have a direct effect on the workers' 
aspiration wages, due to fears of becoming and staying unemployed. However 
there is no evidence to suggest how high a level of unemployment this would 
need to be, if indeed it exists at all. Overall therefore we do not feel 
that reducing excess demand will necessarily reduce inflation. If inflation 
is being generated by a genuine bargaining mechanism, then its effects are 
problematical. This, coupled with the other harmfull effects that unemploy­
ment certainly does have, leads us to advise against the use of such polic­
ies .
This rejection also extends to monetarist policies, for it is through
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excess demand that changes in the money supply affect wage inflation. Thus 
we argue that control of the money supply in a situation where the compet­
itive wage is less than the unions' target wage, is unlikely to bring about 
a significant reduction in the inflation rate. What it will do is to incre­
ase unemployment, increase bancruptcies and reduce living standards. It may 
even have adverse effects on inflation. Thus we reject the views that 
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, and that only 
the government can create inflation by printing money. For the failure to 
do so will not reduce inflation, but lead to increasing unemployment. The 
quantity equation will still hold, but with P rising faster than M and V 
constant, T, the number of transactions has to fall. This cannot go on 
for ever and there are grave dangers in the pursuit of such policies.
However if we reject such policies, then we are equally sceptical 
about the use of incomes policies. Again the problems arise when the union 
leaders target wage exceeds the competitive wage. In this case for inflation 
to be reduced permanently by the incomes policy, it will have to reduce 
workers' aspiration wages. There may indeed be some favourable effects in 
that any reduction in income in one period will reduce the aspiration wage 
in future periods. But such a process will be slow, and several years of 
income restraint will probably be necessary before there has been a signi­
ficant enough reduction in the worker's aspiration wage. However we do not 
believe that any incomes policy can successfully restrain incomes for a 
lengthy period. If the policy is voluntary then pressure will build up 
against the union leaders who agreed to such a policy and we do not believe 
that they can successfully withstand such pressure. Even if they try tq we 
can expect support to increase for rivals to the leadership, both formal 
and informal. Faced with this threat to their positions, trade union 
leaders must respond to their memberships wishes, or be replaced by
leaders who will.
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Neither can a compulsory policy be successfull, for a modern 
economy is highly dependent on certain key sectors, such as power, and the 
workers in these industries have the ability to overcome any incomes 
policy. This is not to deny that certain incomes policies have met with 
some temporary success, but in general this has also generated opposition 
to the policy which has led to its termination. After which inflation once 
more accelerates as workers attempt to restore their standard of living. 
However we do not totally reject the use of incomes policies, but their 
role is a more minor one within a general strategy, and it is to this that 
we now turn.
We noted earlier that there may be a tendancy for inflation to 
accelerate even in the absence of demand pressures. The reason being that 
union leaders may tend to overcompensate for expected price inflation, due 
to both individual uncertainty about those expectations, and their need to 
satisfy the aspirations of more than half of their membership. The individ­
ual uncertainty aspect is relevant as it causes union members to be 
uncertain about the real wage over the contract period. This could be 
overcome to some extent, by offering union leaders the opportunity to 
link the negotiated wage to an index of prices. Unions would then have the 
opportunity of bargaining for a real wage increase and workers could be 
certain that this increase would remain constant over the contract period.
To counteract the tendancy of union leaders' to overcompensate for 
expected inflation, and their memberships aspiration wage, secret ballots 
could be introduced on whether to strike and whether to end a strike in 
the light of the employers latest offer. This would tend to result in a 
negotiated wage which would satisfy about 50% of the membership, rather 
than a proportion in excess of that. The principal problem with this 
suggestion is that unions tend to be very sensitive to outside interference 
in their affairs and the imposition upon them of secret ballots could 
worsen industrial relations. However this is the only suggestion for trade
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union "reform" which we make, and by itself might not prove unacceptable.
The second set of policy suggestions are related to the problem of 
reducing the rate of inflation, as opposed to merely stopping it from 
accelerating. In very simple terms the basic problem arose because workers 
aspired to a standard of living which was incompatible with the rate of 
productivity growth. To reduce inflation therefore we must either reduce 
those aspirations, or increase the productive capacity of the economy. We 
shall deal with the former possibility first.
The individual forms his real aspiration wage on the basis of past 
trends in income and income growth which he expects to continue into the 
future. We have suggested that this is done using a permanent income type 
mechanism. Therefore to reduce the aspiration wage this mechanism needs to 
be bypassed, or alternatively altered so that the rate at which income is 
expected to grow at in the future is no longer equal to the rate at which 
it has been perceived to have been growing at in the past. But this entails 
a reduction in the individuals standard of living and in their planned 
consumption patterns, and it is not easy to see how this can be achieved. 
The government could mount a concerted campaign in an attempt to convince 
people of this. However we remain sceptical about the extent to which this 
can be achieved.
Alternatively the government could attempt more drastic action still 
and impose a change on those consumption patterns. This could be done by, 
for example, rationing or in some other way controlling the consumption of 
certain widely consumed goods such as petrol, cigarettes and alcohol. This 
would certainly have an impact on the public conciousness, but whether it 
would be politically feasible and whether it would have the desired effects 
on workers' aspiration wages are open to doubt. In particular it is possi­
ble that individuals in attempting to maintain their standard of living 
might merely change their consumption plans and substitute unrationed goods
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for rationed ones.
There are two further alternatives both linked with taxes and both 
of which have to an extent already been implemented. Firstly the governm­
ent could reduce taxes, either direct or indirect, the individual would 
then experience an increase in real disposable income and there would be 
a reduction in the gross money income required for the individual to 
maintain his standard of living. In a sense this would be a temporary 
effect only, but to the extent that it would lead to reduction in the rate 
of price inflation which would feed through to expectations of price 
inflation the effects would be more permanent.
This suggestion has been made elsewhere, for example Jackson, Turner 
and Wilkinson (1972) and Henry, Sawyer and Smith (1976). But there is one 
important qualification we would add to their conclusions. This policy 
will only have a dampening effect on the inflation rate when the unions' 
target wage exceeds the competitive wage. When this is not the case the 
negotiated wage will in any case be in excess of the workers' aspiration 
wage. In this case a reduction in taxes will have no effects on inflation 
in that period. Instead it will only serve to increase real net income still 
further, and this will in turn tend to increase permanent income in 
future periods. Thus leading to increased inflationary pressures during 
future periods when the union leaders' target wage exceeds the competitive 
wage.
Secondly, as we noted in the previous chapter, the greater the differ­
ence between the average and marginal tax retention ratios, the greater 
will be the inflationary pressure as increases in income are taxed at higher 
than average rates. To overcome this personal tax allowances could be 
linked to a price index, a suggestion which has fact already been implem­
ented .
We now turn to the second part of the suggested "strategy ', that of
increasing the rate of productivity growth. We have argued that if this 
can be done then the productive potential of the economy can be brought 
nearer to the sum of individual aspirations which have to be met from 
that economy. Again we are aware that there are wider economic and 
political considerations to be taken into account when arguing for increa­
sed productivity growth. We are also aware that many economists now 
believe that the era of continual growth has passed, and that faced with 
dwindling resources the nations of the world must come to terms with 
stagnant, or even declining economies. We make no comment on these wider 
issues. The arguments we are putting forward are based on considerations 
of their effects on inflation and unemployment alone.
The argument is then, that the U.K. should attempt to increase 
productivity growth by a slow and steady expansion of the economy at a rate 
which it is hoped will be maintainable indefinitely. Thus at first this 
would come about through firms making increased use of resources which are 
at present not fully employed. However it is to be hoped that by the time 
these resources are fully employed, employers will be encouraged, by the 
steady expansion of the economy to invest in uptodate machinery, thus 
enabling the rate of growth to be maintained indefinitely. In addition the 
government should take all possible steps to encourage investment. However 
a too rapid expansion of the economy is likely, as in the early 1970's, to 
lead to the competitive wage exceeding the union leader's target wage, thus 
exacerbating the problem, not only in that period but in the future as well. 
It may also be that here too incomes policies can play a role, not in 
holding down the wage level below the worker’s aspiration wage, but in 
preventing it from exceeding that wage, as employers' attempt to attract 
labour.
These then are the policies we suggest should be followed in attempt­
ing to reduce inflation, we are not certain that they will work, it may be
-285-
that the economy cannot attain a sufficiently high rate of productivity 
growth. We do believe, however, that they stand a greater chance than any 
alternatives. Indeed we believe that many of the suggested alternatives 
are in part responsible for the difficult nature of the problem. Thus 
reducing the level of demand in the economy has, in our view, only exacerb­
ated inflation, whilst causing unecessarily high levels of unemployment.
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Table Al Data Used in Chapter 3
Date Vacancies Unemployment Benefits Earnings
1967 Feb. 91473 414519 10.25 16.25
March 94153 406454 10.25 16.34
April 95839 402374 10.25 16.40
May 96871 384261 10.40 16.42
June 98047 365285 10.55 16.52
July 95423 365622 10.55 16.71
Aug. 90877 376813 10.55 16.68
Sept. 89989 394446 10.55 16.82
Oct. 90823 408751 10.55 16.82
Nov. 85887 433549 10.95 17.04
Dec. 85331 446238 11.35 16.94
1968 Jan. 79868 481817 11.35 17.24
Feb. 81683 481013 11.35 17.41
March 87431 463560 11.35 17.45
April 90386 456793 11.35 17.42
May 94226 435633 11.55 17.55
June 97652 417023 11.75 17.54
July 98243 409488 11.75 17.64
Aug. 94616 412203 11.75 17.76
Sept. 95205 411126 11.75 17.82
Oct. 93947 432286 11.75 17.88
Nov. 97993 442630 11.75 18.05
Dec. 100257 444040 11.75 18.18
1969 Jan. 89657 481498 11.75 18.22
Feb. 93838 476369 11.75 18.14
March 98225 470626 11.75 18.29
April 102888 451569 11.75 18.50
May 106864 421480 12.00 18.39
June 110570 402350 12.25 18.67
July 108228 398249 12.25 18.73
Aug. 107739 407587 12.25 18.79
Sept. 108238 412678 12.25 18.97
Oct. 104481 436000 12.25 19.12
Nov. 101212 448881 12.65 18.97
Dec. 102123 467056 13.05 19.20
1970 Jan. 95576 508059 13.05 19.26
Feb. 9707 6 503069 13.05 19.57
March 99086 500693 13.05 19.73
April 103895 488302 13.05 20.01
May 105363 457278 13.40 20.20
June 107784 435525 13.75 20.43
July 107742 432809 13.75 20.51
Aug. 103219 439982 13.75 20.83
Sept. 104207 442666 13.75 20.90
Oct. 101676 459489 13.75 21.09
Nov. 93818 474038 13.75 21.32
Dec. 89484 493268 13.75 21.52
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Date Profits G.D.P.
1967 Feb. 1152 8561
March 1155 8601
April 1151 8638
May 1146 8675
June 1142 8712
July 1154 8732
Aug. 1166 8753
Sept. 1178 8773
Oct. 1190 8831
Nov. 1203 8888
Dec. 1215 8946
1968 Jan. 1234 8990
Feb. 1253 9033
March 1272 9077
April 1285 9150
May 1298 9223
June 1311 9296
July 1315 9336
Aug. 1320 9375
Sept. 1324 9415
Oct. 1320 9465
Nov. 1317 9515
Dec. 1313 9565
1969 Jan. 1308 9592
Feb. 1304 9620
March 1299 9647
April 1296 9681
May 1293 9714
June 1290 9748
July 1295 9805
Aug. 1300 9861
Sept. 1305 9918
Oct. 1306 9980
Nov. 1308 10041
Dec. 1309 10103
1970 Jan. 1311 10194
Feb. 1313 10285
March 1315 10376
April 1321 10460
May 1326 10545
June 1332 10629
July 1346 10750
Aug. 1361 10870
Sept. 1375 10991
Oct. 1390 11073
Nov. 1404 11154
Dec. 1419 11236
Table A1 (cont.)
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Table A1 (cont.)
Date Vacancies Unemployment Benefits Earnings
1971 Jan. 78029 552415 13.75 21.71
Feb. 76069 556258 13.75 21.75
March 72233 568219 13.75 21.94
April 70018 580422 13.75 22.33
May 71016 583497 14.30 22.62
June 73764 565489 i4.85 22.65
July 66848 580742 14.85 22.91
Aug. 68158 601875 14.85 23.14
Sept. 65992 616834 14.85 23.06
Oct. 64537 644399 15.65 23.22
Nov. 62124 678156 16.45 23.26
Dec. 59745 699544 16.45 23.42
1972 Jan. 54452 748302 16.45 23.64
Feb. 61700 748323 16.45 23.97
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Table A1 (cont.)
Date Profits G.D.P.
1971 Jan. 1441 11353
Feb. 1463 11471
March 1485 11588
April 1494 11721
May 1502 11855
June 1511 11988
July 1521 12141
Aug. 1532 12294
Sept. 1542 12448
Oct. 1538 12569
Nov. 1534 12690
Dec. 1530 12811
1972 Jan. 1548 12915
Feb. 1566 13019
Note: For details about this data, see the appendix at the end of chapter
3.
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Table A2 Data Used in Chapter 5
Date Wage Index Expectations of M L  
Wage Inflation
Retail 
Price Index
1961 March 128.6 112.7
April 129.0 113.3
May 129.7 113.6
June 130.4 114.6
July 130.5 114.6
Aug. 130.7 115.7
Sept. 131.0 115.5
Oct. 132.3 115.7
Nov. 132.3 116.9
Dec. 132.4 117.1
1962 Jan. 133.2 100.0
Feb. 133.6 100.1
March 134.2 100.5
April 135.3 101.9
May 135.7 102.2
June 135.9 102.9
July 137.0 102.5
Aug. 137.4 101.6
Sept. 137.6 101.5
Oct. 137.7 101.4
Nov. 138.5 101.8
Dec. 138.8 102.3
1963 Jan. 139.1 102.7
Feb. 139.4 103.6
March 139.7 103.7
Apri 1 140.6 104.0
May 140.9 103.9
June 141.9 103.9
July 141.4 103.3
Aug. 141.5 103.0
Sept. 141.7 103.3
Oct. 141.8 103.7
Nov. 143.1 104.0
Dec. 145.1 104.2
1964 Jan. 145.7 104.7
Feb. 146.0 104.8
March 146.5 105.2
April 147.0 106.5
May 147.7 107.0
June 148.6 107.4
July 149.2 107.4
Aug. 149.5 107.8
Sept. 149.9 107.8
Oct. 150.0 107.9
Nov. 150.8 108.8
Dec. 152.2 109.2
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Table A2 (cont.)
Date Wage Index Expectations of M L Retail
Wage Inflation Price Index
1965 Jan. 153.4 104.7
Feb. 153.6 104.8
March 154.5 109.9
Apri 1 155.3 112.0
May 156.0 112.4
June 157.2 112.7
July 159.5 112.7
Aug. 159.9 112.9
Sept. 160.2 113.0
Oct. 161.1 113.1
Nov. 162.1 113.6
Dec. 162.6 114.1
1966 Jan. 165.1 114.3
Feb. 165.6 114.4
March 167.7 114.6
April 167.7 116.0
May 167.8 116.8
June 168.7 117.1
July 169.7 116.6
Aug. 169.8 117.3
Sept. 169.8 117.1
Oct. 169.9 117.4
Nov. 169.9 118.1
Dec. 169.9 118.3
1967 Jan. 171.0 118.5
Feb. 171.3 3.57 2 118.6
March 171.9 3.44 1 118.6
April 172.1 3.71 1 119.5
May 173.1 4.03 2 119.4
June 173.3 4.24 1 119.9
July 176.7 4.47 1 119.2
Aug. 177.2 4.35 3 118.9
Sept. 178.1 4.23 2 118.8
Oct. 179.0 3.94 4 119.7
Nov. 179.8 4.02 3 120.4
Dec. 180.3 3.98 4 121.2
1968 Jan. 184.3 4.08 3 121.6
Feb. 184.9 4.18 6 122.2
March 185.3 4.30 8 122.6
April 185.6 4.28 10 124.8
May 185.8 3.82 13 124.9
June 186.0 3.91 19 125.4
July 187.1 4.02 10 125.5
Aug. 187.6 3.88 7 125.7
Sept. 188.3 4.20 6 125.8
Oct. 188.8 4.16 8 126.4
Nov. 190.7 4.09 8 126.7
Dec. 193.5 4.24 10 128.4
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Table A2 (cont■)
Date Wage Index Expectations of M L Retail
Wage Inflation Price Index
1969 Jan. 194.2 4.28 12 129.1
Feb. 194.7 4.17 11 129.8
March 195.0 4.27 8 130.3
April 195.2 4.32 6 131.7
May 195.5 4.68 8 131.5
June 196.1 4.69 5 132.1
July 197.0 4.87 11 132.1
Aug. 197.5 4.82 18 131.8
Sept. 198.9 4.82 18 132.2
Oct. 199.1 5.22 24 133.2
Nov. 200.8 5.43 19 133.5
Dec. 205.0 5.73 23 134.4
1970 Jan. 206.5 135.5
Feb. 209.4 136.2
March 211.1 137.0
April 211.8 139.1
May 214.3 139.5
June 215.8 139.9
July 217.5 140.9
Aug. 219.7 140.8
Sept. 221.3 141.5
Oct. 222.7 143.0
Nov. 228.8 . . 144.0
Dec. 233.3 145.0
1971 Jan. 237.1 147.0
Feb. 237.4 10.57 9 147.8
March 238.1 11.03 9 149.0
April 239.3 11.22 4 152.2
May 242.8 11.06 1 153.2
June 245.1 11.01 0 154.3
July 247.1 10.07 0 155.2
Aug. 248.6 9.69 0 155.3
Sept. 250.0 8.97 0 155.5
Oct. 250.7 8.82 0 156.4
Nov. 257.8 8.84 0 157.3
Dec. 262.6 8.50 1 158.1
1972 Jan. 265.2 8.53 1 159.0
Feb. 265.6 8.88 2 159.8
March 266.9 8.92 2 160.3
April 268.6 9.51 1 161.8
May 271.7 9.84 2 162.6
June 275.9 9.74 0 163.7
July 100.0 10.33 1 164.2
Aug. 103.5 10.51 1 165.5
Sept. 106.8 10.54 3 166.4
Oct. 107.6 10.89 3 168.7
Nov. 108.2 10.45 4 169.3
Dec. 108.4 9.18 5 170.2
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Table A2 (cont■)
Date Wage Index Expectations of M L  
Wage Inflation
Retail 
Price Index
1973 Jan. 108.4 8.77 6 171.3
Feb. 108.9 8.03 7 172.4
March 109.5 7.53 11 173.4
April 112.3 7.81 21 176.7
May 113.3 8.21 19 178.0
June 115.7 8.44 25 178.9
July 116.0 8.79 27 179.7
Aug. 119.7 9.70 29 180.2
Sept. 120.0 10.08 36 181.8
Oct. 120.3 10.10 46 185.4
Nov. 121.0 10.21 49 186.8
Dec. 122.0 10.22 45 188.2
1974 Jan. 123.7 10.14 38 191.8
Feb. 124.7 10.27 27 101.7
March 126.5 10.90 18 102.6
April 128.0 11.71 19 106.1
May 132.1 12.68 26 107.6
June 136.9 14.51 26 108.7
July 139.9 15.37 29 109.7
Aug. 145.6 16.92 31 109.8
Sept. 146.4 17.16 27 111.0
Oct. 148.7 16.88 34 113.2
Nov. 153.9 18.33 30 115.2
Dec. 158.0 18.94 24 116.9
1975 Jan. 159.8 119.9
Feb. 162.0 121.9
March 169.0 124.3
April 170.1 129.1
May 176.4 134.5
June 182.6 137.1
July 184.8 17.29 6 138.5
Aug. 185.6 15.65 6 139.3
Sept. 186.0 14.30 4 140.5
Oct. 187.5 14.17 0 142.5
Nov. 195.6 14.29 0 144.2
Dec. 198.2 14.61 0 146.0
1976 Jan. 202.1 14.57 0 147.9
Feb. 206.4 14.02 2 149.8
March 207.9 12.62 2 150.6
April 210.1 10.62 2 153.5
May 211.7 9.82 5 155.2
June 216.6 8.28 3 156.0
July 219.0 8.32 3 156.3
Aug. 219.1 8.38 3 158.5
Sept. 219.2 8.46 3 160.6
Oct. 219.5 8.99 4 163.5
Nov. 220.7 8.94 5 165.8
Dec. 221.5 9.67 5 168.0
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Table A2 (cont.)
Date Wage Index Expectations of M L  
Wage Inflation
Retail 
Price Index
1977 Jan. 223.8 172.4
Feb. 224.8 174.1
March 225.2 175.8
April 226.0 180.3
May 226.8 181.7
June 228.7 183.6
July 229.5
Note : The two indices have, where appropriate, been multipled by an
appropriate conversion factor when the base year is revised.
Sources : Wage Index and Retail Price Index, British Labour Statistics 
Yearbook (various issues) and Historical Abstract.
Expectations of Wage Inflation and M L , The Financial Times Survey of 
Business Opinion.
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Table A3 Data Used in Chapter 6
Date Expectations Standard
Deviation
N A
1967 June 4.7 1.79 27
Aug. 4.8 1.44 7
Oct. 4.0 1.19 5
Dec . 6.8 1.53 6
1968 Feb. 4.9 1.67 0
April 5.0 1.74 9
June 4.4 1.14 0
Aug. 6.3 1.62 1
Oct. 4.0 0.75 0
Dec. 4.6 1.32 0
1969 Feb. 4.7 1.41 2
April 6.4 1.69 0
June 4.6 1.73 4
Aug. 5.8 1.75 0
Oct. 4.4 1.59 0
1971 Dec. 00 CO 2.05 1
1972 Feb. 7.8 1.22 16
April 10.3 2.49 2
June 10.5 2.47 0
Aug. 9.1 2.32 0
Oct. 9.5 2.43 20
Dec. 9.3 2.39 41
1973 Feb. 7.7 4.10 6
April 6.0 2.28 12
June 8.0 1.95 7
Aug. 9.2 2.35 12
Oct. 9.7 2.49 3
Dec. 10.1 3.35 0
197-1 Feb. 11.5 2.02 17
April 12.8 4.42 4
June 16.8 4.86 19
Aug. 17.7 3.70 0
Oct. 18.8 4.04 0
Dec. 19.5 2.50 17
1975 Aug. 12.06 4.90 32
Oct. 12.50 1.48 8
Dec. 11.03 3.10 0
1976 Feb. 12.30 2.45 1
April 4.51 3.30 28
June 8.05 1.75 18
Aug. 9.90 6.19 0
Oct. 8.15 3.85 0
Dec. 11.55 5.95 0
Source: Financial Times Survey of Business Opinion.
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Table A4 Data Used in Chapters 7 and 8
Date Wage Index Vacancies Unemployment Expectations of 
Wage Inflation
1949(2) 110.6 289.1 283.9 2.200
(3) 111.0 294.3 244.3 1.950
(4) 111.4 238.1 309.2 1.510
1950(1) 112.0 241.1 351.4 1.020
(2) 112.2 254.5 293.9 0.870
(3) 112.5 253.1 262.5 1.350
(4) 116.0 233.5 293.8 2.950
1951(1) 119.4 264.4 291.2 4.375
(2) 121.2 326.2 211.1 6.197
(3) 123.8 321.0 183.1 7.360
(4) 128.7 228.2 247.6 7.457
1952(1) 130.6 201.4 318.6 6.957
(2) 131.8 225.7 308.6 6.097
(3) 133.7 202.7 302.4 4.747
(4) 136.3 159.1 359.9 3.933
1953(1) 137.8 169.1 381.2 3.273
(2) 138.0 199.6 308.0 3.317
(3) 139.3 210.3 261.2 3.123
(4) 140.4 184.0 304.4 3.043
1954(1) 142.0 187.7 343.5 3.187
(2) 145.1 241.2 263.4 3.263
(3) 145.7 252.0 211.6 3.360
(4) 146.9 226.9 245.3 3.700
1955(1) 152.0 245.2 261.8 4.077
(2) 155.5 302.3 198.4 4.377
(3) 156.1 310.2 169.3 4.590
(4) 157.3 261.9 206.3 4.903
1956(1) 103.7 257.3 242.0 5.167
(2) 105.4 266.6 206.3 5.377
(3) 106.0 242.4 203.6 5.360
(4) 106.4 198.4 251.7 4.593
1957(1) 107.6 168.5 341.4 3.980
(2) 110.7 197.4 282.7 4.010
(3) 111.6 204.1 239.2 4.067
(4) 112.5 169.5 294.1 3.900
1958(1) 113.0 147.1 382.8 3.260
(2) 113.8 147.6 382.1 2.997
(3) 115.1 136.1 376.0 2.930
(4) 116.7 114.8 466.7 2.760
1959(1) 117.1 117.5 522.5 2.443
(2) 117.2 154.1 430.9 1.830
(3) 117.8 183.5 370.9 1.310
(4) 118.1 172.6 406.9 1.563
1960(1) 121.1 180.2 418.9 2.083
(2) 122.4 223.3 330.5 2.713
(3) 123.8 236.7 280.9 3.557
(4) 125.9 207.4 318.5 3.890
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Tableï M j c o n t )
Date Earnings
1949(2) 5.90
(3) 5.95
(4) 5.99
1950(1) 6.11
(2) 6.22
(3) 6.34
(4) 6.45
1951(1) 6.64
(2) 6.73
(3) 6.85
(4) 6.96
1952(1) 7.10
(2) 7.44
(3) 7.54
(4) 7.64
1953(1) 7.82
(2) 8.05
(3) 8.11
(4) 8.17
1954(1) 8.33
(2) 8.47
(3) 8.60
(4) 8.73
1955(1) 8.97
(2) 9.17
(3) 9.27
(4) 9.38
1956(1) 9.60
(2) 9.83
(3) 9.88
(4) 9.93
1957(1) 9.98
(2) 10.02
(3) 10.25
(4) 10.40
1958(1) 10.42
(2) 10.37
(3) 10.42
(4) 10.47
1959(1) 10.56
(2) 10.86
(3) 11.00
(4) 11.14
1960(1) 11.35
(2) 11.55
(3) 11.69
(4) 11.82
Benefits Profits
1.3 458
1.3 461
1.3 479
1.3 496
1.3 514
1.3 532
1.3 554
1.3 576
1.3 599
1.3 621
1.3 602
1.3 583
1.3 564
1.625 545
1.625 553
1.625 562
1.625 570
1.625 578
1.625 595
1.625 611
1.625 628
1.625 644
1.625 664
1.625 720
2.0 706
2.0 730
2.0 730
2.0 743
2 .0 727
2.0 715
2 .0 743
2 .0 747
2.0 770
2.0 789
2.0 769
2.5 741
2.5 718
2.5 741
2.5 783
2.5 727
2.5 819
2.5 849
2.5 922
2.5 961
2.5 932
2.5 926
2.5 911
G.D.P.
2696
2736
2763
2791
2818
2845
2926
3007
3088
3168
3240
3313
3385
3457
3525
3592
3660
3727
3780
3833
3885
3938
4009
4119
4069
4311
4395
4482
4520
4569
4718
4729
4794
4885
4982
5057
4973
5086 
5088
5087 
5288 
5331 
5530
5563
5557
5653
5842
Table A4 (cont.)
Date Nurses Working
Population
Str
1949(1) 22982
(2) 26431 22982 179
(3) 25784 22982 129
(4) 24490 22982 120
1950(1) 23036 22982 155
(2) 22049 22982 151
(3) 21490 23057 125
(4) 20913 23075 130
1951(1) 20600 23188 177
(2) 20448 23239 249
(3) 20225 23329 217
(4) 19678 23325 167
1952(1) 18835 23389 166
(2) 18630 23357 210
(3) 18623 23355 167
(4) 18478 23324 152
1953(1) 18264 23353 207
(2) 18041 23444 173
(3) 18129 23531 172
(4) 17944 23602 215
1954(1) 17597 23669 242
(2) 17824 23720 248
(3) 18144 23825 210
(4) 18077 23873 245
1955(1) 18123 23914 258
(2) 18519 23932 341
(3) 18746 24073 292
(4) 19145 24114 332
1956(1) 19721 24115 327
(2) 19821 24156 313
(3) 19562 24274 291
(4) 19084 24224 259
1957(1) 18875 24204 293
(2) 19183 24246 352
(3) 19464 24220 294
(4) 19299 24184 318
1958(1) 18960 24078 373
(2) 18577 24117 285
(3) 18386 24115 299
(4) 18209 24131 271
1959(1) 17883 24187 225
(2) 17750 24196 300
(3) 17562 24364 202
(4) 17362 24390 219
1960(1) 17355 24524 386
(2) 17580 24526 338
(3) 17867 24620 323
(4) 18152 24761 279
■____
Table A4 (cont. )
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Date Retail Expectations of
Price Index Price Inflation
1949(2) 108.9 2.38
(3) 111.1 2.42
(4) 111.7 2.53
1950(1) 112.6 2.37
(2) 113.5 2.15
(3) 113.6 2.15
(4) 113.9 2.56
1951(1) 116.2 4.02
(2) 119.2 5.81
(3) 124.5 6.55
(4) 127.9 7 .04
1952(1) 130.2 7.00
(2) 133.3 6.21
(3) 137.7 5.22
(4) 136.5 4.65
1953(1) 138.5 4.12
(2) 139.7 3.61
(3) 141.2 3.04
(4) 140.1 2.52
1954(1) 139.9 2.17
(2) 141.2 2.11
(3) 142.2 2.21
(4) 143.4 2.33
1955(1) 145.5 2 51
(2) 146.0 2.75
(3) 149.6 3.08
(4) 150 .0 3.45
1956(1) 154.0 3.61
(2) 155.4 3.52
(3) 157.1 3.33
(4) 156.6 3.08
1957(1) 158.6 2.93
(2) 159.7 2.97
(3) 162.1 3.00
(4) 162.8 3 .01
1958(1) 166.0 2.92
(2) 166.3 2.61
(3) 169.0 2.37
(4) 166.3 2.06
1959(1) 169.0 1.43
(2) 169.2 1.16
(3) 167.7 0.89
(4) 166.7 0.69
1960(1) 169.0 0.76
(2) 168.3 0.86
(3) 170.1 1.00
(4) 169.5 1.20
VTable A4 (cont.)
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Date Wage Index Vacancies Unemployment Expectations of 
Wage Inflation
1961(1) 128.6 201.0 336.8 4.073
(2) 130.4 241.2 282.1 4.200
(3) 131.0 236.3 261.8 4.127
(4) 132.4 174.8 338.9 3.947
1962(1) 134.2 150.2 407.6 3.843
(2) 135.9 171.8 386.7 3.793
(3) 137.6 156.1 390.0 3.713
(4) 138.8 119.6 491.0 3.483
1963(1) 139.7 113.3 626.7 2.893
(2) 141.1 147.2 504.2 2.210
(3) 141.7 157.1 428.0 2.343
(4) 145.1 157.5 450.3 2.613
1964(1) 146.5 182.1 445.1 2.913
(2) 148.6 230.1 355.4 3.270
(3) 149.9 242.4 310.4 3.413
(4) 152.2 228.6 336.0 3.563
1965(1) 154.5 233.2 353.3 3.790
(2) 157.2 287.8 292.6 4.130
(3) 160.2 284.5 276.6 4.433
(4) 162.6 255.0 311.1 4.780
1966(1) 167.4 260.0 322.6 4.880
(2) 168.7 295.0 271.1 4.510
(3) 169.8 272.3 277.7 3.630
(4) 169.9 192.1 422.5 2.520
1967(1) 171.9 168.5 527.0 2.067
(2) 173.3 181.5 491.4 2.470
(3) 178.1 177.9 478.8 3.293
(4) 180.3 168.2 542.2 4.140
1968(1) 185.3 166.8 586.2 4.430
(2) 186.0 194.2 531.3 4.297
(3) 188.3 197.8 499.3 4.350
(4) 193.5 193.2 536.7 4.197
1969(1) 195.0 187.6 572.7 4.123
(2) 196.1 211.6 509.5 4.117
(3) 198.9 208.6 492.1 4.203
(4) 205.0 190.4 548.6 4.627
1970(1) 211.1 181.5 603.5 5.473
(2) 215.8 197.5 552.3 6.670
(3) 221.3 194.0 532.2 7.853
(4) 233.3 170.3 583.2 8.390
1971(1) 238.1 137.4 681.7 8.740
(2) 245.1 136.9 699.1 8.943
(3) 250.0 128.3 734.5 9 .010
(4) 262.6 113.4 832.5 9.083
-301-
Table A4 (cont.)
Date Earnings
1961(1) 11.92
(2) 12.02
(3) 12.09
(4) 12.18
1962(1) 12.27
(2) 12.36
(3) 12.45
(4) 12.54
1963(1) 12.65
(2) 12.86
(3) 13.02
(4) 13.15
1964(1) 13.44
(2) 13.72
(3) 13.90
(4) 14.03
1965(1) 14.33
(2) 14.36
(3) 14.51
(4) 14.82
1966(1) 14.97
(2) 15.27
(3) 15.30
(4) 15.25
1967(1) 15.22
(2) 15.45
(3) 15.76
(4) 15.87
1968(1) 16.28
(2) 16.47
(3) 16.69
(4) 16.93
1969(1) 17.27
(2) 17.54
(3) 17.77
(4) 18.17
1970(1) 18.31
(2) 18.90
(3) 19.40
(4) 19.98
1971(1) 20.60
(2) 21.29
(3) 21.87
(4) 22.18
Benefits Profits
2.5 934
2.875 920
2.875 911
2.875 874
2.875 855
2.875 886
2.875 921
2.875 933
2.875 833
3.375 1038
3.375 1075
3.375 1157
3.375 1110
3.375 1149
3.375 1142
3.375 1143
4.0 1200
4.0 1182
4.0 1178
4.0 1181
4.0 1154
4.0 1131
4.0 1158
7.75 1149
7.75 1111
8.05 1181
8.05 1093
8.55 1240
8.55 1280
8.95 1273
8.95 1349
8.95 1352
8.95 1357
9.45 1432
9.45 1447
9.95 1432
9.95 1429
10.65 1436
10.65 1462
10.65 1603
10.65 1604
11.75 1690
11.75 1691
12.75 1710
G.D.P.
5970
5929
6230
6069
6158
6329
6345
6420
6373
6721
6778
6991
7008
7625
7359
7550
7609
7691
7908
8004
8108
8223
8348
8404
8621
8708
8823
8725
9171
9175
9500
9544
9616
9719
9909
10094
10311
10751
10492
11364
11544
12023
12658
12926
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Table A4 (cont.)
Date Nurses
1961(1) 18708
(2) 19368
(3) 19499
(4) 19262
1962(1) 19200
( 2)
(3)
(4)
1963(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1964(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1965(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1966(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1967(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1968(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1969(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1970(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1971(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Working Strik
Population
24835 328
24773 371
24916 277
24849 252
25002 318
25046 285
25153 217
25097 189
25060 175
25138 230
25207 226
25275 230
25189 273
25268 338
25440 260
25471 264
25410 308
25463 303
25553 235
25636 217
25532 326
25584 237
25698 125
25554 106
25343 199
25402 211
25538 238
25400 237
25238 209
25253 273
25349 326
25314 265
24220 287
25236 357
25312 347
25243 428
25181 656
25082 675
25141 487
25091 312
24828 267
24874 262
24896 253
24935 175
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Table A4 (cont.)
Date Retail 
Price Index
Expectations of 
Price Inflation
1961(1) 172.1 1.49
(2) 172.9 1.87
(3) 175.8 2.20
(4) 177.2 2.60
1962(1) 179.6 2.92
(2) 181.1 2.82
(3) 185.5 2.65
(4) 182.9 2.52
1963(1) 184.4 1.99
(2) 186.9 1.81
(3) 187.3 1.72
(4) 186.2 1.63
1964(1) 187.8 1.82
(2) 189.6 2.14
(3) 193.6 2.43
(4) 194.3 2.69
1965(1) 196.8 2.92
(2) 198.1 3 .07
(3) 203.1 3.13
(4) 203.7 3.12
1966(1) 205.7 3.06
(2) 206.6 3.00
(3) 211.1 2.96
(4) 211.1 2.72
1967(1) 213.2 2.25
(2) 213.8 1.92
(3) 216.1 1.90
(4) 214.3 2.67
1968(1) 218.5 2.39
(2) 221.0 2.80
(3) 226.0 3.15
(4) 226.7 3.49
1969(1) 231.4 3.59
(2) 234.9 3.65
(3) 238.1 3.67
(4) 238.3 3.74
1970(1) 242.2 3.94
(2) 246.9 4.26
(3) 252.2 4.74
(4) 255.0 5.35
1971(1) 261.4 5.99
(2) 268.6 6.29
(3) 278.1 6.24
(4) 280.3 5.62
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Table A4(cont^2
Date Wage Index Vacancies
Unemployment Expectations of 
Wage Inflation
1972(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1973(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1974(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1975(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
266.9
275.9
106.8
108.4
109.5
115.7
120.0
122.0
126.5
136.9 
146.4
158.0
169.0
182.6
186.0
198.2
111.1
141.8
154.8
173.2
216.3
299.0
341.6
358.7
272.9
319.3
313.4
285.0
179.3
165.5
139.8
114.6
917.0
824.8
769.8
752.3
716.3
590.9
523.9
491.8
592.4
538.0
561.7
605.1
747.1
799.1
937.3
1077.8
9.177
9.977
10.257
10.313
10.683
10.443
10.173
10.087
10.583 
12.160 
14.857 
17.703
19.470 
19.550 
19.050 
18.827
"_
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Table A4 (cont.)
Date Earnings
1972(1) 22.60
(2) 24.47
(3) 25.05
(4) 26.31
1973(1) 26.81
(2) 27.70
(3) 28.86
(4) 29.67
1974(1) 29.06
(2) 29.90
(3) 32.24
(4) 33.63
1975(1) 35.68
(2) 36.70
(3) 38.91
(4) 39.98
Benefits Profits
12.75 1632
13.00 1830
13.00 1954
13.75 2053
13.75 2203
13.75 2226
13.75 2426
14.35 2378
15.10 2457
15.18 2460
16.35 2551
16.35 2494
17.15 2401
18.35 2335
18.35 2314
18.35 2627
G.D.P.
13180
13509
13815
14454
15795
15451
15900
16346
16530
17541
19511
20070
21697
22733
23656
24992
Table A4 (cont.)
Date Nurses
1972(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1973(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1974(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1975(1)
(2 )
(3)
(4)
Working Stri
Population
25075 224
25003 389
25209 326
25272 320
25416 298
25359 320
25421 286
25386 328
25332 237
25409 523
25662 386
25662 443
25494 314
25633 417
25917 245
25893 113
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Table A4 (cont.)
Date Retail 
Price Index
1972(1) 285.0
(2) 288.9
(3) 295.1
(4) 299.9
1973(1) 306.8
(2) 312.5
(3) 322.5
(4) 327.7
1974(1) 339.2
(2) 354.7
(3) 375.8
(4) 383.7
1975(1) 404.1
(2) 429.7
(3) 474.0
(4) 485.7
Note : The two indices
Expectations of 
Price Inflation
4.66
4.70
4.94
5.22
5.58
5.92
6.48
7.60
9.20
10.10
11.09
12.19
14.06
15.55
16.13
15.43
where a p p r o p r i a t e ,been multiplied by a conversion
factor when the base year is revised
For further details on this data see the a
ppendix at the end of chapter 7
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